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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to develop models and provide evidence about the impacts of family-
related ownership, governance and powerful management players’ characteristics on 
corporate performance, both financial and social, of listed companies in India. In relation to 
financial performance, some, but not all of these impacts have been studied in various 
contexts with inconsistent findings. The country context is found to make a difference. 
Although there is a substantial body of literature on the relationships between family control 
and other governance characteristics and corporate financial performance, there is much less 
prior research on how these factors relate to corporate social (including environmental) 
performance.  
This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance in 
family businesses by filling several gaps in the evidence currently available, especially 
concerning effects on corporate social performance. It does so by designing and testing a 
comprehensive set of models. These models contain several aspects lacking from prior 
empirical research about family controlling status, family-impacted governance mechanisms 
and family-positioned key management players and their effects on financial and social 
performance. The thesis also provides first-time evidence in the context of a large emerging 
economy, India. Large listed family-controlled companies in India have the distinctive 
characteristics of a dominance of family business groups owned by culturally-identified 
‘trading communities’, and for several mega-size corporations, the presence of a long family 
succession with fourth or fifth generation family members establishing their unique 
management culture that emphasises the recruitment of loyal executives and strict control of 
powerful patriarchs over both the family and business. Using over 12000 observations 
collected from a sample of the 300 largest family-controlled companies listed on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange in 2010, this thesis applies several quantitative techniques including 
regression analysis to investigate the abovementioned relationships. Results reveal a number 
of significant effects on financial as compared to effects on social performance. First, in terms 
of family control through ownership or status, the family shareholding is positively related to 
financial performance but has a significant negative effect on social performance. For family 
status, its reputation significantly relates to financial performance but has no impact on social 
performance. The family founder’s presence on the board has a negative impact on both 
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financial and social performance. However, family companies owned by longer succeeding 
generations are significantly associated with better social performance. Second, in terms of 
family-impacted board governance mechanisms, this thesis finds that outsiders’ presence on 
the board have a significant positive impact on social performance. Further, higher numbers 
of board committees are positively related to both financial and social performance. Third, in 
terms of the impacts of normative influences of family-positioned powerful management 
players, this thesis finds that demographic characteristics of family chairpersons have more 
impact on financial and social performance as compared to family CEOs. Also those 
chairpersons and CEOs with greater outside connections and holding a foreign qualification 
have a positive influence on social performance, where as those holding an MBA 
qualification have a negative impact on both financial and social performance. 
After cautioning for the modelling and measurement limitations underlying these findings, 
there are several insights provided by them that can have implications for controlling family 
members, as well as corporate governance regulators in India. First, controlling family 
members need to address the issue of better integration of company performance since 
companies with higher family ownership are found to have significantly poorer social 
performance relative to financial performance. Family members should also question the need 
for the family founder to have a presence on the board since this is found to negatively affect 
both financial and social performance. Second, corporate governance regulators, when 
reviewing guidelines and regulations, should consider requiring an increase in the number of 
board committees, since this is found to positively affect both financial and social 
performance of listed family-controlled companies. Further, regulators might consider 
guidelines on the educational qualifications of chairpersons and CEOs that encourage a 
foreign qualification, but not an MBA.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and statement of the problem 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the background and motivation for this thesis. The 
chapter sets out objectives of this study and provides a discussion leading to the research 
questions to be investigated. It also provides justification for selecting India and large family-
controlled businesses as the context of the study.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section covers background information and 
a statement of the problem. The second section discusses the motivation and significance of 
this study. This section also contains a justification for the choice of context. The third section 
presents objectives of this study and also discusses research questions to be investigated for 
achieving these objectives. Finally the fourth section briefly outlines the structure of the body 
of the thesis followed by conclusion. 
As a scholarly field of inquiry, the area of family business research is relatively new despite 
the fact that family businesses have been the backbone of corporate life across nations around 
the globe (Poutziouris et al. 2006). One of the biggest issues which have retarded the pace of 
family business research is the problem of finding a universally accepted definition of family 
business. The family business research area is large and diverse. Past researchers (mainly 
quantitative) have studied several issues related to the accounting discipline in this area such 
as family business and governance, family business and financial performance and family 
business and accounting conservatism. Recently some studies have started looking at the 
social and environmental performance of family businesses.  
Firm ownership structure and its impact on financial performance have been addressed widely 
in the family business and governance literature predominantly in the context of developed 
economies, particularly the US and UK (Demsetz 1983; McConaughy et al. 1998; McConnell 
& Serveas 1990; Shleifer & Vishny 1986). From an agency theory perspective, prior studies 
drawing on Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesize that family 
control reduces agency cost, thereby leading to better financial performance. In contrast, other 
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behavioural studies draw conclusions that family firms suffer from capital restriction, 
intergenerational squabbles, executive entrenchment and nepotism which would have a 
negative impact on firm financial performance (e.g. Allen & Panian 1982; Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2003; Schulze et al.2001, 2003). Empirical results primarily from the US show that the 
composite financial performance measure, Tobin’s Q, of listed companies founded and 
controlled by a family is greater than other types of ownership and control (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Barontini & Caprio 2006). In contrast, empirical studies 
conducted in Europe and Asia find that family firms have a negative effect on financial 
performance. These different conclusions about the influence of family on firm financial 
performance indicate that in different regions it would be expected that different cultural, 
economic and business environments play a role in the success of the family mode of business 
ownership and governance. Hence, findings need to be interpreted in a context-specific way. 
The impact of family control on corporate ‘social’ performance (defined in the wider sense of 
social responsibility-related performance that includes both social and environmental 
dimensions) is a relatively new area of research. There is a paucity of systematic empirical 
evidence about the effect of family ownership/control and governance on corporate social 
performance. Large Indian family businesses have a long tradition of involvement with 
communities through social charity, religious affiliation and environmental concern. But 
minimal theory or evidence has been published about those characteristics of large Indian 
family businesses that can explain the level of social responsibility performed by those 
companies. Hence, this literature has several unresearched aspects of the relationships 
between family-related control, board governance and top management characteristics and 
corporate social performance. This makes it a fertile ground for a research contribution.  
In order to address gaps in aspects of this literature, this thesis seeks to develop a 
comprehensive set of models on the effects of family control (through ownership and status), 
family-impacted governance mechanisms and family-positioned key management’s 
characteristics on corporate performance, both financial and social, of listed companies in 
India. Furthermore, this thesis develops a schema of the way these family-related factors 
contribute to the integration or decoupling of the firm’s financial and social performance.  
1.2 Motivation and significance 
The first motivation for conducting this research is that there has been very little prior 
research on Indian family businesses despite their strong national and global economic 
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contribution. Prior studies have consistently recognised the lack of research in the area. 
Ramachandran (2007) states that Indian family businesses are still like a black box and lack 
quality investigations for explaining particular behaviours displayed by these family 
businesses. He further states that most of the research literature available for Indian family 
businesses is in the form of biographies and consultant impressions (Piramal 1997, 1998; 
Dutta 1997) and lacks more generalizable empirical evidence on the impact of family-related 
factors on financial performance. Therefore, the context of India as a rapidly emerging 
economy with historically unique family values and culture will provide a contribution to the 
existing literature on financial performance of family businesses. 
The second reason for conducting this research is to investigate family influences on 
corporate governance practices in Indian family businesses and how these governance 
practices affect company performance. Governance of family owned companies can be 
different from governance of companies with other forms of ownership. Sir Adrian Cadbury 
(2000a, p.5) also recognises this fact and states “It is essential at the outset to recognise that 
the governance of a family firm is in many ways more complex than the governance of a firm 
with no family involvement. Family relationships have to be managed in addition to business 
relationships”.   
Although the relationships between family-impacted governance and financial performance 
have been studied in developed economies primarily in the US and Europe, these results are 
country and culture specific as family values and family networks differs across different 
cultures. Therefore, investigating the effects of family-impacted governance factors on 
financial performance in a large emerging economy will be a contribution to the existing 
corporate governance literature. 
Third, there has been very little empirical research investigating the role of corporate 
governance for achieving social and environmental performance. The present era of corporate 
philanthropy and triple bottom line reporting has broadened the corporate governance 
definition used in the past. Sir Adrian Cadbury (2000b, p.6) describes this broadened 
definition of corporate governance as “Corporate governance is concerned with holding the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals. The 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations, and society.’’ 
Levy (1999) takes a similar view and argues that corporate philanthropy and social initiatives 
taken by organisations for the welfare of society are the heart and soul of business. Similarly, 
other researchers such as Dilling (2010) and Painter-Morland (2006) have also recognised the 
 6 
 
importance of corporate governance in achieving goals of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Although the past literature has conceptually addressed the link between governance 
variables and financial performance, the effects of governance on the interrelation between 
financial, economic and social performance do not appear to have been empirically 
investigated.  No study could be found that provides empirical evidence on the relationship 
between governance variables and corporate performance in the combined dimensions of 
financial, social and environmental performance. This thesis seeks to provide such empirical 
evidence on the relationships between corporate board governance mechanisms and both 
financial and social (including environmental) performance in the context of large listed 
Indian family businesses. 
Fourth, relatively less attention has been paid by past research on the relationship between 
ownership structure and social or environmental performance. The available literature is 
dominated by conceptual or normative arguments on this topic, with a lack of consensus on 
the expected direction of the relationship between family ownership and social-environmental 
performance. Indian family businesses have a long tradition of involvement with communities 
through social charity, religious affiliations and environmental concerns, but the motivation of 
Indian family businesses for their involvement with the community is not well understood. 
Recently, Indian family businesses have changed their focus from local charity to wider 
philanthropy and have added many new philanthropic activities such as environmental 
conservation and preservation of history and art in their portfolio of corporate social 
responsibilities (Ramachandran and Jha, 2009). This study seeks to provide new evidence on 
the relationship between Indian family ownership and a composite corporate social and 
environmental performance index, derived from broad international criteria.   
Fifth, prior studies have largely neglected the impacts of powerful actors on financial, social 
and environmental performance. In the Indian context family patriarchs are accorded a 
powerful role in both the family and business, and have additional responsibility to look after 
both family and business welfare. Therefore, normative influences of these powerful actors on 
financial, social and environmental performance are expected to be significant. Prior studies 
have conducted cross-disciplinary research (mainly based on organisational behaviour and 
psychology literature) to explain how the cognitive processes of key players in the upper 
echelons of management can affect their firm’s financial and social performance. These 
cognitions are proxied by demographic and experiential characteristics of the upper echelons 
players. However, findings from this upper echelons theory have differed in different contexts 
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(Hosmer 1982; Mintzberg 1978; Hambrick & Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007; Manner 2010). 
This thesis invokes upper echelons theory to add to its modelling of family-related influences 
on firm performance by investigating the effects of demographic characteristics of the 
family/non-family Chairperson and CEO. 
Finally, minimal attention has been given by governance researchers to providing evidence on 
the family-related factors affecting the ability of a firm to integrate rather than decouple its 
financial and social performance. Integrated and decoupled performance at the workplace 
level from the perspective of the management of internal organisational processes and policies 
has been addressed widely in the management literature (Weaver et al.1999; Grayson & 
Hodges 2004; Porter & Kramer 2006). This thesis extends the application of concepts of 
integrated and decoupled performance beyond the field of internal management to the field of 
corporate-wide governance and performance. 
1.3 India as a context for the study 
India provides a rich context for a study on the effects of a controlling family on the financial 
and social performance of large listed companies. Private sector business in India is heavily 
dominated by family groups. As Dutta (1997) establishes from a survey conducted in 1993, 
out of 297,000 companies in India only 3,000 were non-family controlled businesses. He 
contends that family business is critically important for Indian society as it is a primary 
supplier of goods and services, user and creator of economic resources and major creator of 
jobs for the population. He argues that “for Indians, family business is not merely an 
economic structure but a social identity” (p.91). He explains that it is a social obligation on 
coming generations to successfully operate the business initiated by previous family 
generations, and this success earns social prestige for them in the community. He further 
argues that “family traditions, community restrictions, superiority of relationship and male 
dominance are some factors that make Indian family business different from Western and 
other global counterparts.” (p. 102). These peculiar characteristics of Indian family business 
make them different from their Western counterparts on which most of the family business 
research has been conducted. In India importance has not been given to this area of research 
despite the fact that 60-70% of Indian GDP is generated by Indian family businesses. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to redress some of this deficiency in evidence about family-related 
control and governance effects on the financial and social performance of these large firms in 
India. 
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Although India inherited its corporate governance framework from British company law, 
serious corporate governance reforms started taking place after economic liberalisation in 
1991. Corporate governance became a well-known term in India after a series of scandals in 
1992 and 1993 (Goswami 2000). In India, corporate governance reforms are comparatively 
new compared to developed economies where most of the corporate governance research has 
been conducted. Moreover, in India, implementation of corporate governance regulation has 
also been influenced by the existence of excessive concentration of ownership, a slow and 
tedious Indian court system, and relatively high corruption. Gollakota and Gupta (2006) call 
for the urgent conduct of research that enables better understanding of governance structures 
and practices in India. This thesis seeks to respond to this urgent call. In doing so, it first 
needs to review the history of development of the corporate governance system in India. Then 
the modelling and testing of family-related governance structures and practices will be 
pursued.  
The choice of India as the context of this study can also be supported by its current and 
growing economic importance. The Indian economy along with Brazil, Russia and China has 
a major influence on the world economy. Family businesses are important drivers of the 
Indian economy contributing to 60-70% of Indian GDP1. Data released by the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) in the year 2010 reveals a strong flow of foreign direct investment in the Indian 
capital market dominated by the presence of family businesses. Therefore, India as a context 
for this study can help foreign institutional and individual investors to understand corporate 
governance mechanism in listed Indian family controlled businesses. 
 
1.4 Objectives 
This thesis has four primary objectives. 
(1) To investigate the relationship between family control (based on ownership and status) 
and financial and social performance of listed Indian family controlled firms. 
(2) To investigate the relationship between family-impacted governance (mainly board) 
mechanisms and financial and social performance of Indian listed family controlled firms.  
                                                             
1http://www.fmblinks.org/article/globalisation-of-indian-family-managed-businesses-at-the-crossroads 
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(3) To investigate the influence of cognitive pre-dispositions of key powerful management 
players (i.e., Chairperson and CEO) on the financial and social performance of listed Indian 
family controlled firms. 
 (4) To extend the workplace and internal management studies on the phenomenon of 
integrating and decoupling financial and social performance, to a study that provides findings 
at the firm-wide governance and performance level.  
The overall objective of this thesis is to develop models and provide findings from which 
inferences can be drawn about the effects of family controlling status, family-related 
governance and power management players’ demographic characteristics on financial and 
social performance of listed family-controlled companies in India.  
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the above objectives this thesis addresses the following research questions: 
RQ 1: What is the impact of family controlling status (family reputation, family shareholding, 
family generation, family business group affiliation, family social background) on financial 
and social performance, whether as decoupled or integrated performance, of listed family 
firms in India? 
RQ 2: What is the impact of family-related and other board governance characteristics (family 
CEO, family chair, founder on board, family members on board, gender diversity, insiders’ 
involvement, outsiders’ involvement, insiders’ reputation, outsiders reputation, board size, 
board independence, board philosophy, CEO duality, total no. of committees,  board meeting 
frequency) on financial and social performance, whether as decoupled and integrated 
performance, of  listed family firms in India?  
RQ3: What is the impact of the normative influences of powerful management players, 
namely, the CEO and Chairperson, (their reputation, extent of education, holding an MBA, 
humanities/science-engineering/business qualification, foreign qualification, age, career 
experience, and tenure) on financial and social performance, whether as decoupled or 
integrated performance, of listed family firms in India? 
1.6 Organisation of this thesis 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters given below: 
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Following chapter 1 Introduction, Chapter 2 reviews family business definitional ambiguities 
and peculiar characteristics of Indian family businesses which distinguish them from their 
global counterparts. This chapter also aims to provide a brief history and current state of the 
corporate governance environment in India. 
Chapter 3 reviews past studies in detail, identifies the gaps in the literature and provides 
theoretical constructs and the scope of the investigation to be pursued. This chapter also 
addresses the theories which have been used to rationalize the expected relationships between 
family ownership, board governance and family managers’ demographic characteristics and 
the financial, social and environmental performance of family owned and managed firms.   
Chapter 4 proposes a conceptual framework aimed at investigating the impacts of family 
control, board governance and top managements’ demographic characteristics on financial 
and social performance of listed Indian family firms. This chapter also poses research 
questions arising from the research gaps identified in chapter 3. It also discusses the 
theoretical basis of the relationship between variables covered in the research questions. 
Chapter 5 explains the research methods used in this thesis for modelling and gathering data 
about the impacts of family control, board governance and powerful managers’ demographic 
characteristics on financial and social performance of listed Indian family firms. It covers a 
detailed discussion of sample selection, data sources, research models and quantitative 
techniques used in this thesis. 
Chapter 6 provides the results of data analysis. This chapter also contains a detailed 
discussion on the findings and compares the findings with prior literature. It also contains a 
detailed discussion on the research contribution of this thesis. 
Chapter 7 summarizes overall findings, highlights the limitations of these findings, and draws 
implications for theory and practice. This chapter also covers the contribution of this thesis 
and suggests directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONTEXT OF FAMILY BUSINESSES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explore family business definitional ambiguities and peculiar 
characteristics of Indian family businesses which distinguish them from their global 
counterparts. This chapter also aims to provide a brief history and the current status of 
corporate governance in India. 
There is a large body of literature in family businesses, but most of the prior studies are 
conducted in Western countries particularly in the USA and UK. Recently, empirical studies 
have been emerging on Asian family businesses (mainly from China, Japan and Taiwan) 
covering the family impact on financial performance. Ramachandran (2007) states that Indian 
family businesses are still like a black box because there is a lack of systematic rigorous 
research about the governance and management behaviour that can explain the success of 
family businesses in India. He further states that most of the research literature available for 
Indian family businesses is in the form of biographies and consultant impressions (Piramal 
1997, 1998; Dutta, 1997) and this research lacks availability of empirical evidence on the 
impact of Indian family businesses on financial performance. 
India has inherited its corporate governance framework from British company law and is 
considered having a sounder governance system compared to other major emerging 
economies such as Brazil, China and Russia (Chakrabarti et al. 2008). The Indian corporate 
governance framework makes provision for best investor protection on paper but the Satyam 
scandal of 2009 raised a number of weaknesses in the implementation of corporate 
governance rules and regulations in India because of slow and overburdened courts, and 
significant corruption (GMI governance ratings 2011; Chakrabarti et al. 2008). But rapid 
economic change inducing record growth in foreign direct investment and expansion of 
Indian companies into Western markets is pushing both the Government of India and Indian 
companies to have international standing in their governance systems. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section covers a literature 
review of prior research related to the nature and definition of family firms. The second 
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section gives an insight into the history of family business in India and peculiar characteristics 
of Indian family businesses which differentiate them from family firms in other countries. The 
final section covers the regulatory and enforcement environments of corporate governance in 
India. 
2.2 Definition of family firms 
Handler (1989) includes ‘defining the family firm’ as one of the five methodological issues 
critical to the development of family firms’ research. He argues that “defining the family firm 
is the first and most obvious challenge facing the family business researcher” (p.258). 
Limited research was conducted in this area before 1975 as only three theorists Christensen 
(1953), Donnelley (1964) and Levinson (1971) were involved in conducting active research in 
this area ( Handler 1989). Littunen and Hyrsky (2000) and Colli (2003) also mention the lack 
of a widely accepted definition of family firms.  
Fig 2.1: Shankar and Astrachen’s (1996) criterion to define family firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 (Source: Shankar & Astrachen 1996)  
Shankar and Astrachen (1996) have also commented about the definitional ambiguities in 
prior research in defining family firms. They indicate that most of the research in the family 
business area is less than 10 year old and there is no standard or formula for distinguishing a 
family firm from non-family firm. They classify the criteria used in defining family firms into 
three groups: broad, middle and narrow.  Narrow and middle definitions only classify firms as 
family firms if a founder or descendants or a founder’s family members are directly involved 
in the business. Broader definitions add those firms where family is not directly involved in 
the business but they have effective control in decision making through stock ownership or 
board involvement. Fig 2.1, illustrates Shankar and Astrachen’s (1996) classification scheme.                                
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Generally, the term family firm refers to those firms where a family has significant control 
over formulation of policies and management of a company. Family control over a firm is 
associated with a large family shareholding and/or top management position occupied by 
family members. Literature on the definition of a family firm is widely diverse and there is 
little consensus among researchers. Researchers in the past have considered factors such as 
family shareholding, voting rights, presence of family members on the board and family CEO. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Anderson et al. (2003) consider fractional equity ownership of 
the founding family, family members in the board, and the presence of the founder or 
descendent of the founder as CEO. Ang et al. (2000) characterise a firm as a family firm if a 
single family controls more than 50% of the company’s shares while Barth et al. (2005) 
propose at least 33% control. Barontini and Caprio (2006) classify a firm as family firm if the 
largest shareholders have more than 10% of ownership rights and control more than 51% of 
voting rights. They also consider issues such as family Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
family members on the board and the founder’s presence. In contrast Gomez-Mejia et al. 
(2003) consider control of at least 5% of voting rights and two or more related directors on the 
board. La Porta et al. (1999) consider control of more than 20% of indirect and direct voting 
rights. Fahlenbrach (2009) and McConaughy et al. (1998) consider the presence of the 
founder or cofounder or family CEO to characterise a firm as a family firm. Other researchers 
such as Morck et al. (1988) and Claessens et al. (2000) consider top positions held by family 
members or those having blood or marriage relationship with the dominant family to define 
family firm. Villalonga and Amit (2006) characterise a family firm by the founder or member 
of the founding family being an officer or director or an owner with more than 5% of firm 
equity. Miller et al. (2007) define a family firm by the numbers of members from same family 
that are involved in the firm as managers or owners during the same period of time or over 
time. Saito (2008) define a firm as family firm if the founder or descendent is president or 
Chairperson and/or the family has largest shareholding in the firm.  
Table 2.1 illustrates a number of definitions of family businesses used by past researchers 
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   Table 2.1: Definitions of family businesses 
 S
N 
Researcher Year Definition of family firm 
1 Burch  1972 Criteria for defining family firms-                              
1-   4-5% or more voting stocks are held by a 
family or group of families or one affluent 
individual 
2-   Inside and outside representation of family 
on the board of directors, over a period of 
time 
2 Barry  1975 An enterprise, which in practice, is controlled 
by the members of a single family”. Includes 
both private (where single family owns all the 
shares) and public limited firms (where family 
have effective control). 
3 Barnes and Hershon  1976 A business where controlling ownership is in 
the hands of an individual or members of a 
single family. 
4 Alcorn  1982 A profit making concern that is either a 
proprietorship, a partnership, or a corporation. 
If part of the stock is publicly owned, the 
family must also operate the business  
5 Davis  1983 Businesses whose policy and direction are 
subject to significant influence by one or more 
family units. It is an interaction between two 
sets of organisations, family and business 
6 Dyer  1986 A firm in which decisions regarding ownership 
or management are influenced by a relationship 
to a family or families. 
7 Ward  1987 A business in which owners’ intend to pass 
ownership to one or more other family 
members 
8 Lansberg, Perrow and 
Rogolsky  
1988 A business in which members of a family have 
legal control over ownership. 
9 Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny  
1988 Firms in which the founder or a member of the 
founding family is a top officer 
10 Ward and Aronoff  1990 A business in which owner and at least one 
family member works 
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 S
N 
Researcher Year Definition of family firm 
11 Daily and Dollinger 1992 A business owned and managed by family 
members 
12 Beeher, Drexler and 
Faulkner  
1997 Follow same definition given by Ward and 
Aronoff (1990) 
13 Dutta  1997 A firm or company in which the family has a 
strong influence in the day to day running of 
the business 
14 McConaughy, Walker, 
Henderson and Mishra  
1998 Public corporations whose CEOs are either the 
founder or related to founder’s family 
15 La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer  
1999 A firm is classified as a family firm if a family 
or individual owner controls more than 20% of 
indirect and direct voting rights 
16 Smith and Amoako-Adu  1999 Businesses run by an individual or a group 
related by family ties that holds the largest 
voting block and hold at least 10% of voting 
power 
17 Ang, Cole and Lin  2000 Controlling family is the one who owns more 
than 50% of the firm’s equity. 
18 McConaughy, 
Matthews, and Fialko  
2001 Public corporations whose CEOs are either the 
founder or relative of the founder 
19 Anderson and Reeb  2003 Criteria for defining family firms-                        
1- Fractional equity ownership of the founding 
family and (or)                            2- Presence of 
family members on the board of directors 
20 Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb  
2003 Those firms where family holds at least 1% of 
fractional equity in the firms 
21 Gomez- Mejia, Larraza-
Kintana and Makri  
2003 A firm is defined as a family firm if:  
1- two or more directors have family 
relationship, and  
2- family members owned and controlled at 
least 5% of voting stocks 
22 Schulze et al.  2003 
2001 
Businesses that are privately held, have greater 
than $ 5 million annual sales and listed as a 
family business by Arthur Anderson 
23 Barth, Gulbrandsen and 
Schone  
2005 A firm in which at least 33% of shares are 
owned by one person or by one family 
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 S
N 
Researcher Year Definition of family firm 
24 Barontini and Caprio  2006 A firm is defined as a family firm if- 
1- Family hold more than 10% of ownership 
rights and, 
2- Either the family controls 51% of direct 
voting rights, or control more than the double 
of  the direct voting rights of the second largest 
shareholder 
25 Villalonga and Amit  2006 Firms in which the founder or a member of his 
or her family by either blood or marriage is an 
officer, director, or the owner of at least 5% of 
the firm’s equity, either individually or as a 
group. 
26 Maury  2006 1- If the largest controlling shareholder holding 
at least 10 % of voting rights is a family, an 
individual or an unlisted firm  
2- If the largest shareholder is an identified 
family member  
3- If the controlling shareholder is a family or 
an individual family member who holds the 
CEO, honorary chairman, chairman or vice 
chairman’s position 
27 Miller et al.  2007 Firms in which multiple members of the same 
family are involved as major owners or 
managers, either in the same period of time or 
over time. 
28 Saito  2008 Firms in which the founder or descendent is a 
president or chairman and/or the family has the 
largest shareholding in the firm 
29 Pandey et al.  2011 A listed firm is categorized as a family firm for 
purposes of sample selection if its founder 
and/or co-founder or descendent (by blood or 
marriage) holds a current position on the Board 
as Chairperson, CEO, Chairperson Emeritus or 
Promoter,  and/or that  person and his/her 
family members hold the largest shareholding 
in the company.   
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As evidenced from Table 2.1, different definitions have been used by prior researchers. 
Although prima facie these approaches look different but in depth, most of these approaches 
are similar, as they consider dominance of family using various perspectives, including 
shareholding, voting rights, presence in board, holding dominant positions in the firm. 
Following the approach of Miller et al. (2007), Saito (2008) and Pandey et al. (2011), this 
thesis defines a family firm as those in which founder or descendent or their blood or 
marriage relative is Chairperson or Chairperson emeritus or CEO or Promoter (s) and/or the 
founder’s family is largest shareholder in the firm. Therefore, this study adopts the definition 
of a family business from the perspective of the family member(s) holding a dominant 
position in the firm and/or holding the largest shareholding in the firm. 
2.3 Evolution and cultural heritage of family business in India 
Concentrated ownership is quite widespread in India (Balasubramanian 2010) and has been an 
important feature of India’s private business sector in the past seven decades (Khanna & 
Palepu 2004). Manikutty (2000) also reports that the private sector of Indian industries is 
dominated by family groups since Indian independence in 1947. Khanna and Palepu (1997) 
state that institutional voids and the absence of specialized intermediaries in capital markets 
are the main reasons for existence of concentrated ownership at any point in time. 
Balasubramanian (2010) suggests two reasons for the existence of concentrated ownership in 
India: first, the weaker legal system in India as compared to international standards and 
second, a relatively higher level of private benefits available to controlling shareholders in 
India.  He further states that managing the agency system evolved under the British period in 
the late eighteenth to mid twentieth centuries also contributed to the growth and continuance 
of large proportions of concentrated ownership in India.  
The existence of leading family groups in the Indian private sector has also been explained by 
Gollakota and Gupta (2006) within the hypothesis proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997). This hypothesis suggests that concentrated ownership offers 
significant benefits in economies where property rights are not well defined and/or 
government has excessive powers in enforcing it. Gollakota and Gupta (2006) further argue 
that during pre-independence phase there was low confidence in the British Government’s 
commitment to protect the rights of Indians that resulted in more family ownership in order to 
reduce risk as compared to other types of ownership. 
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Fig 2.2: Evolution of concentrated ownership over the years in India 
Origin of concentrated ownership over the years 
 
                                                                                 (Source: Khanna and Palepu, 2004) 
Gollakota and Gupta (2006) also explain the existence of a high number of family firms in 
India by considering the hypothesis proposed by Claessens and Fan (2002). They argue that 
existence of typical trading communities such as Marwaris (ethnic group of traders from 
Western Rajasthan), Banias (trading caste), Chettiars (trading community from Tamilnadu), 
Parsis (a trading community from Gujarat and Maharashtra who migrated from Iran many 
centuries ago), Khatri (trading caste from Punjab) and Kammas (trading community from 
Andhra Pradesh) are traditionally responsible for the existence of high number of family firms 
in India. These trading communities have a strong culture of frugality and high saving rate, 
which helped them in establishing their own businesses. Raychaudhary and Habib (1982) 
state that despite the odd circumstances during British and Muslim rule in India these 
communities survived as Sahukar (moneylenders in small villages) and as shopkeeper.  These 
communities were capable enough to provide a source of capital; the risk of lending money 
within the community was rectified by community pressure (Khanna& Palepu, 2004). The 
caste system in India, which had allocated the task of business to Vaishya or trading 
communities, has also played a significant role in development of these communities as 
skilled business communities.  
Modern industries mainly around Bombay and Calcutta started taking shapes under the 
British from the mid-nineteenth century. Initially Indian industries were limited to the cotton 
and textile industry and later on, especially during first world war, when British investment 
became scarce, Indian trading communities filled this vacuum and started investing in other 
sectors such as cement, sugar, steel and engineering firms (Dutta 1997, p.54).  Reviews of 
Indian business history after independence describe the journey of Indian businesses from 
socialistic environment to liberalised or open system. The coverage of a wide history of 
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evolution of Indian family businesses is beyond the scope of this thesis. But for understanding 
traditional family governance this study concentrates on the typical characteristics of Indian 
family firms which distinguish them from other global family firms. 
2.4 Typical Characteristics of Indian Family Businesses 
Unlike in the West, where family business management and comparison of family ownership 
with other types of ownership structures has been an established topic of research, in India 
almost no importance has been given to the research of family businesses despite the fact that 
60-70% of Indian GDP2 is generated by family operated businesses. Dutta (1997) who wrote 
the first book on Indian family businesses also supports this statement “In 1989, when I set 
out to unravel the complexities of the Indian business scene, I found little documented 
information, just much lore” (p.8). He further states “ Since the culture of family business in 
India is still based on confidentiality and secretiveness, sanitised memoirs and authorised or 
ghosted biographies apart, the genre of hard hitting story is entirely absent in the Indian 
industrial and corporate word” (p.8) 
Global researchers (most of them are foreign academics having Indian background) started 
looking at Indian family businesses from a research point of view after the evolution of India 
as a strong emerging economy post-economic liberalisation of 1991. Most of these studies are 
empirical, not addressing peculiar characteristics of Indian family businesses but mainly 
emphasising on data analysis techniques and comparing their findings with existing family 
ownership studies from the West. Unlike prior studies, this thesis conducts an in-depth 
analysis of typical characteristics of Indian family businesses on the basis of information 
mainly available from biographies, autobiographies, newspaper articles and available 
academic research articles. Thorough analyses of these sources refer to the following 
characteristics of Indian family businesses.    
2.4.1 Joint families 
Most of the business families in India are extended families having four or five generations 
living under the same roof (Dutta 1997), but this trend is changing in recent times due to a 
change in Indian society as most of the business families have been nuclear families, staying 
in different locations and independently looking after their businesses.  
                                                             
2 Globsyn launches an institute for family business, Indian express, Wed Aug 26,2009 
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Figure 2.3: Birla Family Tree 
 
                                                                                          (Source: BIMTECH)  
Figure 2.3 shows Birla family tree as an illustration of change in business families. Figure 
depicts that G.D. Birla started family business with his brothers J.K. Birla, R.D. Birla and 
B.M.Birla in 1919. Since then the Birla family has become one of the richest families in India 
owning businesses in diversified industry sectors. Most of the Birla companies were managed 
by managing agencies until its abolition in 1970, after that company supervision was passed 
to the Board. In the first generation of founders, the Birla family was a joint family of 
brothers, but in the later generations it turned into a set of nuclear families where each family 
controlled one or more independent companies of the Birla Group. 
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2.4.2 Traditional communities 
Most of the business families in India belong to trading communities and these communities 
have dominated Indian businesses over a millennium (Dutta 1997).  Any study of Indian 
family businesses start from the fact that most of these businessmen are from trading 
communities which strongly dominate Indian business environment (Lamb 1955). She 
identifies main business communities as Marwari, Gujrati, Parsi, Punjabi Hindu Khatri, 
Chettiar, Naidu and Kayastha. The table below clearly indicates that these trading 
communities still dominate Indian business environment as out of 10 top businessmen 90% 
belong to these trading communities. 
Table 2.2: Top 10 Businessmen from India- community-wise classification3 
S.No. Name Business Name Trading community  
1 Mukesh Ambani RIL Yes 
2 Lakshami Mittal Mittal Ispat Yes 
3 Aziz Premji Wipro No 
4 Shashi and Ravi Ruia Essar Energy Yes 
5 Savitri Jindal Jindal Group Yes 
6 Sunila Mittal Bharti Enterprises Yes 
7 Gautam Adani Adani group Yes 
8 Kumar Mangalam Birla Aditya Birla Group Yes 
9 Pallonji Mistry Shapoorji Pallonji 
Group 
Yes 
10 Adi Godrej Godrej Group Yes 
 
                                                             
3http://businesstoday.intoday.in/photoplay/top-ten-richest-indians/3/237.html retrieved on 11 Feb,2012 
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2.4.3 Unique management culture and paternalistic approach towards employees 
Family businesses run by these communities are highly distinct and unique. For example, 
Herdeck and Pirmal (1985) report that Birlas use a ‘referral system’, a system of recruiting 
management based on family background and similar cultural values, means they preferred 
appointing their own Marwari people as managers. Those recruited are given rigorous training 
and for promotion they have to display loyalty, results, complete financial integrity and 
acceptance of principle of the accountability. Age is not a bar for gaining senior positions in 
the Birla Group, if a young manager is innovative and proves himself he is given a senior 
executive position. Loyal and efficient employees are accepted as family members. There is 
no retirement age for senior Birla executives, this approach helps Birla group to retain 
valuable experience within the family (Herdeck& Piramal 1985, p.80). Piramal (1997, p.193) 
reports that most of the senior managers in the Birla joined organisation in the 60’s and today 
these experienced managers are Kumar Mangalam Birla’s (fourth generation Birla) five star 
generals. 
There is no boss-subordinate relationship between family owners and employees in Indian 
family business. Employees are considered as family members and the attitude of founder 
towards his employees and their families is paternalistic. Piramal (1997, p.81) states that 
Dheeru Bhai Ambani (founder of Reliance group) was highly concerned about his employees 
and their families welfare for example, if any employee’s child is sick he used to send his own 
car to drop him to hospital.  
Similarly, Aditya Birla, founder of Aditya Birla Group, used to say that for becoming a 
successful business you need capable and trustworthy people, you need to give them 
tremendous powers and independence while monitoring their performance (Piramal 1997, 
p.193).  
2.4.4 Powerful patriarchs 
Dutta (1997, pp. 65-67) states that the presence of a patriarch is quite critical for Indian 
business families and family businesses. He mentions about three types of patriarchs, (a) the 
entrepreneur patriarch, who is accepted in the family for being founder of the business (b) the 
eldest son of a successful businessman, who inherits patriarchy after retirement or death of his 
father and (c) extraordinary family member who become head of the business due to his 
capabilities. He further states that the third type of patriarchy is very rare in India, is against 
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traditional social hierarchy in Indian family system and often leads to a family split due to 
shifting of the balance of power.  
Family patriarchs are undisputed leaders of the family and business both. Their responsibility 
is to expand business and create opportunities for coming generations. As a head of the family 
and business both, they are very powerful and take most of the crucial business decisions. The 
following statement by Piramal (1997) shows patriarch’s power in Indian family business set 
up: 
“While G D4 was alive, individuals couldn’t, or did not dare, express their real feelings. His 
word was law” (Piramal 1997, p.143) 
2.4.5 Family tight control over business 
Dutta (1997, p.13) argues that although the Indian way of running businesses seems to be 
similar to Western businesses because of the inherited Anglo Saxon legal framework but the 
process of running business is uniquely Indian based on traditions. Gollakota and Gupta 
(2006) mention one of the important features of family ownership in India that owners can 
maintain control over a company even if their actual equity contributions are low; this is 
possible in part because for growth companies often use debt and their equity bases are low. 
They further argue that family firms in India emphasise stability, thrift, conservatism, prefer 
family member to be CEO and realize high performance under the combined and overall 
control of family. Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) state that dominant shareholding of family, 
use of pyramidal ownership structure to control large business group, related party transaction 
and families or allies appointment in the board as main characteristics of Indian family 
business. 
2.4.6 Strong motivation for family sons to join family business 
Preferences for family sons over family daughters in India also have an impact on Indian 
family businesses. As   Dutta (1997, p.74) states that in India family sons are given exposure 
to family business during their school/college days and later on they are absorbed in the 
business in their early 20s and transferring general management control of the business to 
them in their late twenties. He further states that if family business has potential for growth 
then normally family sons work in their business. 
                                                             
4G.D. Birla, founder of Birla Group 
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Business families in India motivate their sons to join their own businesses, most of the time 
families expand their businesses and make their sons as independent in charge of these new 
businesses under the supervision of experienced older generation. For example, when Aditya 
Birla returned to India after completing his qualification from MIT in the United States, his 
father handed over a big project of INR 8 million to him with complete freedom to run the 
project. In an interview B.K. Birla, a leading industrialist, recalls the moment of handing over 
“I wasn’t worried. If, in this process my son lost INR 1-1.5 million, it wouldn’t matter. If he 
profited from failures and learnt the right lessons, it would be a small price to pay for through 
training” (Piramal 1997, p.149) 
Similarly, in an interview with Gita Piramal, Anil Ambani, CEO Reliance Power and MBA 
from Wharton School of Management, talks about his induction in his family owned company 
‘Reliance Industries Limited’. He shares “I left America in four hours flat after writing my last 
examination paper. When I came home and said “Dad, I‘ve graduated.” He said, “No big 
deal, come on, let’s go to office” (Piramal 1997, p.48). Likewise, Piramal (1997, p.42) reports 
that for launching a new INR 100 Crores ( 202 Million USD) Poly Fibre Yarn plant, Dheeru 
Bhai Ambani, founder of the Reliance Group, pulled out his son from  Stanford University 
where he was enrolled for MBA and told him “ You do it. If you think you’re going wrong you 
come back to me but go ahead and do it”.  
2.4.7 Dummy board 
Dutta (1997, p.109) states that most of the business communities in India are orthodox and 
conservative and follow traditional religious practices more as compared to professional 
middle class families. Dutta (1997, p.162) further points out that contrary to their Western 
counterparts Indian family businesses have tendency to invite business solicitors, auditors and 
stockbrokers to join their  boards  as directors because they think that these will provide sound 
business advice related to the business and board appointment is business savvy rather than 
strategist. He further states that most of the outside directors are close to family and preserve 
internal family and financial interest. Moreover he states that board exists just to follow 
mandatory requirements imposed by regulation and in most of the cases board rubber stamp is 
approval of family decisions. Family keeps overall control on the business as a CEO or 
Chairperson where mostly eldest family member remain associated with business as 
Chairperson or Chairperson emeritus to provide valuable advice to younger family member 
who works as CEO. Recently, the implementation of Clause 49 Listing Rule and New 
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Company Act has granted more powers to the Board, but still board independence is a major 
issue in Indian corporate governance. 
2.4.8 Women’s underrepresentation 
Traditionally family women were not encouraged to participate in the family businesses in 
India. Trading communities are highly gender biased; mainly sons are given best education 
and exposure to prepare them for joining family business at some stage in the future. Aditya 
Birla in response to a question asked about the possibility of his daughter joining family 
business “ I would not object to my daughter joining the business, but I would advise her that 
there are better things she could do…..Bringing up the family, they can contribute to cultural, 
social and so many other aspects of life” (Piramal1997, p.97). Ramachandran (2007) also 
mentions about unwritten rule of not involving daughters and daughters-in law in the family 
business activities in India. He states that most of the big business groups run charities 
through independent entities within groups and ladies are given opportunity to be in charge of 
these charitable trusts. Ramachandran (2007) further explains that it is the method of giving 
recognition and occupation to ladies who are not actively involved in business. 
But scenario is changing very rapidly; modern family businesses have started appointing 
female members in senior management positions.  
2.5 The Evolution of corporate governance in the Indian environment 
Corporate governance as an area of research has been very widely investigated in the past 
decade. However, most of studies are concentrated in Europe and North America. Limited 
research has been conducted in the Indian context. Gollakota and Gupta (2006) state that there 
is an urgent need to understand governance structures and practices in India, a large emerging 
economy and financial market. 
Corporate governance practices and regulations are country-specific in terms of particular 
culture, history and technological background affecting the way they are developed (Rubach 
and Sebora 1998). In the past, researchers have compared Anglo-American and Continental- 
European models of corporate governance (Becht & Roel 1999; La Porta et al. 1998). These 
two models are characterised in terms of organising finance, ownership type and flexibility of 
labour markets (Aguilera&Jackson 2003). They further state that this dichotomisation can be 
applied only partially to other geographical locations. Rubach and Sebora (1998) compare 
corporate governance systems in the USA, Japan and Germany and report differences in the 
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primary focus of governance in these countries. They state that the US system emphasizes the 
role of free market to control corporate owners, while the Japanese system gives emphasis to 
the role of business networks and mutual self-interest to keep check on each other, whereas 
the German system takes corporations as a system of wealth creation where incentives and 
controls are provided by the mutual self -interest of corporate employees and creditors. They 
further argue that in the US, effectiveness of the governance system is measured in terms of 
returns on invested financial capital, in Japan it is measured by returns on social capital and 
by returns on human capital in Germany.  
In India, the development of corporate governance regulations would expect to be influenced 
by its British colonial past, but its governance practices would arise from its own cultural, 
social and economic context. This thesis reviews the background in which corporate 
governance in India was evolved and developed over the time, especially after the economic 
liberalisation. Although a sociological review of the cultural and social environment’s effects 
on the development of corporate governance systems in India will not be undertaken. This 
chapter will provide a detailed review of the development of corporate governance regulations 
in India as affected by economic and political environments. 
Gollakota and Gupta (2006) divide the evolution of corporate governance in India into 
following four phases: 
Phase I. Pre- independence (until 1947) - eco-centrism and family ownership 
Phase II. The License Raj (1947-1981) - social altruism and public enterprises 
Phase III. Knowledge professionalism (1981-1991) - social justice and professional 
ownership 
Phase IV. Liberalisation (1991 onwards) - ego centrism and foreign ownership   
The focus of review will be on Phase I and IV. 
The first company in India was the East India Company established by the British, which 
eventually controlled a vast Indian trade. The industrial sector containing joint stock liability 
companies came into existence after 1870s. The first stock exchange, Bombay Stock 
Exchange, was incorporated in 1875. By independence in 1947, India had 800 listed 
companies and many of these had significant floats (Goswami 2000). The following statement 
by Goswami (2000, p.3) reflects a picture of the Indian corporate environment in 1947: 
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At the time of independence in 1947, India was one of the poorest nations in the world with a 
per capita income of less than $30. Yet, manufacturing accounted for almost a fifth of the 
country’s national product, and half of that (10% of GDP) was contributed by the modern 
factory sector which included cotton textile mills, jute mills and collieries, iron and steel 
mills, nascent engineering units and foundries, cement, sugar and paper. 
Goswami (2000) states that in 1947 at the time of independence India had a well-functioning 
stock market and a significant body of law5 to deal with the conduct of companies, trusts and 
stock markets. But this system was not sufficient to provide effective protection to minority 
shareholders.  
Traditionally in India, the majority of corporations were managed by managing agencies, 
which were a closely held company or partnership acting like a holding company. These 
agencies floated shares in the market for expansion and distributed their shares in such a 
manner that only they remain the largest shareholder and keep control on the company by 
their presence on board. Thus Goswami (2000, p.4) states: 
From the corporate governance point of view, the tendency for management in India to enjoy 
control rights that are disproportionately greater than residual cash flow rights goes back to 
the early years of the 20th century. 
After independence India adopted a socialistic approach and government implemented the 
1951 Industries (Development and Regulation) Act and 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution. 
These acts cultivated a culture of licensing, protection, red-tapism, corruption, nepotism and 
inefficiency in the Indian corporate governance system. These traits became hallmarks of 
Indian corporate sector (Chakrabarti et al. 2008). 
Prior to economic liberalisation of 1991 in India, the heavy industry sector was monopoly of 
state. For opening businesses in other industries, it was necessary to cross tedious, tiring and 
time-taking bureaucratic channels to get a license from government. Goswami (2000) states 
that the licensing system before economic liberalisation of 1991, required manufacturing firm 
to obtain government permission to establish a new unit, to expand its capacity, import goods 
or change its location.  This process is reflected by the statement made by Aditya Vikram 
Birla (Industrialist from one of the famous business empire in India) in an interview given to 
Piramal (1997): 
                                                             
5. Reference is made to Indian Companies Acts of 1866, 1882, 1913, Reserve bank of India 
Act, 1934. 
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Bureaucrats took eleven long years to clear the Mangalore Refinery Project, nine for sponge 
iron one, six for the Polyster filament yarn plant, three for the one making argon gas and 
hydrogen peroxide, and two for the fertilizer unit. Bilra abandoned the glass shell project 
because the government dragged its feet for so long that business conditions changed and it 
became unviable. There are many projects which he could not get cleared at all (p.177). 
An excerpt from the Asian Development Bank report on corporate governance reforms in 
India also provides a real picture of business environment prior to economic liberalisation: 
The tight control of the government on industry was aptly captured by a leading cartoonist in 
a 1980s comic strip showing the industry minister tell his staff, “We shouldn’t encourage big  
industry—that is our policy, I know. But I say we shouldn’t encourage small industries either. 
If we do, they are bound to become big.… (Panigariya 2001). 
However, the business environment has changed a lot in last the two decades. State monopoly 
has abolished, licensing system is a story of past (Panigariya 2001) and ownership has 
transferred from state to private owners and foreign investors. Transfer of ownership to 
private owners and managers may lead to expropriation of minority shareholders by large 
blockholders, which can be characterised as Principal-Principal conflict (Described as agency 
problem 2 by Maury, 2006). This need of designing governance mechanisms and safeguard to 
protect minority shareholders’ from expropriation by large shareholders (Rajagopalan & 
Zhang, 2008) led to corporate governance reforms in India.  
          Although India inherited British company law and modern industries in India have been 
planned under the English common law of joint stock liability, corporate governance as a term 
was unknown until 1993. Before the existence of any specific listing rules for corporate 
governance, the Companies Act of 1956 was responsible for maintaining good governance 
across both the public and private sectors. This Act continues to be important for corporate 
governance after a series of amendments (Companies Amendments Act. 1996 and 2006) 
made due to the changing environment of Indian business sector. This Act mainly covers 
issues related to company incorporation, roles, responsibilities and compensation of board of 
directors, allotment of shares and debentures, shareholders’ rights and prevention of 
oppression and mismanagement. Balasubramanian (2010) classifies the Companies Act 1956 
as a mother document of corporate governance system in India.    
Goswami (2000) explains that “corporate governance” became a well-known phrase in India 
in 1993 after a series of corporate scandals in the aftermath of economic liberalisation in 
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1991. He mentions particularly about a major security scam of 1992 and a scandal involved 
disappearing companies in 1993-94 which led to the need for good corporate governance. 
Rajagopalan and Zhang (2008) examine the evolution of corporate governance reforms in 
India and China, stating that privatisation and globalisation are two major driving forces 
pushing for corporate governance in emerging economies like India and China. They further 
state that evolution of a new diversified ownership structure in the emerging economies due to 
globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation has put more pressure on governing bodies to 
make laws to protect minority shareholders’ interest. Chakrabarti et al. (2008) state that after 
economic liberalisation in 1991, there has been a major change in both laws and regulations. 
They argue that the single most important development in the field of corporate governance 
was the establishment of SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) under the Act of 
parliament in 1992. The preamble of SEBI describes the basic objective of SEBI as “to 
protect the interest of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to 
regulate, the securities market and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”6 
2.6 The Development of a Corporate Governance Code and Regulations 
2.6.1 Initiatives by the Confederation of Indian Industries 
Surprisingly the first initiative towards establishing corporate governance regime in India was 
taken by industry itself, not by the Indian Government. In 1996 the Confederation of Indian 
Industries (CII) appointed a committee for the development of a code for corporate 
governance under the chairmanship of Rahul Bajaj, a leading family businessman from India.  
In 1998, CII released its Desirable Corporate Governance Code to promote a code for 
corporate governance to be adopted by private and public sector Indian companies, banks and 
financial institutions. CII’s Desirable Corporate Governance Code defines minimal corporate 
governance as follows; 
Corporate governance deals with laws, procedures, practices and implicit rules that 
determine a company’s ability to take informed managerial decisions vis-à-vis its claimants- 
in particular, its shareholders, creditors, customers, the state and employees. There is a 
global consensus about the objective of ‘good’ corporate governance: maximising long-term 
shareholder value. 
                                                             
6  Source :http://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/stpages/about_sebi.jsp, retrieved on5th Feb,2012 
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The Desirable Code of Corporate Governance made seventeen recommendations on the role 
of board of directors, desirable disclosures, capital market issues and creditors’ rights. The 
following are the main issues covered by these recommendations: 
a) composition of Board of directors 
b) roles and responsibilities of non-executive and independent directors and payment to 
non-executive directors 
c) board meetings and directors attendance 
d) maximum cross directorships held by directors 
e) audit committee and internal audit 
f)  board composition, role of non-executive and independent directors, maximum cross 
directorships by directors, Board meetings, Board committees 
g) list of documents that should be given to the board before meeting 
h) nominee directors of foreign investors 
 
2.6.2 Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report 
In early 1999, the Securities and Exchange Board of India appointed a committee under the 
chairmanship of Kumar Mangalam Birla, a family business tycoon, for promoting and raising 
standards of corporate governance in India. The committee states its primary objective as “to 
view corporate governance from the perspective of the investors and shareholders and to 
prepare a code to suit the Indian corporate environment, as corporate governance 
frameworks are not exportable”7. The committee identifies the shareholders, the board of 
directors and the management as key elements of corporate governance. Some of the 
mandatory recommendations8 made by the committee are as follows: 
a) optimal combination of executive and non- executive directors on board with not less 
than 50 %  non-executive directors, remuneration of non-executive directors, 
appointment and reappointment of the directors 
b) minimum number of  independent director on board 
c) non-executive chairman and office bearing expenses 
d) an independent audit committee with minimum three members with at least one 
director with finance and Accounting knowledge.  
                                                             
7http://web.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html 
8http://web.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html 
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e) frequency of audit committee meetings, power of audit committee and functions of 
audit committee 
f)  a compensation committee  
g) full disclosure of remuneration package of the directors 
h) board meetings minimum four times in a year with a maximum time gap of four 
months between the meetings 
i) inclusion of a management analysis and discussion report as a part of annual report 
j) in relation to shareholders’ rights, the preparation of quarterly and half yearly 
financial statements and formation of a shareholders’ grievances committee under the 
chairmanship of a non-executive director 
Based on the recommendations of Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee, in 2000 SEBI 
implemented “Clause 49 of Listing Agreement”, a milestone in the development of 
corporate governance in India.  Prior to the implementation of Clause 49 Listing Rules, 
India was considered as a laggard in corporate governance (Black& Khanna 2007) 
Table 2.3: Journey of corporate governance in India 
Industry  Initiatives SEBI       Initiatives Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs Initiatives 
Desirable Corporate 
Governance- A Code 
1998 (2.6.1) 
Kumar Mangalam Birla 
committee’s Report on 
Corporate Governance 2000 
(2.6.2) 
Report on Corporate 
Excellence through 
Governance 2000 
 Clause 49 of Listing 
Agreement 2000 (2.6.5) 
Naresh Chandra Committee 
Report 2002 (2.6.3) 
 Narayan Murthy Committee 
Report 2003 (2.6.4) 
Dr J J Irani Committee 
Report on Company Law, 
2005 
 Amended Clause 49 of 
Listing Agreement 2006 
(2.6.5) 
Corporate governance 
voluntary guidelines 2009 
(2.8) 
 Amended Clause 49 of 
Listing Agreement 2008 
(2.6.5) 
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2.6.3 Naresh Chandra Committee Report 
Although Clause 49 of the Listing agreement came into existence in 2000, both SEBI and 
Ministry of Corporate affairs kept on making serious efforts for improving corporate 
governance rules in India. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs appointed a high level 
committee under the chairmanship of Naresh Chandra. This committee submitted its report 
‘Corporate Audit and Governance’ in 2002.  
Naresh Chandra committee report on corporate governance widely covers issues related to 
disqualification of auditors, prohibition of non-audit services, auditors’ rotation, auditor’ 
independence, board independence and board procedures.  
2.6.4 Narayan Murthy Committee Report 
Later in 2002, in order to assess current governance practices and for further improvement, 
SEBI constituted the Narayan Murthy Committee under the chairmanship of N.R. Narayan 
Murthy, chairman emeritus and founder of Infosys Technologies Limited. The main task 
given to the committee was to evaluate clause 49 and suggest further improvements for 
achieving a sound corporate governance regime. Following are key mandatory 
recommendations: 
a) Audit committee effectiveness, bigger roles and responsibilities for empowering audit 
committees 
b) Financial disclosures related to related party transactions and fund raised through 
initial public offerings 
c) Management report on business risk, and measures taken to minimise such risks. 
Disclosure of risk analysis report as a part of annual report 
d) A Code of conduct for all board members and senior management of the company and 
board’s responsibilities to make sure that code is being followed both in the letter and 
spirit 
e) The appointment and responsibilities of nominee directors 
f) Shareholders’ approval on the compensation paid to non-executive directors and 
proper disclosures of details of compensation 
g) Placement of whistle blower policy in the company 
 
The Narayan Murthy Committee submitted its report to SEBI in February 2003. SEBI 
adopted some of the recommendations made by the committee and issued a modified clause 
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49 ‘the revised clause 49’ on 29th October 2004 which came into operation on 1st January 
2006. Clause 49 has been a major land mark in the history of Indian corporate governance. 
Since this thesis analyses the impact of governance on the firm performance in the context of 
Indian family controlled businesses, it will make considerable reference to Clause 49 listing 
rules in India.  
2.6.5 Revised Clause 49 Listing Rules 
2.6.5.1 Listing Rules related to the Board of Directors 
Companies listed on any Indian stock exchange have to comply with the following 
requirements of clause 499 in respect of the Board of Directors: 
Board composition 
The requirement is to have optimum combination of executive and non- executive directors 
with no less than fifty per cent directors as non-executive directors. If the chairman of the 
board is non-executive then at least one third of directors should be independent and in case 
he is executive then at least half of the board should be independent.  
Meaning of independent directors 
Clause 49 defines independent director as a non-executive director of the company who: 
a) Apart from receiving director’s remuneration does not have any material 
pecuniary relationship or transaction with the company, its promoters, its 
directors, its senior management, or its holding company, its subsidiaries and 
associates. 
b) Has not been an executive of the company in the past three years, is not a material 
supplier, service provider or customer or a lessor or lessee of the company and is 
not a substantial shareholder of the company 
c) is not less than 21 years of age and is not a partner or an executive or was not 
partner or an executive during the past three years of any statutory audit firm or 
internal audit firm and legal and consulting firms associated with the company 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 This part of thesis has been drawn heavily from revised clause 49 issued by SEBI 
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Board meetings 
Board should meet at least four times in a year, with maximum time gap of four months 
between any two consecutive meetings. 
Cross directorships 
Any director should not be a member of more than 10 committees or act as a chairman of 
more than five committees across all companies in which he is a director. 
Board’s responsibility regarding law compliance 
The responsibility of board to periodically review compliance reports of all laws applicable to 
the company and steps taken by the company to minimise possibilities of non –compliances. 
Code of conduct 
The board has responsibility to laydown code of conduct for board members and senior 
management of the company. All board members and senior management personnel should 
affirm compliance with the code on yearly basis and code of conduct should be available on 
the company’s website and a declaration to this effect signed by the CEO should be included 
in the annual report of the company. 
Other sections in clause 49 are summarised in the Appendix 1. 
2.6.5.2 Listing rules related to the disclosures 
Related party transactions 
Related party transactions in the ordinary course of business, out of ordinary course of 
business and transactions not at arm’s length basis should be disclosed to the audit committee. 
Disclosure of accounting treatment 
Any deviation from prescribed accounting standards, in the preparation of financial statement 
should be disclosed in the financial statement, together with management’s justification of 
using alternate approach. 
Board disclosures- risk management 
The company should lay down procedures to inform board members about the risk 
assessment and rectification procedures. 
 35 
 
Proceeds from public issues, rights issues, preferential issues etc. 
Management should disclose to the audit committee about the use/application of money raised 
through various types of share issued on quarterly basis. Company should also prepare a 
statement of funds utilised, on an annual basis, for purposes other than stated in the offer 
document/prospectus.  
Table 2.4: Format of quarterly compliance report on corporate governance 
                                                                              (Source: www.primedirectors.com) 
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Management 
Management discussion and analysis report should be part of the annual report and should 
include discussion on (a) industry structure and development (b) opportunities and threats (c) 
segment-wise and product-wise performance (d) outlook (e) risk and concerns (f) internal 
control system and their adequacy (g) discussion on financial performance with respect to 
operational performance and (h) material development in Human Resources/ Industrial 
Relations front. 
Senior management is also required to make disclosures to the board about their material, 
financial and commercial transactions, that may have potential conflict with the interest of the 
company. 
Shareholders 
In case of the appointment of new director or reappointment of director, a detailed 
information about the directors e.g. brief resume, nature of expertise, shareholdings, 
relationship with other directors should be disclosed to the shareholders. The company should 
also form a committee ‘Shareholders/ Investors Grievance Committee’ under the 
chairmanship of a non-executive director to specially look into the redressal of shareholders 
and investors complaints like transfer of shares, non-receipt of declared dividends etc. The 
company should also delegate the power of share transfer to an officer or a committee or to 
the registrar and share transfer agents for speeding up the process of share transfers. 
CEO/CFO Certification 
The CEO/ Managing Director/ Manager appointed in terms of Companies Act,1956 and the 
CFO or equivalent should certify that financial statement and disclosures are “ True and Fair” 
and do not contain any material information which might be misleading. They should also 
accept in writing their responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls. They 
should also certify that information related to changes in accounting policies, significant 
changes in internal control, significant deficiency in the internal control system and instances 
of significant fraud has been communicated to the auditors and the audit committee. 
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Report on corporate governance 
The Company should provide a separate section on corporate governance in the annual report 
of the company, with a detailed compliance report on corporate governance. The company 
should also disclose the reasons for non-compliance of any mandatory requirements and 
should highlight the extent to which the non-mandatory requirements have been adopted by 
the company. The company is also required to submit a quarterly compliance report on 
corporate governance signed by the compliance officer or the CEO, to the stock exchanges 
within 15 days from the close of quarter.  
Compliance  
The Company is also required to obtain a certificate from either Auditors or practising 
company secretaries regarding compliance with mandatory requirements of clause 49.  
Non Mandatory Requirements 
Clause 49 also mentions about non mandatory requirements related to non-executive 
chairman’s office expenses, maximum tenure of 9 years for independent directors, obligation 
on the company to ensure requisite qualification and experience of independent directors, the 
constitution of remuneration committee, half yearly reporting of financial performance to the 
shareholders, moving towards a regime of unqualified financial statements, board members 
training, performance evaluation of non-executive directors and establishment of whistle 
blower policy. 
The company is also required to provide disclosure on the adoption/non adoption of the non-
mandatory requirements in the section on corporate governance of the annual report.  
2.7 Impact of clause 49 on Indian corporate governance mechanism 
Chakrabarti et al. (2008) consider Clause 49 as equivalent to Sarbanes- Oxley Act (SOX Act) 
in the USA and classify it as a mirror image of SOX Act in the Indian perspective. They 
further state that in some areas like certification compliance Indian clauses are stricter as 
compared to SOX requirements.  The adoption of Clause 49 Listing rules was a historical 
event in the history of corporate governance in India, as it was the first serious attempt to 
standardise corporate governance reporting to protect minority shareholders and other 
investors. 
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The question is whether implementation of Clause 49 succeeded in providing additional 
confidence to shareholders and other investors in the market. Black and Khanna (2007) 
conducted an event study on the impacts of corporate governance reforms on market valuation 
and found that implementation of Clause 49 by SEBI witnessed a 4% increase in the share 
prices of large public firms as compared to smaller public firms on a two day event window 
and a 7% increase over a five day event window. They further compared the positive response 
of Clause 49 on the Indian share market with the mixed response found in the US market on 
SOX Act’s adoption. They concluded that the impact of mandatory governance rulings on the 
market may also depend on a country’s prevailing institutional environment.  
In 2008, KPMG conducted a poll to study impacts of implementation of clause 49 on 
corporate governance in India and the steps to be taken to make Clause 49 more effective. The 
respondents were mainly CEOs, CFOs, independent directors and similar leaders 
predominantly from private equity firms, financial services and the manufacturing sector. In 
total 60 respondents participated in this study. Respondents were asked about the 
improvement in corporate governance in India after implementation of Clause 49. Some 19% 
of respondents believe that there has been a significant improvement, 68% of respondents 
think that significant improvement opportunity will exist in the future and 13% of respondents 
are of the view that there has not been any significant improvement in corporate governance 
after the implementation of Clause 49. There was a mixed response to KPMG’s survey 
question about the need to further strengthen Clause 49. 46% of respondents felt that Clause 
49 only required a few changes while 44% thought that it needed a significant revision. Only 
10% of respondents felt that existing clause was sufficient.  
Majority of respondents (71%) to the KPMG survey believed that penalty levels in India for 
punishing bad and unethical governance are low as compared to other developed countries 
and 80% of the respondents were of the view that corporate governance should be principle 
based with moderate regulations. Respondents also nominated the five biggest challenges to 
effective governance in India, in order of their weightage as follows: (a) weak oversight and 
monitoring mechanism (b) management override (c) inadequate board independence (d) lack 
of respect for shareholder community and (e) low financial discipline.  
Regarding the role of independent directors’ on the board, the majority of respondents felt that 
inclusion of independent directors on a board was just a process to meet the 50% 
independence requirement. The respondents were of the view that often independent directors 
do not challenge the decisions made by the executive directors and management in the 
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process of discharging their governance responsibilities. A majority of respondents (72%) 
strongly believed in implementing an independent and transparent process to evaluate board 
members’ performance for improving corporate governance at the firm level. They also 
suggested that for improving corporate governance, the board should conduct exclusive 
sessions with independent directors. Also the board members related to the promoter group 
should not participate in the process of appointing directors related to their group.   
Regarding the appropriate protection for minority shareholders, majority of respondents felt 
that significant changes are required in the corporate governance laws to protect minority 
shareholders’ interests. 12% of respondents reported that sometimes minority shareholders’ 
issues are discussed during board meetings but for personal interest rather than in the best 
interests of the company. 
2.8 Recent developments in corporate governance 
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs, a body mainly responsible for the administration of the 
Companies Act 1956, has also been actively involved in the process of designing regulations 
and guidelines for achieving better governance. For providing better governance and more 
protection to shareholders in the changing business environment, the Ministry made two 
amendments to the Companies Act 1956, namely, The Companies Amendment Act, 1996 and 
2006. 
In relation to the specific initiatives taken by the Ministry for improving corporate 
governance, in 2009 the Ministry released the ‘Corporate Governance- Voluntary Guidelines 
2009’ based on the recommendations of the task force set up by the CII under the 
Chairmanship of Shri Naresh Chandra. These guidelines are recommendatory in nature and 
the Ministry expects companies to make sincere efforts to consider adoption of these 
guidelines. Some of the main recommendations of these guidelines, which are not included in 
the Clause 49 but may be helpful in maintaining better governance are: 
a) Separation of the roles and responsibilities of Chairman and CEO, to promote 
balance of power 
b) Formation of a nomination committee comprising of a majority of independent 
directors, including its chairman 
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c) Maximum cross directorships held by the managing director or whole time director 
is restricted to seven. There is no cap on cross directorship held by non-executive 
and independent directors  
d) A clear cut policy for specifying positive attributes of independent directors such as 
integrity, experience and expertise, foresight, managerial quality and ability to read 
and understand financial statements 
e) Maximum tenure of six years for independent directors and an adequate sitting fee 
based on the twin criteria of net worth and turnover of companies 
f) Audit partner should be rotated once every three years and the audit firm to be 
rotated once every five years and a cooling off period of three years before a 
partner can resume the same audit assignment, and five years before the audit firm 
can resume. 
g) Secretarial Audit for checking robustness of the Board processes and compliance 
mechanisms 
 
The role of good governance is also mentioned in ‘National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, 
Environmental and Economic Responsibilities of Business’ released by Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs recently in 2011. The first principle states that Businesses should conduct and govern 
themselves with ethics, transparency and accountability. It further states that businesses 
should develop governance structures, procedures and practices for ensuring ethical running 
of businesses.   
The above discussion clearly indicates serious efforts made by Indian regulatory bodies for 
achieving the goal of good corporate governance in publicly listed firms. But, recently 
conducted survey results by KPMG provide a feeling that firms are complying with the 
mandatory regulations in letter only, rather than in spirit, as most of the top executives has 
raised concern about the role of independent directors, their qualification and appointment 
procedure. Even after the implementation of Clause 49 in 2006, management override, lack of 
respect for shareholders community and inadequate protection for minority shareholders are 
major on-going issues faced by Indian corporate governance. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that clause 49 is still far from achieving its objectives. Although Clause 49 as a regulation is 
on a par with Western regulations on corporate governance, there is a perception that its 
implementation is poorer in India and it is limited to fulfilling disclosure requirements as a 
ritual. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter outlines ambiguity in the definition of family businesses, characteristics of 
Indian family businesses and the evolution and current state of corporate governance in India.  
There has been extensive research on family businesses but still there is no consensus among 
researchers for a single definition of family firms. Some definitions use a narrow meaning of 
family businesses and consider only a few aspects of family businesses. Others have focussed 
on wider definitions of family businesses. The difference in the approach has been a major 
problem in family business research. The major concern is the increase in definition variance 
arising from growing number of studies in this area. Past researchers have used major factors 
such as family shareholding percentage, control in terms of acquiring major positions (family 
CEO/ Chair), voting rights and domination of family members on board. This thesis adopts 
the wider definition of family firms and defines a family firm as those in which the founder or 
descendent or their blood or marriage relationship is Chairperson or Chairperson emeritus or 
CEO or Promoter and/or the founder’s family is the largest shareholder in the company. 
There have been only a few studies on family businesses in India. Most of the material 
available for Indian family business research is biographies, autobiographies and journalists’ 
perception of story inside the family and business. Other studies have covered Indian family 
businesses in an historical context such as evolution of ownership and big business groups. 
Family business governance and its impact on overall performance of a family-owned and 
managed firm is a relatively new area of research. Some of the recent empirical studies treat 
Indian family businesses similar to its Western counterparts; therefore, they explain its 
behaviour on the basis of Western literature. This thesis emphasizes the uniqueness of Indian 
family businesses and explains family business behaviour on the basis of distinct trading 
community/caste characteristics.   
This chapter also provides a detailed insight into the history and current status of corporate 
governance in India. On paper, Indian corporate governance listing rules are on a par with 
governance listing rules in Western countries and provide ultimate protection to shareholders 
from exploitation by big business groups. But anecdotal evidence suggests a slow and tedious 
Indian court system, backlogged with a huge number of cases and weaker implementation of 
existing governance law due to high corruption. This pushes India into the category of a 
country having weak corporate governance. But, the Government of India and other 
regulatory agencies are seeking to promote good governance practices among Indian 
corporates to attract foreign investors.   
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the literature related to the impacts of family 
controlling status, family impacted governance characteristics and powerful management 
players’ normative influences on financial and social performance of family controlled firms. 
This chapter reviews past studies in detail, identifies the gaps in the literature and provides 
both theoretical constructs and the scope of new knowledge to be explored. This chapter also 
covers the theories used by prior researchers that develop a rationale for the expected impacts 
of the above mentioned characteristics on financial and social performance. 
Family control is common in publically listed firms around the globe (Burkart et al. 2003). La 
Porta et al. (1999) report that families’ control 53% of publicly listed firms in 27 countries 
with total market capitalisation of $500 million. Anderson and Reeb (2003) also find that 
family ownership is quite widespread and is of world-wide significance. They argue that one 
third of the firms in the Standard and Poor’s 500 can be classified as family firms. Other 
researchers have looked at the degree of dominance of family firms in different geographical 
locations. La Porta et al.(1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) state that most of the publicly 
listed firms in Western Europe are  family firms, while in the Asian context, Claessens et al. 
(2000) report that more than two thirds of firms in East Asia are family firms, controlled by a 
single shareholder. India, one of the largest emerging economies with an average GDP growth 
rate of 7.45% in the last decade, has the highest percentage (67%) of family businesses in 
Asia and these businesses account for 46.8% of market capitalisation10. Dutta (1997) also 
mentions family firms’ domination in India and reports, on the basis of a survey conducted in 
1993, that out of 297,000 companies in India only 3000 were non-family controlled 
businesses. 
The impact of family control and ownership on financial performance is currently a topic of 
intense debate (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga &Amit 2006) and there has been 
considerable research on family firms in recent years (Bertrand & Schoar 2006). Past 
literature has been highly sceptical about the successes of the family firm as a form of 
                                                             
10https://www.credit-suisse.com/news/en/media_release.jsp?ns=41862retrieved 18 Feb,2012 
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organisation.  Some researchers consider that family controlled businesses are prone to 
suffering from capital restrictions, executive entrenchment and nepotism, intergenerational 
squabbles and expropriation of minority shareholders (Allen & Panian 1982; Chandler 1990; 
Gomez-Mejia et al.2003; Perez- Gonaflez 2006; Schulze et al. 2001, 2003; Morck & Yeung 
2003) which can have negative impacts on performance.  In contrast empirical studies 
conducted mainly on samples primarily taken from large firms in the United States, found that 
family firms had superior performance compared to other types of ownership structures 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006).  In addition, a group of researchers have 
also investigated the founder effects in the family business. They report that firms, in which a 
founding family is actively involved in the management of the firm, perform better than other 
types of ownership structure in terms of firm valuation (Adams et al. 2009; Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Palia & Ravid 2002; Villalonga &Amit 2006). A detailed review of past literature 
provides empirical evidence in favour of and against the concept that family ownership 
enhances profitability and is associated with better financial performance.  
Turning to studies on the impact of family control on social performance, this is a relatively 
new area of research and lacks a body of systematic empirical studies. The impacts of family 
ownership, control and governance on social and environmental performance have not been 
widely tested to date. But this literature review gives consideration to both conceptual and 
empirical studies addressing this relationship. 
The rest of the chapter is organised into three sections. The first section discusses theoretical 
issues related to the impacts of family ownership and control on financial and social 
performance. This section provides a detailed discussion of the impacts of family 
shareholdings, family CEOs, family Chairpersons, family members’ presence on boards and 
family succession on the financial performance of family controlled firms. The second section 
covers the impact of family governance on financial and social performance. This section 
discusses in detail the impacts of board size, board independence, board meetings, cross 
directorships and family presence on the board, on the financial and social performance of 
family owned firms. The third section discusses impacts of demographic characteristics of the 
CEO and Chairperson on financial and social performance followed by a brief literature 
review on integrated and decoupled performance. Conclusions are provided at the end of this 
chapter. 
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3.2 Family ownership and performance 
3.2.1 Family ownership and financial performance 
The debate about the relationship between large ownership and financial performance was 
started after the publication of a famous book The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
by Berle and Means (1932), who suggest a negative correlation between diffused ownership 
and firm performance. They argue that diffused ownership makes shareholders powerless, 
thus providing opportunity for managers to take decisions on behalf of shareholders. They 
further state that managers’ interest might not coincide with the interest of shareholders; 
therefore, there is a possibility that firm resources are not used for enhancing shareholders’ 
profit. Demsetz (1983) challenges the view point of Berle and Means (1932) and claims that 
there is no systematic relationship between ownership structure and financial performance; 
the best ownership structure should evolve endogenously. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
empirically test a sample of 511 US corporations over the period 1976-80 to provide evidence 
of the endogeneity of this relationship and conclude that ownership structure is influenced by 
the profit maximising interest of shareholders.  
Agency theory has been used predominantly to explain the relationship between ownership 
structure and financial performance. The separation of ownership and management in 
publicly-listed firms leads to the agency problem as explained by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
and Fama and Jensen (1983). They suggest that in family firms, family has both ownership 
and control which reduces the agency cost of monitoring, thus leading to performance 
enhancement. Fama and Jensen (1985) state that managerial decisions for these firms are very 
different compared to firms where ownership and control are separated, they further argue 
that when ownership and control resides with the same individual then there is no need for 
costly monitoring by outside parties leading eventually to increased firm value. DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1985) also emphasise the role of family in monitoring and disciplining managers. 
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1986) state that large shareholders play an active role in 
corporate governance mechanisms as they have a strong financial incentive to reduce agency 
cost and they have the power to collect information and monitor management.  
The impact of family ownership on firm performance has been studied extensively with 
inconsistent findings. Researchers have responded to this issue in two ways: by studying the 
impact of ownership structure on performance (Berle & Means 1932) or by declaring the 
endogeneity of the relationship between ownership structure and performance (Demsetz 
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1983). Seminal agency theorists, Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
posit that family control mitigates agency conflict, thereby leading to performance 
enhancement. In contrast several other researchers argue that family firms suffer from capital 
restriction, intergenerational squabbles, executive entrenchment and nepotism which would 
have a negative impact on firm performance (e.g. Allen & Panian 1982; Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2003; Schulze et al. 2001, 2003). Other researchers find no relationship between family 
ownership and financial performance (Demsetz 1983; Demsetz & Lehn 1985). How can these 
studies come to such conflicting conclusions? One explanation has been offered by Cucculelli 
and Micucci (2008), who identify two major weaknesses in the studies to date. The first one is 
ambiguity in the definition of family firms and the second is the weak applicability of 
research results obtained in one country to explain firm performance in other countries. 
Morck et al. (1988) investigate the relationship between managerial ownership and market 
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) in a sample of 371 Fortune-500 firms and find 
evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between ownership and performance. They suggest 
two conflicting effects of insider ownership, namely, alignment and entrenchment. They 
report that the market value of a firm increases initially with the increase in the number of 
shares held by insiders (alignment effect) but decrease when insiders’ shareholding increases 
after a certain level which leads to entrenchment effect. Their results suggest a positive 
relationship between ownership and Tobin’s Q for 0-5% ownership, negative relationship in 
the 5-25% range and further positive relationship beyond 25% ownership.  
Similarly to Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) report a curvilinear 
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance, they state that Tobin’s Q 
increases with an increase in insider ownership until it reaches 40-50% and decreases after 
that.  This non linearity of relationship is also witnessed by Cho (1998), Short and Keasey 
(1999) and Gugler et al. (2004) in their studies. Claessens et al. (2002) provide an 
interpretation of these findings. They suggest that with the increase in managerial ownership, 
the firm value also increases (alignment or monitoring effect). But beyond certain percentage 
of ownership, mangers become entrenched and promote their own interest at the expense of 
other shareholders (entrenchment or expropriation effect). Fig. 3.1 shows the combined effect 
of the monitoring and expropriation processes that have been discussed above. 
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Fig 3.1: Monitoring and expropriation effect 
 
 
                                                                                            (Source: Arosa et al., 2010) 
The wider body of literature on the relationship between family ownership/control/influence 
and financial performance has investigated a range of characteristics as depicted in Figure 3.2. 
A review of key articles from this body of literature is given below. 
Daily and Dollinger (1992) conduct a field survey to compare family owned and managed 
firms with professionally managed firms in terms of structure, process and performance 
dimensions. They find that family owned and managed firms perform better as compared to 
the professionally managed firm because of the amalgamation of ownership and control in 
such firms, thus providing empirical support for an agency theory argument. 
Beehr et al. (1997) conducted a study on a sample of 45 small family-owned businesses by 
measuring performance in five dimensions defined as conflict, expectations and advantages, 
individual outcomes, organisational outcomes and family outcomes. They report that family 
firms perform better than non-family firms on these five performance measuring dimensions. 
McConaughy et al. (1998) investigate the impact of founding family ownership on financial 
performance by conducting univariate and multivariate analysis and find that founding family 
controlled firms are more valued (in terms of the ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value) and more efficient as compared to non- founding family controlled firms of the 
same size, in the same industry and with similar managerial ownership. 
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Fig 3.2- Family factors considered by past researchers for investigating impacts of 
family business on financial performance 
 
Claessens et al.(2000) investigate the separation of ownership and control in 2,980 publicly 
traded companies in nine East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand).They report that in a group owned by 
a controlling family, the family control the firm through a pyramid structure and cross 
holdings among firms. They also report that separation of ownership and management is very 
rare in family firms in these geographical locations as about 60% of top management is 
related to the controlling family. These circumstances provide incentives for the expropriation 
of minority shareholders’ wealth, later on described by some researchers as Agency Problem 2 
(Maury 2006; Villalonga & Amit 2006). 
Claessens et al. (2002) conducted a further study on the impact of family ownership on 
financial performance by using data of 1,301 publicly listed corporations from eight East 
Asian countries. They find that with an increase in the cash flow to the ownership of the 
largest shareholder, the firm value also increases. This finding supports the positive incentive 
effect. But when the controlling rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow ownership, 
then firm value is found to decrease, thus supporting the entrenchment effect. 
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Anderson and Reeb (2003) investigate the impact of family control on financial performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE) in a sample of 403 firms selected from Standard 
and Poor’s 500from 1992 to 1999 and find that family firms performed better than non-family 
firms. They further report that firms with continued founding family presence exhibit better 
performance than non-family firms. They also witness a non-monotonic relationship between 
founding family ownership and performance; initially performance increases with increasing 
family ownership but later on decreases with further increase in family ownership. They 
report that the positive impact of family ownership on financial performance vanishes when 
family ownership increases above 30%.  
Barontini and Caprio (2006) investigate the impact of ownership structure on firm 
performance in a sample of 675 publicly-traded corporations from 11 countries in continental 
Europe and find that family control enhances firm value and operating performance. They 
also find that founder controlled firms outperform descendent controlled firms in terms of 
operating performance and firm valuation.   
Villalonga and Amit (2006) mention about two types of agency problems related to the 
impacts of family ownership on financial performance. The first one they name Agency 
Problem 1. It refers to agency theory explaining the vindication of classical owner-manager 
conflict in the presence of large shareholders as described by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). The second agency problem they name Agency Problem 2. This 
problem is said to appear when large shareholders use their controlling power to expropriate 
minority shareholders’ wealth for their private benefits. This problem is explained by Faccio 
et al. (2001) for East Asian economies. They state that a single family or an individual has 
more incentives for both expropriation and monitoring. On the other hand, if the largest 
shareholder is an institution or a widely-held corporation, then incentives for both 
expropriation and monitoring will be small, leading to Agency Problem 1 (Faccio et al. 2001). 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the impact of family ownership in a sample of Fortune 
500 firms over the period 1994-2000 and find that family ownership creates value only when 
the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman with a hired CEO. They 
further report that firm value is destroyed when the descendants serve as CEOs. They find 
evidence of reduction in agency cost in founder-CEO firms as compared to non-family firms, 
and higher agency cost in descendant-CEO firms as compared to non-family firms.  
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Cheung and Wei (2006) examine the relationship between the percentage of insider 
ownership and corporate performance measured by Tobin’s Q for a sample of 1,430 firms 
over the period 1991 to 2000. Similar to Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Demestz and Villalonga (2001), they do not find any evidence of relationship between insider 
ownership and corporate performance. They further argue that ignoring adjustment costs 
could give an indication of a false relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. To test this issue, they empirically analyse this relationship by analysing two 
models. In the first model they ignore the adjustment cost and find a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and corporate performance. In the second model they take 
adjustment cost into consideration, and find that the relationship no longer exists. In a 
supporting study, Klein et al. (2005) find no relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance for a sample of 263 Canadian firms.    
Miller et al. (2007) empirically analyse data of 896 Fortune 1000 companies for the period 
1996-2000.They find that superiority of family businesses over other types of businesses 
depends on the way family businesses are defined as well as on the nature of the sample being 
selected. They further report that after removing lone founder businesses from the sample, the 
superiority of family businesses vanishes.  
Using panel data on 275 listed German companies, Andres (2008) also finds that family firms 
outperform firms of other types of blockholders, but that performance is better only in the 
firms in which the founding family is still active in the executive or the supervisory board.  
He further reports that family involvement in the business successfully balances the two 
agency problems as explained by Villalonga and Amit (2006). Similar to Andres (2008), 
Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) also witness that superior performance of family firms comes 
mainly from the founder’s effort. They further report that family characteristics typically 
related to better financial performance (such as reduction in agency costs, long term focus, 
and stewardship etc.) seems to disappear when many family members are involved in the 
business. 
Arosa et al. (2010) investigate the impact of family ownership on profitability, measured by 
ROA (based on EBIT) of a sample of 586 small and medium size family businesses from 
Spain. They report no significant relationship between family ownership concentration and 
the profitability of firms. They also investigated the possibility of a non-linear relationship 
between ownership concentration and profitability as suggested by various authors (e.g. 
Morck et al.1988; Claessens et al.2002; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Gedajlovic & Shapiro 
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2002; Miguel et al. 2004; Thomsen & Pedersen 2000). Their study does not find any evidence 
of a non-linear relationship between family ownership and firm profitability for the whole 
sample. But they find that splitting of the sample provides evidence of a non-linear 
relationship (U shaped relationship) for first generation ownership. Their results support the 
monitoring and expropriation hypothesis for first generation family firms and indicate that 
first generation family firms in Spain have more concentrated ownership and unchallenged 
control as compared to successive generations where the ownership is more dispersed. They 
further report that up to 49% of ownership by the first generation family the monitoring 
hypothesis (alignment effect) prevails and beyond 49%, the expropriation hypothesis 
(entrenchment effect) prevails. 
Pandey et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q for 131 largest family firms listed on the BSE and find a 
positive relationship between family ownership and firm performance. They further state that 
this positive relationship is only true for family firms operating in traditional industries. They 
do not find any empirical evidence of a significant relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance in the firms operating in new economy industries.  
O’Boyle et al. (2012) conducted meta-analysis by summarising prior empirical findings of 78 
articles, reporting 95 samples with a total sample size of 80,421. They report that empirical 
findings explaining the relationships between family ownership or involvement and financial 
performance are highly conflicting. The meta-analysis conducted by them suggests no 
relationship between family involvement and firm’s financial performance.  
Therefore, to conclude it can be stated that the impacts of family ownership and control on 
corporate financial performance have been studied in various countries with inconsistent 
findings. The country context is found to make a difference. The past literature on the 
relationship between family ownership, governance and financial performance is dominated 
by US based studies where ownership is diversified and governance laws are stricter as 
compared to India and other Asian countries where ownership can be highly concentrated and 
securities laws can be weak, at least in their implementation and enforcement. 
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3.2.1.1 Impact of the legal environment on the relationship between family 
ownership and financial performance 
Does the legal environment of a country from where the sample is taken have the potential to 
influence the relationship between family control and financial performance? Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) state that publicly-listed but family-controlled firms operating in well-regulated 
and transparent financial markets will achieve reduced agency cost. On the other hand, Faccio 
et al. (2001) raise the issue of the difference between agency problems in economies which 
are well regulated with a transparent financial market and dispersed ownership (e.g. USA), 
compared to those economies that have a relatively weak regulatory system and concentrated 
ownership (e.g. parts of East Asia). They argue that most corporate governance research has 
been focused on the USA, where the agency problem is the conflict between shareholders and 
managers. This is not, they argue, the major agency problem for economies with large family 
shareholdings. The salient agency problem in these countries is expropriation of funds away 
from outside shareholders by the controlling shareholders. 
Maury (2006) empirically compares the performance of family controlled firms with non-
family controlling shareholders in a sample of 1672 non-financial firms from Western Europe. 
He finds that family control that is active leads to higher profitability as compared to non- 
family firms even in different legal regimes, while passive family control has no effect on 
profitability. Maury (2006) further states that only non-majority held firms are benefitted by 
family ownership.  His findings support the theory of agency cost reduction in family owned 
and managed firms given by Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). His 
results also support Faccio et al.’s (2001) viewpoints on conflict between controlling family 
and minority shareholders in a legal regime where shareholder protection is low and family 
control is high.  In the context of emerging economies like India, Martin-Reyna and Duran- 
Enclada (2012) state that weak shareholder protection and concentration of ownership in the 
hands of large shareholders have detrimental impacts on minority shareholders. Therefore, in 
summary, it can be said that the legal and institutional environments have an impact on the 
relationship between family ownership and financial performance. 
3.2.1.2 Family ownership and performance: theoretical explanation 
In the debate about the theoretical perspective to apply to explanations of the relationships 
between family ownership or control or influence and firm performance, a distinction has 
been drawn between the perspectives of agency and stewardship theory. Figure 3.3 depicts 
this theoretical distinction.  
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Fig 3.3: Family firms and financial performance: theoretical explanation of the 
relationship 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Stewardship theory viewpoint 
In addition to the reduction of agency cost, families will transfer knowledge and experience 
from one generation to the next. Therefore, descendants who grow up in the family business 
environment acquire firm and market specific knowledge at a young age and can build a 
relationship of trust and confidence with firm’s customers, suppliers, employees and other 
stakeholders (Andres, 2008).  
Stewardship proponents argue that family owners and managers have deep emotional bonding 
with the firm and they frequently want to contribute to their organisation’s sustainable 
economic development.  Families are said, in general, to be deeply concerned about their 
businesses and take these businesses as an asset to be passed to later generations rather than 
consumed during their lifetime (Casson 1999; Chami 1999); therefore, families are inclined to 
give preference to longevity and sustainable growth of business and take long term investment 
decisions.  James (1999) points out that a family manager tends to have a broader vista in his 
or her business perspective compared to a non-family manager. This broader vista is believed 
to help in resolving problems associated with ownership and control separation. Andres 
(2008) states that families are a unique type of investors who have exceptional concerns over 
their firm’s survival and strong incentives to monitor management closely.  
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Ward (1988) states that trust and loyalty created by families in their working environment 
leads to lower turnover and lesser recruitment cost as compared to other types of firms.  Barth 
et al. (2005) also support Ward’s viewpoint by arguing that family relations are largely based 
on altruism, loyalty and trust.  
Andres (2008) states that the nature of family shareholdings helps families to build a 
reputation with their customers and external capital providers in the long term. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) also support this view point. They report that family firms are able to fetch debt 
financing at a lower rate as compared to the other types of ownership structures, as the 
bondholders have a feeling in general that families provide better protection of their interests.  
These stewardship qualities promote operational flexibility and effective decision making, 
which may have a positive impact on firms’ productivity (Pollack 1985; Coleman 1990). 
3.2.1.2.2 Theory of self interest 
But there are drawbacks as well. As Shleifer and Vishny (1986) state, large shareholders have 
their own interests which are quite different from the interests of other investors, employees 
and managers. Anderson and Reeb (2003) state that controlling families have incentives and 
powers to act in their private self-interest at the expense of the firm’s performance. They 
contend that controlling families can expropriate wealth from the firm through excessive 
compensation, related party transactions and special dividends. In relation to the skills of 
family business successors, Morck et al. (2000) state that descendants tend to have less 
business skill and expertise compared to founders, which negatively impacts firm 
performance. Barclay and Holderness (1989) state that the holding of large ownership stakes 
reduces the chance of bidding by other agents which negatively impacts the value of the firm. 
Perrow (1972, pp. 8-10) argues that family firms are inherently inefficient. These firms follow 
particularism which means there is no criterion for recruitment. Top positions are not offered 
on a competence basis but given as a gift to family members and relatives. This practice of 
particularism leads to poorer performance in the long term. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) 
also report a tendency of weaker performance of firms’ majority-controlled by a family as 
compared to firms with diffused ownership.    
A summary of the two sides of the argument about the consequences of having a firm under 
the control of a family is given in Figure 3.4.   
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Fig 3.4: Advantages and drawbacks of family firms 
 
The conclusion is that a significant number of prior studies have sought to establish a 
relationship between family ownership and firm financial performance but have ended up 
with different findings.  Villalonga and Amit (2006), McConaughy et al. (1998), Miller et al. 
(2007) report that family firms offer superior financial performance as compared to other 
types of firms while other researchers like Maury (2006), Barth et al. (2005), Cronqvist and 
Nilsson (2003) and Claessens et al.(2002) find contrasting results.  
3.2.1.3 Family CEO and financial performance 
In firms where families have the largest shareholding, a family CEOs is very powerful and 
can use his or her powerful status to unilaterally take major decisions. In contrast, other types 
of firm’s CEOs are not so powerful and decisions are more or less made by consensus among 
the members of the board of directors and executive committee. Researchers have recognised 
the powerful status of a family CEO and have extensively compared the performance of the 
family CEO with non-family CEO, as well as the founder CEO compared to the descendent 
CEO. 
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When members of a family have both ownership and executive management roles, the 
contention is that it reduces agency monitoring and bonding costs between the owners and 
managers. Fama and Jensen (1985) state that managerial decisions for these family firms are 
very different compared to firms where ownership and control are separated. James (1999) 
also points out that a family manager is deemed to have a broader and deeper owner (family) 
oriented vista in his or her business perspective as compared to a non-family manager, thereby 
mitigating problems arising from ownership and control separation.  
Shivadasani and Yermack (1999) state that involvement of a CEO in nominating board 
members makes the CEO more powerful as it is less likely that members nominated by him 
counter-attack his decisions or will be interested in monitoring him. This provides the CEO 
more power to influence board decisions.  Adams et al. (2009) investigate the impact on the 
firm performance of family CEOs ability and power to influence decisions in a sample of 336 
firms from the Fortune 500 database over the period from 1992-1999.They find that founder 
CEOs are positively related to financial performance but CEOs’ involvement in nominating 
board members does not have a significant impact on firm performance.  
Barth et al. (2005) state that the ownership and management of a firm by the same family may 
have a negative influence on a firm’s performance because being restricted to selecting 
managers from the family might lead to the appointment of inefficient, incapable and lower 
quality managers. This situation can have a disastrous impact on the firm’s productivity 
(Coleman 1990; Burkart et al. 2003).  They investigate the impact on performance of family- 
owned firms managed by an insider. In a sample of 438 firms associated with the 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO) in the year 1996, they find that 
family owned firms managed by an insider are less productive as compared to non-family 
owned firms.     
Prior studies have compared family CEOs with non-family CEOs on various criteria like 
corporate performance, compensation, strategic and competitive advantage. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) find that a family CEO improves accounting-based performance of a firm. In 
terms of share market-related performance, they find this to be positively associated with a 
founder CEO, but not with succeeding generations of family CEOs. They conclude that 
inherited family CEOs (and non-family CEOs) have a less positive impact on share market 
performance of a firm compared to the founding CEO.  
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Barontini and Caprio (2006) investigate the impact of family succession on financial 
performance and the role of founders and descendants in running family business. They find 
that the presence of a founder either as a CEO or a non-executive director is positively 
reflected in higher firm valuations and operating performance. They do not find evidence of 
the weaker performance of descendent-controlled firms as compared to non-family firms. 
Their findings also suggest that later-generation family firms perform better than non-family 
firms if descendants only contribute to the firm as non-executive directors but not as CEOs.  
Villalonga and Amit is (2006) findings strongly support the differential (positive) effect of 
family ownership, control and management on firm value under certain conditions. They find 
that family ownership only creates value for shareholders when the founder is still active in 
the firm as a CEO or a Chairperson with a non-family CEO. They also report that descendent 
CEOs are worst for minority shareholders, even if the founder is present as a Chairperson of 
the family firm. They further report that the presence of founders in the family firm enhances 
the value of the firm only in the absence of control enhancing mechanisms such as multiple 
share classes with differential voting rights, pyramids, and crossholdings or voting 
agreements which facilitate expropriation away from non-family shareholders. 
Fahlenbrach (2009) argues that a founder CEO is different in approach from successor CEOs. 
He states that founder CEOs invest more in research and development, have higher capital 
expenditure and are involved more in focussed mergers and acquisitions. He reports that 11% 
of the largest publicly traded firms in the USA are headed by founder CEOs. He further 
suggests that founder CEOs have better organisation-specific skills and, due to their 
controlling shareholdings and entrepreneur status, they have better influence and decision 
making power.  Fahlenbrach (2009) investigates the impact of founding family CEOs’ on firm 
valuation and stock market performance in a sample of 2,327 large publicly listed U.S. firms 
during the 1992-93 period and finds that founder CEOs are positively associated with higher 
valuation and better stock market performance  compared to successor CEOs. Similarly, other 
researchers report empirical evidence of a positive relationship between founder family CEO 
and corporate performance (McConaughy et al. 1998; Palia &Ravid, 2002; Villalonga & Amit 
2006). 
Pandey et al. (2011) investigate the impact of a family CEO on financial performance in the 
context of large family-controlled listed companies in India operating in traditional and new 
economy industries. They report a negative relationship between family CEOs and financial 
performance. Their analysis further reveals that this negative relationship is only found in 
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family firms operating in new economy industries in India. They do not find any significant 
impact of family CEO on financial performance in family firms operating in traditional 
industries in India. 
As is evident from past studies, an unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn about the impact 
of family CEO on financial performance. Various studies conducted in different geographical 
locations have come to different conclusions about the role of a family CEO in achieving 
better performance. Therefore, the relationship between family CEO and financial 
performance is an open empirical question which needs to be explored further to explain the 
factors influencing this relationship.  
3.2.1.4 Family Chairperson and financial performance 
Although prior literature has extensively addressed the impacts of family CEOs on both 
financial and accounting performance, but there is a paucity of empirical evidence explaining 
the impacts of family Chairpersons on financial performance. One strong reason for the lack 
of systematic empirical research on this topic is the existence of one-tier boards in the USA, 
the geographical region where most of the past studies on this topic have been conducted and 
separate board chair position is recognised as more ceremonial, symbolic and less powerful as 
compared to the CEO position. But in the Indian family business scenario family chairpersons 
are very powerful and indirectly play an active role in the firms’ strategic decision making. 
Piramal (1997, p.218) describes the role of R.P. Goenka, founder and Chairman Emeritus of 
Goenka Group: “As chairman emeritus, legally he is a figurehead. He rarely attends board 
meetings, and does not receive monthly progress reports of group companies………In reality, 
nothing happens without his nod”. Therefore, the family Chairpersons’ role in the Indian 
family business context and its impact on performance needs to be explored. 
Cadbury (1992) states that a Chairperson’s role is to provide effective leadership of the Board 
as well as “mentoring” of the CEO and executive management. On the other hand, Pearce and 
Zahra (1991) believe that boards with a number of powerful, independently minded members 
are more progressive and are associated with superior financial performance compared to 
boards dominated by the Chairperson. In India, Clause 49 mandatory recommendations are 
silent about the role of the Chairperson but the Birla Committee’s non mandatory 
recommendations state that the role of a Chairperson is to ensure that the board meetings are 
conducted in a manner which secures the effective participation of all directors and maintain a 
balance of power in the board. This Committee’s report further states that the Chairperson’s 
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role should be different from the CEO’s role, although the same individual is allowed to 
perform these roles. Similar to USA and UK, Indian corporate governance listing rules and 
the Companies Act 1956 allow public limited companies to have a single tier board. 
In India, it is a common practice that a founding family member, a patriarch, holds the 
position of non-executive Chairperson or Chairman emeritus after his retirement, but 
technically he is still involved with the company in a role which is beyond that of a visionary 
and strategist (Piramal, p.14). For example, Piramal (1997) reports that although Dheeeru 
Bhai Ambani, founder of Reliance Group, passed the baton to the next generation in the 
1990s, in practical terms he was still working as the CEO of the company. When asked about 
his retirement, he responded “Never. Till my last breath I will work. To retire there is only 
one place-the cremation ground”.  Therefore, especially in the Indian context, the impact of 
the role of the chairman is expected to be significant.  
The emerging evidence on the effect of a Chairperson on board effectiveness and, 
consequently corporate financial performance is inconclusive (Kakabadse & Kakabadse 
2004). Nevertheless, in the case of family companies, there is evidence of a family 
Chairperson being associated with superior financial performance in certain circumstances. A 
study of listed companies in Hong Kong by Lam and Lee (2008) finds that a family 
Chairperson is associated with higher financial performance of a family company when that 
Chairperson has a separate non-family CEO. But financial performance is not higher when the 
family chairperson holds duality as the CEO or when the CEO and chairperson are two 
separate members from the same controlling family. Pandey et al. (2011) studied the impact 
of the family Chairperson on financial performance in large listed family controlled firms in 
India. They report a non-significant impact of the family Chairperson on financial 
performance. However, they find evidence that the family Chairperson significantly 
influences the Board’s operating mode. 
In conclusion, the role of a Chairperson in achieving financial performance has been 
relatively neglected in the prior literature. Moreover, studies conducted to explore the impact 
of a family chairperson on financial performance provide mixed results. The literature also 
suggests that in Indian family firms it is common practices that founder CEOs at the age of 
retirement join their organisation as a board Chairperson and play a mentoring role for the 
coming generation. Therefore, these Chairpersons roles and their impact need to be 
investigated in the context of family businesses in India. 
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3.2.1.5 Family succession and financial performance 
Family business researchers in different countries have identified family succession as one of 
the major issues faced by family businesses (Gollakota & Gupta 2006; Handler 1994). 
Succession means transfer of the family business from the previous generation to the next 
generation.  There is a growing body of research that investigate the founder’s and the 
descendant’s impacts on the value and profitability of a family firm.  
The US based empirical studies give consistent evidence about the superiority of founder-run 
and controlled firms over descendent-controlled firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & 
Amit 2006). Miller et al. (2007) also state that the superiority of family businesses over non-
family businesses is due to the founder’s presence. They further state that after removing lone 
founder firms from the sample, the superiority of family firms over non-family firms 
vanishes. Morck et al. (2000) find that family CEOs who inherit their position from previous 
generations are associated with lower operating performance. Similarly, McConaughy et al. 
(1998) also find evidence of a positive relationship between the founder CEO and firm 
performance. 
The proponents of the ‘positive founder effect’ argue that founder-run firms perform better 
than descendent-run firms because founders are more closely associated with their firm and 
take the betterment of the firm as their achievement. Turning to the succession, Gollakota and 
Gupta (2006) argue that families usually overlook the most competent executives in order to 
appoint family executives or those who have close ties with the family, thus giving preference 
to incompetent executives over competent professional managers from outside.  Cucculelli 
and Micucci (2008) find that inherited management within a family negatively affects 
financial performance. They further state that this impact is highly significant in more 
competitive sectors, where the founder has a specific talent to run the business. Perez- 
Gonzalez (2006) investigates the impact of management succession on performance in a 
sample of 335 firms and finds that family CEOs who inherit their positions underperform 
outsider CEOs. His findings further suggest that the cost of nepotism is very high in family 
businesses and more often minority shareholders are burdened by this cost.  
In contrast, another group of researchers believe that family successors have better firm 
specific knowledge as compared to outsiders because of specific implicit training provided to 
them by families (Cadbury 2000a). Smith and Amoako-Adu (1999) find that family 
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transitions lead to negative performance at the time of appointment but in the long term 
inherited managers perform better than outsiders. 
Slovin and Sushka (1993) investigate the impact of death of a large equity holder on share 
price and find that the founder’s death has no significant impact on share price. On the other 
hand, Johnson et al. (1985) report that sudden death of a founder CEO is related to an increase 
in share price. 
Although most of the evidence from prior literature suggest founders’ superiority over 
descendants in achieving better financial performance, this relationship still need to be 
investigated over different geographical regions for a deeper insight into the dynamics that 
can be at play in diverse circumstances. This study will contribute to the growing body of 
literature by providing evidence of founder vs descendent effects in the Indian family business 
context. 
3.2.2 Family ownership and social performance 
The previous section addresses the impacts of family ownership on financial performance. 
This section specifically reviews the literature addressing the impacts of family ownership on 
social and environmental performance. The literature examining this later relationship is 
considerable less well developed than the literature focussing on the financial performance 
issue. 
The existing literature on family businesses has widely addressed the impact of family control 
on financial performance by taking performance measures as Return on Assets, Return on 
Sales, Tobin’s Q, and Share Price movement (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit 
2006; Beehr et al 1997), but little attention has been paid to determining the impact of family 
presence on social and environmental performance. 
Past literature dominated by conceptual research on this topic provides conflicting views on 
the relationship between family ownership and social-environmental performance. To date 
researchers have studied family firms from two opposite perspectives. A group of researchers 
have used the theory of self-interest to explain the direction of the relationship between family 
ownership and social-environmental performance. In his classic book, The Moral Basis of a 
Backward Society, Banfield (1958) states that families mainly concentrate on self-interest and 
are less likely to be involved in socially responsible behaviour. He states this phenomenon as 
‘amoral familism’. Other researchers have also identified peculiar family characteristics such 
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as excessive nepotism, lack of professionalism, secretiveness, and power games in succession 
(Rosenblatt et al.1985; Handler & Kram 1998; Schulze et al. 2001; Donelly 1988), which may 
have a negative impact on social responsibility performance.  
There is however little empirical evidence to support these viewpoints. Kassinis and Vafeas 
(2002) empirically compare the corporate profile of 209 environmental laws violators as the 
basis for investigating the impact of insider ownership on the likelihood of environmental 
litigation. They find that an increase in the number of environmental violations is positively 
associated with an increase in insider ownership.  
Uhlaner et al. (2004) conducted 42 interviews with the owners of small and medium sized 
Dutch family firms in order to investigate corporate social responsibility in family businesses. 
They report that family business owners prefer to have a good working relationship with 
employees, clients and suppliers, and treat them as a sort of extended family. They also report 
that Dutch SME family businesses are involved in some form of corporate social 
responsibility.   
Morck and Yeung (2004) empirically investigate the relationship between the concentration 
of family firms and various dimensions of societal progress. They find that the countries 
dominated by family firms are backward in a number of dimensions (e.g. physical 
infrastructure, quality of education, economic inequality, infant mortality etc.) due to the self-
interest dominance of family firms. But this study does not look specifically at how family 
ownership relates to social-environmental performance. 
Li and Zhang (2010) examine the impact of ownership structure on corporate social 
responsibility in China, dominated by the presence of state-owned businesses. They find that 
for non-state owned businesses, the dispersion of corporate ownership is positively associated 
with corporate social responsibility while in state-owned firms they find the opposite 
relationship. The point to be noted here is that their research does not specifically address 
family ownership and its impact on corporate social responsibility. 
Dam and Scholtens (2012) consider whether ownership type is linked to corporate social 
responsibility. They use data of 600 European firms from 16 countries and 35 industries and 
find that ownership by employees, individuals and other firms is associated with poor 
corporate social policies of the firms they invest in. Although this study investigates the 
influence of individual shareholders on social and environmental friendly investments, it does 
not specifically address the impacts of family ownership on corporate social responsibility.    
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Some researchers (Chua et al.1999; Whetten & Mackey 2005; Godfrey 2005) have attempted 
to explain the link between family control and social and environmental performance by using 
institutional theory proposed by Scott (1995). Scott (1995) defines an institution as a 
collection of “cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behaviour”. He further states that the cognitive element guides 
behaviour through the construction of social identity, the normative element guides behaviour 
through the less explicit system of social norms, and the values and regulative element 
provides guidance to members of an institution through its rules, controls, rewards and 
sanctions. Leaptrott (2005) states that the construction of social identity, mental scripts and 
templates guide organisational members to adopt those behaviours which are associated with 
positive outcomes and the avoidance of negative outcomes. 
In a more structured institutional theory framework, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify 
three mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic changes take place: “1- Coercive 
isomorphism that stems from political influence and problem of legitimacy; 2- Mimetic 
isomorphism resulting from standard response to uncertainty; and 3- Normative 
isomorphism, associated with professionalization”. They further refer to Hawley’s (1968) 
description of isomorphism as a constraining process that forces one unit in the population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. 
According to Collins et al. (2000), in family businesses members usually share norms and 
values which pressurise family members to conform to normative standards. Scott (1995) 
states that normative business influences can originate from both inside (within family) and 
outside of a family (social networks, government, or professional organisations). According to 
Leaptrott (2005), normative isomorphism results from an organisational need to obtain and 
maintain legitimacy. Similarly, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that when an organisation 
enhances its social acceptance or legitimacy, it helps to increase its access to resources and 
exchange possibilities with other organisations. This eventually can increase its livelihood for 
survival.  
Proponents of institutional theory argue that a family firm not only acts for self-interest but 
has concern for social welfare as well (Chua et al. 1999).  Whetten and Mackey (2005) and 
Dyer and Whetten (2006) provide evidence that family firms are more socially responsible 
compared to non-family firms as they are more concerned for their organisational identity, 
image and reputation. Schein (1983) and Dyer (1992) also suggest that founders of family 
firms see their business operations as an extension of themselves and their identity, and their 
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vision is to pass on a legacy to their coming generations. Therefore, it is contended that 
families are more interested in doing good or being seen to do good for societies.  
In summary, it can be argued on the basis of institutional theory that family businesses might 
be expected to achieve better social and environmental performance in order to obtain social 
acceptance and a better business image for coming generations and, it might be expected that 
later generations will keep these behaviours alive by following family norms and values. 
Gopal Srinivasan, head of the famous TVS group, mentions the institutional loyalty of later 
generations in multigenerational Indian family businesses: “The best way to think about a 
multi-generational family business is as a flow across time. Someone asked me, what would 
your forefathers have thought of your decisions in terms of the values they created? In some 
sense, this defines the family business; it is the whole idea of ‘flow’. Flow from the past, the 
present and inheritance of the legacy you are passing to the future! So, in many ways, good 
families have this strong sense of what I call institutional loyalty versus individual loyalty. It 
is loyalty to what TVS stands for; the reputation we have; the way it opens doors: You want to 
leave it a little bit better than where you got it! It is a very tough job because a lot of 
discomfort and insecurity for the family members comes from having to live up to that 
reputation!” (Source: Forbes India, Oct 21, 2011) 
Overall, it can be concluded that the impact of family ownership on social performance is a 
comparatively new area of research and lacks empirical evidence for defining the direction 
and causation of this relationship. Prior studies have explained this relationship by using 
theories of self-interest and institutional theory which provide contrasting arguments about 
the expected impacts of family ownership on firm social performance.  
3.2.2.1 Indian family firms and social performance 
Indian family firms have a long tradition of donating for social causes. Business families in 
India have a tradition of donating for constructing temples and opening schools in areas of 
high poverty. It is quite common in India to observe temples and rest houses established by 
family business owners with free food and lodging facilities for pilgrims in pilgrimage cities. 
Therefore, it can be said that traditionally Indian family businesses have focussed on charity 
for society as their primary way of expressing social responsibility. However, Ramachandran 
and Jha (2009) state that recently Indian family businesses have changed their focus from 
local charity to wider forms of philanthropy and have added many new philanthropic 
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activities such as environmental conservation and preservation of history and art into their 
corporate social responsibilities.  
Ramachandran and Jha (2009) further state that during the early stage of industrialisation in 
pre-independence India, philanthropy was limited to initiatives taken by individuals and 
organisations for helping the freedom movement, exemplified by the Birla and Godrej 
families’ donations to the freedom struggle and for eradication of the caste system in India. 
 Previously these family groups were donating to charitable organisations. But now most of 
the big family businesses have their own foundations and trusts. These foundations and trusts 
are responsible for philanthropic activities run by these businesses e.g. Tata trust, Aditya Birla 
foundation. Ramachandran and Jha (2009) explain the reason of this phenomenon. They state 
that in Indian philosophy, service to mankind is believed to bring God’s blessings; therefore, 
business families prefer to directly supervise philanthropic activities. They further state that 
non-working family members, particularly women, take an active part in running 
philanthropic activities. 
One of the most well-known family business groups in India, Tata group strongly believes 
that a business thrives on social capital and the group treats the community not simply as a 
stakeholder but a force behind its business existence. J.R.D. Tata, founder of the Tata group 
always used to say: “If you make lots of money you must give it back to society as you have 
received so much love from it”. The Tata group recognises both fiduciary and philanthropic 
commitments and tries to achieve both economic and social goals of their business. 
Gopalakrishnan, an executive director of Tata Sons Limited, describes the philosophy: “ We 
are hard-nosed business guys, who like to earn an extra buck as much as the next guy, 
because we know that extra buck will go back to wipe away a tear somewhere”.11 (Source: 
Tata group website). 
Similarly, another business group, the Aditya Birla Group donates 3% of its net profit to 
charity. The group also believes in the philosophy of social and economic development of the 
communities around its operations for the betterment of weaker sections of the society. The 
group is actively involved in community work across 3000 villages focussing on healthcare, 
education, sustainable livelihood, infrastructure and other social causes. The group spends in 
                                                             
11http://www.tata.com/company/Articles/inside.aspx?artid=HCy+RNqd0vk= 
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excess of INR130 crores12 annually, and runs 18 hospitals and 42 schools (Source: Aditya 
Birla Group website)13 
Traditionally in the Hindu philosophy charity is treated as an act of purifying the inner self 
and is included in one of the ‘Ten Inyalas (Observances) in Hinduism’. The third observance 
of Hinduism speaks about Dana (Charity) without having thought of reward. Therefore, 
family businesses owned by Hindu owners prefer not to publicise charities run by their 
organisations. Kumar Managalam Birla, Chairperson of the Aditya Birla Group, also 
recognises this religious aspect of the Hindu culture. He states “The culture of caring and 
giving permeates many Indian families. In their own way, they are engaged in philanthropic 
pursuits. Several corporates are doing a lot in this space, but they are quiet about it” (Source: 
Times of India). Similarly, Gopal Srinivasan, founder Chairperson and CEO of the TVS 
group also emphasises the need for making strong social connections when running a 
successful business.  
Indian family businesses have a long tradition of involvement with communities through 
social charity and religious affiliations, but little research has been undertaken in the past to 
explain the motivations of Indian family businesses concerning their involvement with 
communities. Moreover, most of the research to date has examined the relationship between 
family ownership and financial and social performance in the context of Western family 
businesses, mainly from the USA and Europe. However, the special characteristics of Indian 
family businesses mainly dominated by trading communities, the caste system, and the strong 
influence of the Hindu philosophy differentiate Indian family businesses from their global 
counterparts. Therefore, there is a strong need to study Indian family business, its particular 
characteristics and their impact on both financial and social performance. This thesis 
addresses this gap and makes an original contribution to the existing literature on family 
businesses by investigating the impacts of family ownership and involvement on social 
performance for listed family controlled firms in India. 
                                                             
12 1 Crore = 10 million 
13http://www.adityabirla.com/social_projects/overview.htm 
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3.3 Board Governance and performance 
3.3.1 Board governance and financial performance 
The role of the board in implementing good governance in publicly listed firms has been a 
topic of discussion in the media and corporate governance research. This role has been widely 
recognised by major agencies involved in promoting and implementing good corporate 
governance practices around the globe. The OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004) clearly refers to the supervising and monitoring roles of boards of directors and their 
need to act in the best interest of the company and shareholders. The Cadbury Report (1992) 
states that boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies and their 
responsibilities include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to 
achieve these aims, supervising management and reporting to shareholders and stakeholders.  
In India, the Desirable Code of Corporate Governance (1998) also recognises the importance 
of effective and efficient boards and states that a well-functioning, informed board of 
directors is the key for achieving a good corporate governance system. The Kumar Mangalam 
Birla Committee report (2000) also highlights the roles and responsibilities of the board: “ the 
board directs the company, by formulating and reviewing company’s policies, strategies, 
major plans of action, risk policy, annual budgets and business plans, setting performance 
objectives, monitoring implementation and corporate performance, and overseeing major 
capital expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures, change in financial control and 
compliance with applicable laws, taking into account the interests of shareholders”(Source: 
SEBI). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that corporate governance guidelines and codes in many 
countries emphasise the supervisory and management monitoring roles of boards of directors 
in providing protection to shareholders, stakeholders and the general public interest. But the 
issue is, if the boards are actively deciding companies’ strategic policies and monitoring firm 
performance in the best interests of the company and wider interests, then there should be 
some relationship between the board governance characteristics and firm financial and social 
performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) argue that effective board monitoring is related 
to positive financial performance as it reduces agency cost. Gompers et al. (2003) argue that 
poor board governance causes agency cost such as managerial shirking, over-investment and 
perquisite consumption. As discussed in the Chapter 2, the corporate governance reforms in 
India are comparatively new as compared to developed economies where most of the 
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governance research has been conducted. This study explores the impact of board governance 
on financial performance in the context of family businesses in India. 
3.3.2 Board governance and social performance 
The present era of corporate philanthropy and triple bottom line reporting has broadened the 
corporate governance definition used in the past.  Sir Adrian Cadbury (2000b) describes this 
broadened definition of corporate governance as “Corporate governance is concerned with 
holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and 
communal goals. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, 
corporations, and society”. Levy (1999) takes this view further and argues that corporate 
philanthropy and social initiatives taken by organisations for the welfare of society are the 
heart and soul of the business. Dilling (2010) argues that corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
is not a standalone concept and its goal is not achievable until or unless it is integrated with 
mission, vision and strategy of the organisation. Similarly, Painter-Morland (2006) also 
argues that CSR cannot provide competitive advantage unless organisational CSR activities 
are aligned with the corporate governance framework of the organisation. Spitzeck (2009) 
also shares a similar view and states that corporations act responsibly, in a consistent way, 
only if corporate responsibility issues are integrated in their governance system and decision 
making process. Therefore, it can be argued that corporate governance can play a pivotal role 
in achieving the goals of CSR. 
Corporate governance and its role in achieving the goal of sustainable development has lately 
been recognised as a topic of research and several researchers have tried to integrate these two 
concepts (e.g. Paine 1994; Blair 1995; Bird 2001; Manville & Ober 2003; Ricart et al. 2005; 
Aguilera et al. 2006; Elkington 2006; White 2006; Aras & Crowther 2008; Dilling 2010; 
Spitzeck 2009). Moreover, corporate governance guidelines issued by different agencies for 
achieving best corporate governance practices (e.g. AS 8000 Corporate governance standard, 
ASX Corporate Governance practices, and OECD guidelines), either directly or indirectly 
refer to social responsibility issues such as community engagement, human rights and 
environmental sustainability (Mallin, 2002).  
In India, government is also seriously concerned about bringing sustainability into the board 
room. The National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, Environmental and Economic 
Responsibilities of Businesses released by the Government of India in 2011, recognise social 
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and environmental responsibilities of businesses. The following are principles outlined in 
these national voluntary guidelines: 
1-Businesses should provide goods and services that are safe and contribute to sustainability 
throughout their life cycle. 
2- Businesses should promote well-being of all employees. 
3- Businesses should respect the interest of, and be responsive towards all stakeholders, 
especially those who are disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised. 
4- Business should respect and promote human rights. 
5- Business should respect, protect and make efforts to restore the environment. 
Although these guidelines are voluntary, it is expected that boards and senior managements 
will take the necessary steps to make sure these guidelines are properly understood and 
executed across their organisations.  
Empirical studies conducted by Ricart et al. (2005) and Mackenzie (2007) witness that 
corporate boards have started integrating social responsibility issues into their governance 
mechanism and their decision making process.  Cartwright and Craig (2006) demonstrate 
seven pathways for aligning corporate governance with global sustainability and state that 
initiation of the operation of these pathways depends on strategic innovation by the corporate 
board. Martineli and Midttun (2010) focus on the impact of the recent global financial crisis 
on governance regulations. They state that this crisis has increased demand for corporations to 
include social and environmental responsibility issues in their governance agenda. Morgan et 
al. (2009) talk about “next generation” corporate citizenship which puts more emphasis on the 
relationship between business and society and they provide advice for inclusion of 
contemporary social and environmental issues in the governance and operation of a firm.  
Therefore, it can be argued, on the basis of above discussion that good governance practices 
need to play a dominant role if better social and environmental performance is to be achieved. 
However, it should be noted that the majority of studies mentioned above are conceptual and 
lack empirical evidence. This study fills this gap by empirically analysing the relationships 
between corporate governance mechanism and social and environmental performance in the 
context of large listed family firms in India. 
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In order to study the impact of corporate governance on financial and social performance, 
prior researchers have covered, to different degrees, the effects of board size, board 
composition, board process and board meeting frequency on financial and social performance. 
Next section addresses those studies that have considered the impacts of board governance 
factors on financial and social performance.  
3.4 Board size and performance 
3.4.1 Board size and firm performance 
What should be an adequate board size to bring about good performance? Leading corporate 
governance guidelines and regulations are silent on recommending a particular board size for 
attaining best governance practices. Principle VI of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2004) broadly covers the responsibilities of the Board for protecting 
shareholders rights but does not mention board size. The latest UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) which replaced the UK’s Combined Code 2003 and 2006 does not specifically 
mention the ‘board size’. But it does refer to the board needing an appropriate balance of 
skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable it to discharge its 
respective duties and responsibilities effectively.  
Similarly, Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement in India does not refer to any specific board 
size but suggests an optimum combination of executive and non-executive directors on the 
board. The Indian Companies Act 1956, the principal legislation providing a formal structure 
for corporate governance, specifically covers the minimum board size requirement for public 
limited companies in India. According to the provisions of s252 of the Indian Companies Act 
1956, all public companies having capital of INR five crores or more and one thousand or 
more shareholders should have at least three directors on the board. All other companies 
should have at least two directors.   
The research literature is far from unanimous about the relationship between board size and 
firm performance.  Researchers supporting smaller boards argue that larger boards are less 
cohesive (Shaw 1981), hard to coordinate (Gladstein1984) and vulnerable to group conflict 
(O’Reilly et al 1989), thus reducing the chances of reaching consensus on critical matters 
(Goodstein et al.1994). On the other hand, researchers who support larger boards (Dalton et 
al.1998) argue this on the basis of Resource Dependency Theory, developed by Pfeffer and 
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Salancik (1978), which discusses organisational dependence on external environment for 
critical resources both financial and physical.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue in favour of a smaller board size as they state that bigger 
boards (bigger than 10) hinder meaningful discussion. They further state that a board is a 
group of individuals and to be effective they should communicate with each other and discuss 
complex company information to reach a consensus before taking a decision, but bigger board 
size reduces the possibility that this can be achieved. Similarly, Jensen (1993) argues in the 
favour of smaller boards. He states that increasing board size beyond seven or eight members 
reduces board effectiveness and provides opportunity for the CEO to override the board. In 
summary these researchers hold that larger boards reduce communication and coordination 
among group members leading to agency problems. 
The first empirical evidence of the relationship between board size and firm performance was 
found by Yermack (1996). In a sample of 452 large U.S. public corporations observed over 
the period 1984 to 1991, Yermack finds negative relationship between board size and firm 
market value measured by Tobin Q. He also reports a negative relationship between board 
size and accounting measures of profitability. To prove the robustness of this relationship, he 
conducted a variety of tests by taking a number of control variables such as firm size, industry 
type, board composition, insider stock ownership etc. and all the tests reach a similar 
conclusion that smaller boards are valued highly in the stock market. The point to be noted 
here is that the average size of corporate board in the sample used by Yermack (1996) was 12. 
Huther (1997) investigates the impact of board size on variable costs for firms governed by 
the Rural Electric Cooperatives in 45 states of the United States and finds that larger boards 
are significantly correlated with higher costs and supports the theory that larger boards are 
ineffective in making decisions. 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) investigate the relationship between board size and firm performance 
in a random sample of 900 Finnish firms from 1992-1994 and find that board size is 
negatively related to firm’s profitability measured by industry adjusted return on assets. They 
further report that this relationship is not only robust to controls for firm size, industry, firm 
age and the change in assets but also robust to endogeneity problems arising from taking 
industry adjusted ROA as a proxy for measuring profitability. They also do not find any 
empirical evidence of increase in the board size as a consequence of poor performance in the 
past.  
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Conyon and Peck (1998) oppose the view point that larger boards are associated with 
effective monitoring hence reduced agency cost. They argue that monitoring advantages of 
larger boards are outweighed by problems related to (a) informal asymmetries between the 
CEO and the board (b) communication issues and (c) decision making. They empirically test 
the relationship between board size and firm performance for a sample from five major 
European countries and find a negative relationship between board size and firm performance 
measured by return on equity. They further report that this negative relationship is less clear 
for a market based performance measure (Tobin’s Q). Similarly, Andres et al. (2005) also find 
a negative relationship between board size and firm performance in a sample taken from 10 
OECD countries. 
Vafeas (2000) empirically investigates the relationship between board size and earning 
informativeness for a sample of 307 US public firms over the period 1990-1994 and finds that 
earnings are more informative for firms having smaller boards (with a minimum of five board 
members). He concludes that board size is inversely related to board monitoring quality. 
Bennedsen et al. (2008) empirically investigate the impact of board size on performance on a 
sample of 7496 small and medium sized firms from Denmark and find a significant negative 
impact of board size on performance when increasing board size above six or more members. 
They do not find any performance effect when varying board size below six directors. 
Similarly, Cheng (2008) investigates the impacts of board size on different measures of 
performance and reports that board size is negatively related for a sample of 1252 U.S. firms 
over the period of 1996-2004 and find that larger boards are associated with lower annual 
accounting return on assets (ROA) and Tobin Q. 
Linck et al. (2008) argue that firms decide their board size on the basis of cost and benefits of 
monitoring and advising. Using a sample of 7000 U.S. firms over the period 1990 to 2004; 
they empirically find that firms with high growth opportunities, high R & D expenditures, and 
high stock return volatility have smaller boards, while the large firms have larger boards.  
In contrast, a positive view of Board size is developed in several studies discussed further.  
Van den Berghe and Levaru (2004) state that a greater number of directors on board bring 
more expertise as larger boards are more likely to have better knowledge and skills as 
compared to smaller boards.  Dalton et al. (1999) talk about the advisory role of a larger 
Board and argue that larger Board provides valuable advice to the CEO and outside directors, 
thereby imparting quality of advice to the CEO otherwise unavailable from internal corporate 
staff. He finds systematic evidence of a positive relationship between board size and 
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performance by conducting meta- analysis of 20620 observations from 131 samples collected 
from 27 relevant studies. Similarly, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) examine the relationship 
between board demographics and corporate performance in a sample of 348 largest publicly 
listed Australian companies and find that after controlling firm size; board size is positively 
related to financial performance. 
Coles et al. (2008) challenge the notion that smaller board size increases firm value. They 
argue that complex firms need larger boards as they need more expertise and greater advising 
as compared to the smaller firms. Using a sample of 8165 firm year observations over the 
period 1992-2001, they report a U shaped relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  They further explain that Tobin’s Q is positively related to board size in 
complex firms and is negatively related to board size in smaller firms. 
Jackling and Johl (2009) also support resource dependency theory to explain the impact of 
board size on financial performance. They empirically test relationship between board size 
and firm performances for the top 180 companies listed at the Bombay Stock Exchange and 
find a positive relation between board size and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q.  
A limited number of studies have specifically looked into the relationship between board size 
and firm performance in the family owned firms. Hu et al. (2010) empirically suggest that 
ownership concentration in family firms hinders the governance and supervision role of board 
of directors, making them unable to effectively influence financial performance. Gracia- 
Ramos and Gracia-Olalla (2011) examine the impact of the founder effect on the relationship 
between board size and firm performance. Using a sample of European publically traded 
family firms they find a positive relation between board size and firm performance in non-
founder led businesses and negative relationship in founder led businesses.  
Pandey et al. (2011) empirically analyse the relationship between board size and firm 
performance for a sample of 131 of the largest (in terms of total assets) family firms listed at 
Bombay Stock Exchange. They find positive relationship between board size and financial 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q. They argue in the favour of the application of resource 
dependency theory in the Indian family firms’ context as most of the largest family firms are 
highly complex and diversified hence they need a big set of board members having expertise 
in different businesses held by family firms. Their findings support the findings of Dalton et 
al. (1999) and Coles et al. (2008). 
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Although most of the reviewed studies investigating this relationship show a negative 
association between board size and financial performance, two recent studies conducted in 
Indian context evidence contradictory findings ( Jackling and Johl 2009 ; Pandey et al. 2011). 
Although Balasubramanian (2010) states that boards in India are mainly considered as legal 
necessities and are constituted only to meet compliance requirements, recent studies support 
the application of resource dependency theory in the Indian context. It has been found that 
Indian businesses, owned and managed by families gain benefit when board bring in 
additional skills and expertise.  
As evident from the past studies an unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn about the 
dependency of firm performance on board size. Various studies conducted in different 
geographical locations for diversified group of companies have come to different findings. 
Even the studies done in the same country for different samples have obtained different 
results. It would seem that there are different known factors (firm size, firm age, CEO 
domination, industry, local governance regulation and corporate culture) and no doubt as yet 
unknown factors that affect the relationship between corporate board size and financial 
performance. Moreover very little research has been done to find out the impact of board size 
on firm performance in the special case of family firms, hence studying this relationship in the 
context of Indian family firms will be a real contribution. 
3.4.2 Board size and corporate social performance 
Corporate social performance refers to firm’s social and environmental performance from a 
variety of perspectives such as community involvement, product safety, philanthropy and 
impact of firm on the environment (Dunn & Sainty 2009). Board of directors are one of the 
most important elements of the corporate governance mechanism and they play a dominant 
role in the supervision of agents running company business (Said et al. 2009). Although in the 
past agency theory has been dominantly used by the researchers to explain principal- agent 
conflict from the financial aspect, the triple bottom line concept and the role of business for 
protecting society and environment has forced researchers to adopt a widened interpretation 
of agency theory which talks about protecting stakeholders interests and suggest that boards 
can play a dominant role in protecting stakeholders interest by overseeing the way 
management is conducting business.   
Researchers in the past have studied the impact of the board composition on the financial 
performance of firm. This study extends financial performance literature to explain 
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relationship between board size and social-environmental performance. The literature review 
on the impact of board size on financial performance has already been discussed in depth 
under the heading board size and financial performance.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Conyon 
and Peck (1998) find in their empirical studies that larger boards are less effective as 
compared to smaller boards, they use agency theory to explain their findings that larger 
boards reduce communication and coordination among group members hence leading to 
agency problems. Agency theory highlights the monitoring and supervisory roles of board of 
directors over management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that 
larger boards are less participative and cohesive as compared to smaller boards. Other 
researchers such as, Dalton et al. (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998),  Van den Berghe 
and Levaru (2004), Coles et al. (2008) suggest that larger boards bring multi skills and 
expertise to the board, provide broader strategic thinking and reduce CEO domination on 
board. This study follows agency theory presumption that effective boards with better 
communication and clear strategic thinking lead to better social performance.  
There are only few studies which have directly addressed the relationship between board size 
and corporate social performance. Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) empirically examine the impact 
of board size on the number of environmental lawsuits in a sample of 209 US firms between 
1994 and 1998. They find that smaller boards are more effective in monitoring and motivating 
managers to comply with environmental regulations compared to larger boards. 
Said et al. (2009) empirically examine the relationship between board size and the level of 
CSR disclosures in a sample of 150 Malaysian listed firms for the year ended 2006. They do 
not find any evidence of a negative relationship between board size and the level of CSR 
disclosures.  
Sahin et al. (2011) empirically investigate the relationship between board size and corporate 
social performance measured by a corporate social responsibility index in sample of 165 
Turkish firms listed in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in 2007 and find no significant 
relationship between board size and corporate social performance. 
There is a small but growing body of research explaining the impact of board size on 
corporate social performance and sustainability disclosures with inconsistent findings. 
Moreover, there is a lack of research explaining the mechanism by which board size impacts 
on corporate social performance. This thesis addresses this gap by collecting empirical 
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evidence of the impact of board size on corporate social performance in the context of Indian 
family businesses. 
3.5 Board independence and firm performance 
3.5.1 Board independence and financial performance 
Traditionally, agency theory has been extensively used in the past literature for investigating 
the relationship between board independence and financial performance. This theory argues 
that principal-agent conflicts would be minimised by better monitoring and effective 
supervision of management by board of directors (Fama & Jensen 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Shleifer &Vishny 1997). Fama and Jensen (1983) further argue that boards dominated 
by independent directors are more effective in the monitoring and supervision of 
management.  
The literature, dominated by agency theory, has mainly concentrated on the monitoring role of 
the board but more recently a number of researchers (Dalton et al.1999; Johnson et al. 1996; 
Hermalin & Weisbach 1998) have started debating the advisory role of the board where the 
skills and knowledge held by the board becomes critical. Proponents of resource dependency 
theory refer to the advisory role of outside directors and their role in providing access to 
resources needed by the firm (Dalton et al.1999; Johnson et al.1996). They further argue that 
outside directors impart advice to the CEO that otherwise would be unavailable from internal 
corporate staff. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) state that ‘‘the CEO may choose an outside 
director who will give good advice and counsel, who can bring valuable experience and 
expertise to the Board”. Van den Berghe and Levaru (2004) also state that suitable external 
directors bring their expertise and experience to the Board. 
Balasubramanian (2010) explains the difference between non-executive directors and 
independent directors in the Indian context. He states that in the developed world non-
executive directors by definition are largely also independent. However in India, due to 
domination of family ownership, provisions do exist for recognising non-independent, non-
executive directors, which means a family member on the board can be non-executive but 
cannot be considered as an independent. Clause 49 of the Indian listing agreement on 
corporate governance also refers to the difference between independent and non-executive-
non independent directors.  
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In India the concept of independent directors was introduced for the first time by the 
Confederation of Indian Industry, in ‘Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code’ (1998).  The 
Code suggests that a listed company with a turnover of INR 100 Crores or above should have 
at least 30 % independent directors on the board if the Chairman is a non-executive director 
and at least half of the board should be independent if the Chairman is an executive director. 
The revised Indian listing agreement Clause 49 also states that for a company with an 
executive chairman, at least half of the board should comprise of independent directors. For a 
company with a non-executive chairman, at least one-third of the board should be 
independent. The revised clause 49 also defines the meaning of ‘independent director’ as a 
non-executive director of the company who: 
a. apart from receiving director’s remuneration, does not have any material 
pecuniary relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters, its 
directors, its senior management or its holding company, its subsidiaries and 
associates which may affect independence of the director;  
b. is not related to promoters or persons occupying management positions at the 
board level or at one level below the board;  
c. has not been an executive of the company in the immediately preceding three 
financial years;  
d. is not a partner or an executive or was not partner or an executive during the 
preceding three years, of any of the following: (i) the statutory audit firm or the 
internal audit firm that is associated with the company, and (ii) the legal firm(s) 
and consulting firm(s) that have a material association with the company.  
e. is not a material supplier, service provider or customer or a lessor or lessee of the 
company, which may affect independence of the director;  
f. is not a substantial shareholder of the company i.e. owning two percent or more of 
the block of voting shares. 
g. is not less than 21 years of age 
(Source: Clause 49 of listing agreement)   
The relationship between board independence and financial performance has been widely 
addressed in past research but with inconsistent findings. Chung et al. (2003) and Hossain et 
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al. (2000) both find a positive relationship between board independence and financial 
performance. Gani and Jermias (2006) investigate the impact of board independence on 
financial performance across different strategies and show that board independence has more 
positive impact on financial performance of firms following a strategy of cost efficiency as 
compared to firms following a strategy of innovation. Similarly, other researchers such as 
Prevost et al. (2002), Choi et al. (2007) and Lefort and Urzua (2008) in other country context 
report a positive relationship between board independence and financial performance.  
 In contrast, Bathala and Rao (1995), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Daily and Johnson 
(1997) find a negative relationship between board independence and financial performance. 
Bhagat and Black (2002) find that low-profitability firms adopt a strategy of increasing 
independence of their board of directors, but they find no evidence suggesting the success of 
this strategy. They further argue that firms having a more independent board do not perform 
better than other firms. Similarly, other researchers (mostly from the US) such as Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Dalton et al. (1998), Bhagat and Black 
(2002),Erickson et al.(2005), Beiner et al. (2006) and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) have reported 
no significant relationship between board independence and financial performance. 
In the context of India, Jackling and Johl (2009) studied the impact of outside directors 
presence on financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA for a sample of 180 
Indian firms, and they found that presence of outsiders on board have positive impact on 
financial performance but the relationship was only marginally significant. Moreover, they 
also report that when ROA is selected as a performance measure then significance disappears. 
They suggest that this weaker association may be attributed to possible lack of independence 
due to strong existence of family firms in India. 
In an another study in the same context, Pandey et al. (2011) investigated the impact of board 
independence on financial performance for a sample of 131 of the largest family firms in 
India and find that the inclusion of independent directors on the board of family owned firms 
does not add financial value to the firm. They suggest that either the independent directors on 
the boards of family controlled firms were not truly independent or that they were only 
appointed as a token to comply with the listing rules. 
These studies about the relationship between board independence and financial performance 
for different profiles of companies in different country jurisdictions have come to different 
conclusions. Therefore it can be argued that each study contributes its own conclusion for its 
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own context. This thesis will provide evidence in the Indian family firm context of the impact 
of board independence as defined in clause 49 of the listing agreement on financial 
performance. 
3.5.2 Board Independence and social performance 
The influence of independent directors on social performance can be explained on the basis of 
agency theory as independent directors can provide better monitoring and more likely to 
challenge management as compared to inside directors who are members of senior 
management team (Dunn & Sainty 2009). They further argue that independent directors may 
promote broader stakeholder orientation by providing diverse inputs into strategic decision 
making process within the board which have potential to monitor and motivate management.  
Webb (2004), who studied board composition of socially and non-socially responsive firms, 
find that socially responsive firms have more independent directors as compared to non- 
socially responsive firms. Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) also find evidence of an enhanced 
level of social responsiveness of board having a higher percentage of independent directors. 
Wang and Dewhrist (1992) find that independent directors are often more sensitive to the 
needs of multiple stakeholders groups and are more socially aware as compared to dependent 
directors. Coffey and Wang (1998) and Johnson and Greening (1999) find that firms having 
higher number of independent directors have better social performance ratings. Kassinis and 
Vafeas (2002) suggests that independent directors pay more attention for long term 
performance and make sure that management comply with environment laws. Their empirical 
analysis reveals that larger numbers of independent directors reduce the chances of 
environmental lawsuit against the firm. Similarly, Huang (2010) argues that the presence of 
independent director on the board has greatest impact on social performance of firm’s worker, 
customer, supplier, community and society dimensions.   
Mckendall et al. (1999) investigate the impacts of board structure on environmental violations 
in a sample of 159 largest companies in US and find no significant relationship between the 
presence of outsiders on board and the incidence of environmental violations.  
In contrast, Dunn and Sainty (2009) investigate the relationship between board independence 
and corporate social performance in a sample of the 50 best companies in Canada for the four 
year period (2002&2004-2006) and find that number of independent directors is positively 
related to social performance. Barako and Brown (2008) examine the relationship between 
number of independent directors and quality of corporate social reporting disclosures by 
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Kenyan banks. They also report a positive relationship between number of independent 
directors and corporate social disclosure. Similarly, Sahin et al. (2011) empirically 
investigated the relationship between board independence and social responsibility 
performance of Turkish firms and find that higher proportion of independent directors on 
board leads to better corporate social performance.  
Although the impact of board independence on financial performance has been widely 
addressed in the past literature but a limited number of systematic empirical studies address 
the influence of board independence on social performance. Past literature provide mixed 
opinion on the impact of board independence on corporate social performance. In conclusion, 
given mixed evidence on board independence, the impact of board independence on financial 
and social performance is an open empirical question. 
3.6 Board meeting frequency and firm performance 
3.6.1 Board meeting frequency and financial performance 
The impacts of board activity on firm performance have been a topic of extensive debate in 
recent corporate governance literature. The number of board meetings held in a year has 
frequently been used as a proxy for measuring board activity or board activeness. Garcia-
Ramos and Garcia-Olalla (2011) argue that a higher frequency of board meetings enables 
better monitoring by the board which reduces agency cost and eventually enhances firm 
performance. Vafeas (1999) draws attention to costs associated with organising board 
meetings such as travel expenses, managerial time and directors sitting fees and argue that 
fewer board meetings would lead to better financial performance. Other groups of researchers 
believe that abnormal business activity in a particular business year is driven by past 
performance (Vafeas 1999; Adams 2005; Brick & Chidambaram 2010).  
Corporate governance guidelines, listing rules and regulations throughout the globe have 
emphasised the importance of holding regular board meetings for efficient governance. 
OECD Principles on Corporate Governance (2004) states that board members should act on a 
fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the 
company and the shareholders. OECD Principles do not suggest a minimum number of board 
meetings that should be held by the board in a year. Similarly, the UK Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance (2010) and the New York Stock Exchange Rules (2006) do not 
mention a minimum number of board meetings. But, in India both Clause 49 Listing Rules 
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and the Companies Act 1956 have a mandatory requirement of a minimum number of board 
meetings to be held in a year. Clause 49 Listing Rules states that the board shall meet at least 
four times a year, with a maximum time gap of four months between any two meetings. 
Similarly, s 285 of the Companies Act 1956 also state that the board should meet at least once 
in three calendar months.   
Prior literature addressing this relationship reveals a contrasting association between Board 
meeting frequency and financial performance of the firm. A common belief is that more 
frequent board meetings equate to board diligence and should have a positive impact on 
financial performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) state that the most widely shared problem 
faced by directors in carrying out their responsibility is a lack of time. They propose that the 
boards should meet at least bimonthly for a whole day meeting for committee sessions and 
other related activities and once a year for a two or three day session for deciding company 
strategy. They argue that frequent meetings provide dialogue opportunity among directors 
which lead to effective monitoring and governance, eventually results in improved financial 
performance. Conger et al. (1998) suggest that directors need sufficient, well organised 
periods of time to make effective strategic decisions for company welfare; hence board 
meetings help in improving the effectiveness of Board.  
There is also an opposite view which suggests that routine board meetings make only a small 
contribution to board effectiveness or have little real impact on the performance of the firm. 
Taking this view, Jensen (1993) argues that standard board meetings are a routine task in 
which the CEO sets the agenda and most of the board meeting time is spent on these tasks, 
providing little opportunity for outside directors to exercise initiative leading to meaningful 
control over the company management. He suggests that boards should be more active when 
there are problems and should be relatively inactive in normal situations. Jensen (1993) 
further argues that while the consequences of higher board activity are unclear, higher board 
activity is a likely corporate response to poor performance. 
Vafeas (1999) argues that board meeting frequency is related to the corporate governance and 
ownership characteristics in line with agency and contracting theory. He empirically examines 
the impact of board meeting frequency on financial performance for a sample of the 350 
largest firms listed in the Forbes Compensation Survey over the period 1990-94 and finds that 
boards that meet more frequently are valued less by the market. He also reports that 
abnormally high meeting frequency leads to better performance in subsequent years, however 
 81 
 
the improvement in the performance was more significant for the firms experiencing poor 
performance and firms not engaged in corporate control transactions. 
Brick and Chidambaram (2008) expect that boards will increase their activities to insulate 
them from the allegations of inactiveness if the company performs poorly in the future. They 
further state that the boards will be meeting more frequently in response to corporate events 
such as mergers and acquisitions. Brick and Chidambaram (2010) examine the impact of 
board activity on financial and accounting performance in a broad panel of 5,228 firm year 
observations over a six year period 1999 to 2005 and they support the findings of Vafeas 
(1999) and Adams (2005) that board activity is driven by past performance. They also show 
that higher board monitoring leads to better financial performance but have no impact on 
accounting performance, thus proving the concept that higher investment opportunity leads to 
more frequent board meetings. 
Jackling and Johl (2009) study the impact of board activity, measured by board meeting 
frequency, on financial performance in a sample of 180 top Indian companies listed in the 
Bombay Stock Exchange and find no significant relationship between board meeting 
frequency and financial performance. A possible reason for this finding has been explained by 
Balasubramanian (2010, p.121), who states that traditionally in India, boards were considered 
as legal necessities fulfilling compliance requirements but with limited practical usefulness of 
fulfilling compliance requirement , therefore, they operated in a way that had  little impact on 
company performance.   
There is still a scarcity of empirical research analysing the impact of board meeting frequency 
on family owned businesses.  Nielsen and Frishkoff (1991) compare the data of family firms 
with non-family firms and state that family business directors meet significantly less often 
than directors serving on non-family business boards, they conclude that higher number of 
board meetings are organised by those boards having no active participation of family 
members.  Van den Berghe and Carchon (2002) analyse questionnaires received from 325 
Belgian companies and report that family boards hold fewer meetings compared to non- 
family boards. They further compare person-owned family Business (where a person owns 
more than 50% share) and family-owned family Business (where family owns more than 50 
% share) and find that family-owned family business holds more meetings and the frequency 
of these meetings increases over generations.   
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Garcia-Ramos and Garcia-Olalla (2011) examine the impact of board governance on financial 
performance in public founder and non-founder-led Spanish, Italian and Portuguese listed 
family businesses during 2001-2007. Their findings support the agency theory proposition 
and show a positive relationship between frequency of board meetings and firm performance. 
They further show that founder-led family businesses hold less frequent board meetings as 
compared to non-founder-led family businesses. They explain their findings on the basis of 
Dana and Smyrnios’s (2010) argument that in founder-led family businesses informal 
meetings such as meal and family gatherings are perceived by external investors as a 
replacement for formal board meetings.  
Pandey et al. (2011) empirically examine the relationship between board meeting frequency 
and financial performance in a sample of 131 top listed Indian family firms and find no 
significant relationship between board meeting frequency and financial performance. They 
further subdivide the whole sample into traditional and new economy industries and 
demonstrate a positive relationship between board meeting frequency and financial 
performance for traditional industries. However, for new economy industries, they find a 
negative relationship between board meeting frequency and financial performance. Vafeas 
(1999) suggests a rational way of explaining this result. He argues that companies in 
traditional industries will be more effective if they emphasize the benefits of having more 
frequent Board meetings to enable more time for directors to confer, set strategy, and monitor 
management. On the other hand, companies in new economy industries will be more effective 
if they emphasize the costs of managerial time, directors’ meeting fees and slowing down 
decision-taking that would be caused by having too many board meetings. 
In summary, the literature suggests some ambiguity in the relationship between board meeting 
frequency and financial performance. Moreover, there have not been enough studies to 
explain this relationship in the context of emerging economy such as India. This study 
addresses this issue and provides empirical support to define the direction of relationship 
between board meeting frequency and financial performance in the context of an emerging 
economy.   
3.6.2 Board meeting frequency and social performance 
Although the frequency of board meetings and its impact on financial performance has been 
widely discussed in corporate governance literature, there is a scarcity of systematic empirical 
research to address the impact of board meeting frequency on corporate social performance. 
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This thesis extends available literature on the impact of board meeting frequency on financial 
performance in the context of social performance.   
Prior literature explaining the impact of board meeting frequency on financial performance 
suggests that the board of directors may influence financial performance. The question is 
whether board of directors can influence corporate social performance and whether board 
meeting frequency has any bearing on this. The literature suggests that the boards have 
responsibility of monitoring and supervising management, designing strategies and allocating 
resources. Therefore, it is a reasonable hypothesis that boards will play a dominant role in 
improving corporate social performance.  
Ricart et al. (2005) conduct an in depth analysis of the governance system of the 18 leading 
corporations in the market sectors included in the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index and 
they report that sustainability is usually discussed informally during every board meeting 
because sustainable development has been integrated into the core strategy of these 
businesses. They find that the frequency of meetings where sustainability policies are 
formally discussed varies from one to four times in a year.  
Zahra (1989) conduct interviews of CEOs and board members of 72 manufacturing 
companies to analyse the relationship between board process and corporate social 
responsibility performance. She measures efficiency of board process by evaluating directors’ 
responses to five items, (a) level of meetings attended (b) frequency of board meetings (c) 
quality of board deliberations (d) thoroughness of board deliberations and (e) boards’ 
effectiveness in making decisions. She reports that effective internal board processes are 
positively related to corporate social responsibility performance. 
In summary, the literature strongly conveys that there is still scarcity of empirical studies 
connecting board meeting frequency and social performance. Therefore, the relationship 
between board meeting frequency and its impact on social performance is an open empirical 
question which needs to be analysed further to make contribution to the existing literature. 
This thesis addresses this gap and investigates the impact of board meeting frequency on 
social performance of listed family controlled firms in India. 
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3.7 CEO duality and firm performance 
3.7.1 CEO duality and financial performance 
CEO duality and its impact on firm performance is one of the widely addressed topics in the 
corporate governance research. Duality refers to a situation when the same person holds the 
position of a CEO and Chairperson in an organisation. The duality exists in those countries 
which follow single- tier board system (e.g. USA) where both executive and supervisory 
power is held with a single board. OECD principles (2004) recommend a separation between 
the posts of the CEO and Chairperson to achieve an appropriate balance of power, to increase 
accountability and to improve the board’s independent decision making. The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2010) does not directly mention the term ‘duality’ but emphasises on a 
clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board 
and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. It further states 
that no one individual should have unfettered powers over decisions. 
In India, none of the committees appointed to recommend best governance practices suggest a 
separation between the CEO and Chairperson’s role. The Desirable Corporate Governance 
Code by CII (1998) advocates the importance of single–tier board for maximising long term 
shareholder value and suggests that there is no need to implement two-tier board system. The 
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report (2000) suggests in its non-mandatory 
recommendations that the Chairperson’s role in principle should be different from the CEO’s 
role but recognises that same individual might perform both these roles. Clause 49 of Listing 
Rules is silent about the possibility of the CEO also holding the Chairperson’s role in the 
public limited corporations in India. 
Prior literature offers contrasting evidence on the relationship between CEO duality and its 
impact on firm performance. Studies conducted in the past have used a wide range of 
terminology for the separation of the CEO and Chairperson’s role. Researchers have used 
terms such as duality and non-duality (Lam & Lee 2008; Baliga et al. 1996; Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni 1994), board leadership and CEO power (Jackling and Johl, 2009), unitary and dual 
leadership (Brickley et al.1997) and dual and non-dual structure (Abdullah, 2004).  
Prior researchers have adopted two different views for explaining the impacts of CEO duality 
on firm performance. Researchers opposing duality argue that separation of the CEO and 
Chairperson’s role and the assignment of the roles to different people enhances the board’s 
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ability to monitor managerial behaviour, therefore, it is argued that this is or should be 
associated with better financial performance (Jackling & Johl 2009; Millstein 1992; Lorsch & 
MacIver 1989). They further argue that combining the role of the CEO and Chairperson can 
be compared to a situation where the CEO is marking his own exam papers (Dedman 2002). 
This situation makes the CEO more powerful, enhances the possibility of CEO entrenchment 
and makes the board less independent and ineffective in monitoring self-interested behaviour 
by management (Rhoades et al. 2001; Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994; Daily& Dalton 1993; 
Jensen 1993).  
Counterposed to this, advocates of the value of CEO duality suggest that a single person 
holding both the CEO and Chairperson’s post has more power and greater authority to take 
and implement decisions, which eventually leads to better financial performance (Donaldson 
& Davis 1991; Anderson & Anthony 1986). They further argue that the CEO non duality can 
lead to the dilution of the CEO power as a leader, can cause a rivalry between the CEO and 
the Chair, create confusion due to lack of clear-cut leadership and may limit CEO innovation 
and intrapreneurship skills, which may negatively affect performance (Baliga et al.1996; 
Alexander et al.1993).  
Rechner and Dalton (1991) conduct a multiple year comparison of financial performance 
between firms with CEO duality and those with independent boards for a sample of 141 firms 
(21.3% of the firms with non-dual leadership structure and 78.7% dual structures) over the 
period 1978-1983. Using ROE, ROI and profit margin for measuring financial performance, 
they show that firms with a dual leadership structure outperform those with non-dual 
structure. However, this study does not control variables such as ownership structure, industry 
type, firm size and environment which may also have a significant impact on financial 
performance and might create quite different environments that could change the balance of 
the advantages and disadvantages of dual and non-dual structures. 
Pi and Timme (1993) argue that combining the roles of the CEO and Chairperson aggravates 
principal-agent conflict because of the amalgamation of control and monitoring processes. 
They study the impacts of board leadership structure on financial performance measured by 
cost efficiency and ROA for a sample of 112 banks over the period 1987-1990 and find that 
banks with separate CEO and Chairperson have higher ROA and better cost efficiency as 
compared to the banks having duality. 
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Boyd’s (1995) study provides partial support for both agency theory and stewardship theory 
for explaining the relationship between CEO duality and financial performance. He suggests 
that although meta-analysis of prior researches conducted on this topic provides an indication 
of a negative relationship between CEO duality and financial performance, his findings 
suggest that both agency theory and stewardship theory are insufficient to explain this 
relationship. He states that duality can have a positive impact on performance under certain 
industry conditions and negative impacts under other conditions.     
Baliga et al. (1996) examine the impacts of CEO duality on firm performance for a sample of 
Fortune 500 companies over the period 1980 to 1991. Unlike previous studies they also 
consider the announcement effect of changes in duality status, accounting measures of 
performance for firms that have changed their leadership structure and measurement of long 
term performance of firms that have a consistent history of a duality structure. Their findings 
suggest that duality has no impact on firm performance, they further state that change of 
leadership structure from duality to non-duality is a kind of scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch 
1964) and more likely a symbolic way of communicating to shareholders that board is 
efficiently performing its supervisory role (Pfeffer 1981).  
Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994) integrate both contrasting theoretical perspectives to develop 
a contingency framework that consolidates the otherwise alternative explanations of CEO 
duality by considering two critical contingency factors: informal CEO power and firm 
performance. Using this contingency framework, they examine the impact of CEO duality on 
performance in a sample of 108 firms from three industries: 41 firms from printing-publishing 
industry, 35 firms from chemical industry and 32 firms from computer industry. Their 
findings contradict the proponents of agency theory and suggest that vigilant boards favour 
CEO duality as boards are more concerned with unity of command rather than entrenchment 
avoidance. Their findings further suggests that board vigilance is more strongly associated 
with CEO duality when firm performance is high, which means that boards prefer non duality 
when either CEO informal power is high or firm performance is high.  
Brickley et al. (1997) argue that although there are benefits to be gained from separating the 
roles of CEO and Chairperson as explained by proponents of agency theory, there are costs as 
well, such as agency costs of controlling the behaviour of powerful Chairperson, information 
costs, succession cost and other costs (inconsistent decision making with shared authority). 
They empirically analyse data of 737 firms collected from the 1989 Forbes survey of 
executive compensation and find that for most large firms the costs associated with the 
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separation of the CEO and Chairperson’s role are larger than the benefits, thus contrasting 
with previous findings.   
Lam and Lee (2008) also consider the family aspect in studying the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance in a sample of 128 publicly listed companies in Hong Kong in 
2003. Their findings suggest that family-controlled firms have a higher proportion of CEO 
duality as compared to non-family firms and CEO duality is positively related to board 
independence which is contrary to prior findings that CEO duality leads to CEO entrenchment 
and reduced board independence. Their findings further suggest that the relationship between 
CEO duality and accounting performance is contingent on the presence of family factor; 
duality is positively related to accounting performance for non-family firms and negatively 
related to accounting performance in family firms. They do not show any relationship 
between CEO duality and market performance for both family and non-family firms. 
Dey et al. (2011) suggest that the decision by a firm to adopt a particular leadership structure 
(dual or non-dual) depends upon costs and benefits of alternative structures based on the 
business and economic environment. They examine the impact of splitting the CEO and 
Chairperson position on financial performance in a sample of 232 switcher firms (firms that 
changed their leadership structures from single tier to two tiers or vice versa) over the period 
2001 to 2009. They find that splitting roles of the CEO and Chairperson due to environmental 
pressure have negative impact on financial performance.  
In summary, empirical findings about the relationship between duality and financial 
performance are mixed and inconclusive. Some researchers empirically support the separation 
of the roles of CEO and Chair (Rechner & Dalton 1991; Daily & Dalton 1994) while others 
advocate for combining these roles for efficient decision making (Donaldson & Davis 1991; 
Brickly et al. 1997; Coles et al. 2001). A few other researchers do not find any significant 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Baliga et al.1996; Daily & Dalton 
1992, 1993, 1994; Dalton et al. 1998; Dulewicz & Herbert 2004). Therefore, the relationship 
between CEO duality and financial performance is an open empirical question which needs to 
be explored further to define the direction of ambiguous relationship between these two 
variables.  
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3.7.2 CEO duality and social performance 
Although impacts of CEO duality on both market and accounting performance have been 
studied widely by corporate governance researchers but there is a lack of empirically 
supported  literature to explain the direction of  relationship between CEO duality and social 
performance.  Very recently, some of the researchers (discussed below) have tried to 
investigate the relationship between board governance characteristics and its impact on social 
and environmental performance. Most of these researches are extension of the literature 
covering financial performance and use agency and stewardship theories for hypothesising the 
relationship between CEO duality and corporate social performance.  
Barktus et al. (2002) investigate the relationship between CEO duality and corporate 
philanthropic activities in a sample of 66 US firms dominated by the presence of CEO duality. 
Their empirical analysis suggests no significant relationship between CEO duality and 
philanthropic activities.  
Said et al. (2009) study the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and 
extent of corporate social responsibility disclosures in a sample of 250 publicly listed 
Malaysian firms for the year ended 2006. They find no significant relationship between the 
CEO duality and corporate social responsibility disclosure.  Similar to Said et al (2009), Sahin 
et al (2011) also adopt an agency theory perspective for explaining the relationship between 
duality and social performance. They hypothesise that CEO duality might lead to a worsening 
of social performance. But similar to Barktus et al. (2002) and Said et al. (2009), their 
empirical analysis does not reveal any significant relationship between CEO duality and 
social performance. 
CEO duality and its impact on social performance is a new area of research and needs to be 
further explored for better understanding of this relationship. Lack of existing literature makes 
this relationship an open empirical question. Moreover, none of the studies conducted in the 
past have addressed this relationship in the context of emerging economies. This thesis fills 
this gap and contributes to the existing corporate governance research by studying this 
relationship in the context of India, an emerging economy dominated by the presence of 
family owned listed companies. 
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3.8 Cross-directorships and firm performance: 
3.8.1 Cross directorship and financial performance 
Cross directorships, also known by corporate governance researchers as multiple directorships 
or board busyness, have been addressed extensively in corporate governance and finance 
research. Corporate governance best practice guidelines, listing rules and regulators around 
the globe have also given weight to this issue. OECD principles of Corporate Governance 
(2004) emphasise periodic disclosures of key executives qualifications, remuneration and 
other directorships held by key executives. However, OECD guidelines provide no 
recommendations on putting a cap on maximum number of directorships could be held by an 
individual director. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) underlines commitment of 
board of directors and states that all directors should be able to provide sufficient time to the 
company in order to discharge their responsibilities effectively. Provisions of this code further 
recommend that the board should not allow a full time executive director to take more than 
one executive directorships or Chairmanship in a FTSE 100 company.   
In India, Clause 49 of the Listing Rules states in its mandatory recommendations that a 
director shall not be a member of more than 10 committees or act as a Chairperson of more 
than five committees in which he is a director. Clause 49 further imposes mandatory 
requirement on both companies and directors for making proper disclosures related to 
multiple directorships. Clause 49 does not mention the maximum number of directorships that 
could be held by executive and non-executive directors of listed companies in India. 
Early researchers have treated cross-directorship as an issue of directors’ reputation (Jiraporn 
et al. 2008). Fama (1980) states that outside directors are regarded as professional referees by 
the external market whose task is to supervise the competition among firm’s top managers. 
Fama and Jensen (1985) contend that outside directors have incentives to develop their 
reputation as a decision controller in the board process. Although reputational explanation of 
directors’ cross-directorships has been given empirical support by later researchers (Gilson 
1990; Kaplan & Reishus 1990), recently a number of researchers have described cross-
directorships as a hindrance to effective decision making due to lack of commitment i.e. the 
busyness hypothesis (Core et al 1999; Shivdasani & Yermack 1999). 
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Pfeffer (1972) argues the benefits of interorganisational dependence as a way for promoting 
the exchange of resources and networking. Similarly, Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) and Booth 
and Deli (1996) state that directors having outside connections can help an organisation to 
collect necessary resources for effective running of business. The resource dependency 
argument hypothesises that multiple directorships held by board of directors should be 
positively related to firm performance.  
Core et al. (1999) investigate the impact of board governance structures on CEO 
compensation for a sample of 205 publicly traded US firms over a three year period and find a 
significant relationship between board governance and CEO compensation. They show that 
the percentage of outside directors who serve on multiple boards is positively related to 
excess CEO remuneration, thus supporting busyness hypothesis. Similarly, an empirical study 
conducted by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) in a sample of Fortune 500 firms also shows a 
lack of effectiveness of directors having multiple appointments. 
Fig 3.5: Three approaches adopted by prior researchers for explaining relationship 
between multiple board appointments and firm performance 
 
 
Ferris et al. (2003) support the viewpoint of Fama and Jensen (1993) that multiple 
directorships held by directors has positive effects on firm performance. Using a sample of 
3190 firms they investigate the impacts of multiple cross directorships on financial 
performance and find that reputation matters in the market for directors. They find a positive 
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relationship between number of board seats subsequently held by a director and firm 
performance, thus contradicting with the argument of busyness hypothesis. 
The findings of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) support the busyness hypothesis argument that 
overstretched directors serving on multiple boards are not effective monitors. Using a panel of 
large US industrial firms from 1989 to 1995, they report firms with a majority of busy outside 
directors have lower market to book ratio as compared to other firms. They also report that 
these firms also display lower ROA, lower asset turnover ratios and lower operating return on 
sales.    
Jiraporn et al. (2008) contend that multiple directorships held by board of directors affect the 
monitoring and supervisory effectiveness of the board. They examine the impact of multiple 
directorships held by directors on firm value in a sample of 3605 firm year observations over 
the period 1998 to 2002. Using various methods of measuring board busyness, they show an 
inverse relationship between board busyness and firm value and conclude that over committed 
boards diminish the value of the firm, supporting the busyness hypothesis. 
Sarkar and Sarkar (2009) find contradicting evidence of a relationship between multiple 
directorships held by independent directors and the value of the firm. They state that in India 
the incidence of multiple directorships is high compared to other global counterparts. Using a 
sample of 500 large Indian firms, they find a positive relationship between independent 
directors’ multiple directorships and firm value; however they report a negative relationship 
between insiders’ cross directorships and firm value. Unlike previous studies which support 
the busyness hypothesis, their findings support the quality hypothesis and resource 
dependency hypothesis. 
Ahn et al. (2010) examine the impact of multiple directorships on stockholder wealth during 
the announcement of mergers and acquisitions in a sample of 1207 merger and acquisition 
observations from 1998 to 2003 and report that acquiring firms with directors having multiple 
board assignments experience highly abnormal returns. They further state that this effect is 
only significant when board busyness surpasses a certain threshold. He explains that below 
this threshold the reputation effect is much more powerful than busyness effect and once the 
number of directorships surpasses this threshold then the busyness effect becomes more 
powerful than reputational effect. 
 
 92 
 
Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) investigate the impact of board busyness on firm performance in 
an environment of no regulation for privately held firms for a sample of 335 firms per year for 
the 1996-2006 periods with 244 private firms and 285 affiliated to seven largest non- financial 
business groups. They report that outside directors having multiple board appointments have a 
positive impact on financial performance but too much busyness negatively influences 
financial performance.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the relationship between multiple board appointment and 
firm financial performance is mixed and highly inconclusive. Prior studies have shown 
empirical evidence in support of the busyness, reputational and resource dependency 
arguments. However, very few studies address this relationship in the context of family 
ownership. This thesis contributes to existing literature by studying this relationship in the 
context on family firms listed in India, one of the emerging economies around the globe. 
3.8.2 Cross directorships and social performance: 
Although a large number of studies address the impacts of multiple board appointments on 
financial performance, the relationship between cross directorships and corporate social 
performance is a new area of research that lacks empirical evidence and effective theorising. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) investigate the impact of the number of directorships held by 
corporate directors on the likelihood of a firm being a target of environmental lawsuits against 
a firm for violating environmental laws in a sample of 209 US firms convicted and penalised 
for breaking an environmental law between 1994 and 1998. They find that the likelihood of 
becoming a lawsuit defendant decreases with the number of directorships held by outside 
directors, thus supporting the reputational and resource dependency arguments.  
The existing theoretical framework used for explaining the relationship between board 
busyness and financial performance has been extended by researchers to define the direction 
of this relationship in terms of social performance. This study makes an original contribution 
to the existing governance and sustainability literature by collecting empirical evidence of the 
relationship between multiple board appointments and social performance in the context of 
large listed family owned businesses in India. 
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3.9 Board committees and financial and social performance 
In modern corporations, it has become a custom to establish board committees. These board 
committees help the board to discharge its oversight responsibilities for governance of the 
corporation for the overall benefit of its shareholders (Balasubramanian 2010, p. 170). The 
Bosch committee in Australia has also recognised the importance of establishing board 
committees and states “The effectiveness of the board, and particularly of the non-executive 
directors, is likely to be enhanced by the establishment of appropriate board committees. 
They can distribute the board’s workload and enable more detailed consideration to be given 
to important matters and, where sensitive issues (such as appointment of auditors) have to be 
considered, an appropriately constituted committee may give independent consideration 
which will be valuable”. Therefore, in summary, it can be said that board committees help 
directors to deal with highly specialised issues, thus helping them in timely and efficient 
decision making.  
A number of studies have addressed the role of board committees and their impact on board 
activity and performance. Klein (1998) states that corporate boards delegate tasks to board 
committees, thus a higher number of board committees reflects the amount of delegation by 
the board to these committees (Vafeas 1999).  In her empirical study Klein (1998) does not 
find any relationship between presence of the audit, compensation and nominating 
committees and firm performance. However, she states that dominance of insiders in the 
board’s investment committee improves firm performance, thus, supporting the view point 
that insiders have more information about the firm as compared to outsiders. 
Vafeas (1999) conducted an empirical study to find the net effect of delegation on board 
activity and the overall impact of number of committees on firm value. He reports that boards 
having more committees meet more often thus suggesting that a higher number of board 
committees increase the need for supervision and coordination by the board. Vafeas (1999) 
does not find any evidence of a relationship between the number of board committees and 
firm value. 
In the context of family businesses, Jaggi and Leung (2007) find that dominant presence of 
family members on the Board of family-controlled companies has a significant negative 
impact on the effectiveness of audit committee. Similarly, a number of studies have been 
conducted to investigate the impacts on firm performance of board committee effectiveness 
and expertise (focussing in particular on the audit committee, compensation committee, and 
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nomination committee) (Dhaliwal et al. 2006; Carcello and Neal 2003; Lee et al. 2004; 
DeFond et al. 2005). Unlike these studies, this thesis investigates the specific case of the 
impact of the number of board committees on the financial and social performance of family-
controlled listed firms in India. This thesis does not examine the functioning of individual 
board committees such as Audit, compensation and nomination committees. 
It seems that the impact of the number of board committees on social performance has never 
been empirically analysed before, therefore, this thesis makes an original contribution to the 
existing governance and sustainability literature by investigating this relationship in the 
context of family businesses. 
3.10 CEOs and Chairpersons’ demographics and its impact on financial 
and social performance 
A central question in the minds of organisational theorists is, why do organisations act as they 
do? Upper echelons theory by Hambrick and Mason (1984) takes the perspective that 
demographic characteristics and personal connections of top management create normative 
pressures that will predictably shaping organisational outcome. Hosmer (1982) and Mintzberg 
(1978) suggest that the CEO and Chairperson are symbolic leaders of an organisation whose 
thoughts are significant in resource allocation and decision making process. Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) and Hambrick (2007) argue that top management’s demographic characteristics 
such as age, experience, gender, ethnicity and diversity influence their decisions and 
eventually organisational outcomes of organisations they lead. Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
provide a new emphasis in macro-organisational research and argue that organisational 
outcomes are perceived as a reflection of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in 
the organisation. They propose a model for explaining organisational outcomes based on 
upper echelon characteristics.   
Lieberson and O’connor (1972) empirically investigate the impact of leadership effect on firm 
performance in a sample of 167 large US corporations over twenty years. They use three 
performance variables (Sales, earnings and profit margins) for comparing the impacts of 
changes in top management with the influence of factors such as state of the economy, the 
company’s primary industry and the company’s position in the industry. They report that 
leadership has a stronger effect on profit margin as compared to effects on sales and earnings. 
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Hambrick and Mason (1984) emphasise observable managerial characteristics such as age, 
tenure in the organisation, functional background, education, socio-economic roots and 
financial position because they argue that cognitive bases, values and perceptions of managers 
cannot be measured conveniently.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on executives’ demographics by exploring the 
impacts of observable managerial characteristics on corporate financial and social 
performance in the context of an emerging economy.  
The next section covers an extensive review of literature describing the evidence collected by 
other researchers to explain the impacts of these characteristics on financial and social 
performance. 
3.10.1 Executives’ age and firm financial and social performance 
There is a rich psychology literature addressing behavioural and intellectual changes in 
humans with increasing age. Tests of rigidity and flexibility demonstrate a possible 
connection between youth and flexibility, age and rigidity (Carlsson and Karlsson 1970). 
Chown (1960) states (using the ‘citing learning theory’) that with increasing age there is a 
decline in the ability to grasp new ideas and learn new behaviour. Child (1974) contends that 
older managers lack physical and mental stamina required for implementing organisation 
changes. Hart and Melon (1970) empirically examine the impact of managerial age on 
company growth in four UK industries and fifty large US corporations and find that 
managerial youths are more associated with corporate growth but for the UK sample only. 
Taylor (1975) empirically investigates differences in managerial decision making 
performance due to age and decision making experiences and find that managerial age is 
negatively linked to ability to integrate information in making decision and confidence in 
taking decisions. However it is positively associated with tendencies to seek more 
information. Other researchers (Carlsson & Karlsson 1970; Hambrick & Mason 1984; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990) also report that older executives give more weight to financial 
and social security as compared to young executives, thus avoiding certain types of risky 
decisions while trying to achieve performance results well accepted as per industry norms. 
Williams et al. (1995) empirically investigate the impact of managers’ age on the top 
management team’s structural change decisions in a sample of 76 firms. Their findings 
support the arguments of Carlsson and Karlsson (1970), Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990). They conclude that older managers are less willing than 
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younger managers to make structural changes in the organisation. Barker and Mueller (2002) 
empirically examine the impact of CEO age on firm’s R & D spending and witness a strong 
negative association between CEO age and firm’s R & D spending, thus proving that older 
executives are generally less innovative compared to younger executives. 
Although behavioural aspects of top managements’ age have been researched extensively in 
the psychology literature but there has been limited research investigating the impacts of the 
age of top management on firm’s financial performance. However, Koufopoulos et al. (2008) 
examine the impacts of the Chairperson’s age on financial performance by empirically 
analysing 27 survey questionnaires received from 27 chairpersons of Greek Corporations 
listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. Their findings suggest a positive relationship between 
age and firm’s competitive positioning, and a negative association between age and overall 
firm performance measured by ROA, after tax return on sales and total sales growth. Their 
findings on the relationship between age and financial performance cannot be generalised 
because of small sample size. 
The literature review suggests that although there has been extensive research in Psychology 
explaining the impacts of age on intellect and behavioural changes, only a small number of 
researchers have tried to empirically analyse the impact of executives’ age on corporate 
performance-with inconsistent findings. Moreover, it appears that none of the studies in the 
past have explained the impact of executives’ age on sustainability related performance. This 
study contributes to existing research literature by investigating the impact of the CEO’s and 
Chairperson’s age on financial and social performance of large listed Indian family firms. 
Moreover, this study also extends the application of the upper echelon theory for examining a 
possible relationship between top management’s age and corporate social performance which 
has never been systematically and empirically studied.  
3.10.2 Educational background and firm financial and social performance 
Proponents of the upper echelon theory have attempted to find any possible linkage between 
educational backgrounds of top management personnel and strategic decision making, 
particularly innovation. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that educational background is a 
useful indication of knowledge and skill base, for example, it can generally be accepted that 
an engineering graduate will have a different cognitive base compared to a history and law 
graduate. Some researchers report positive associations between decision makers’ level of 
education and being innovative (Becker 1970; Rogers & Shoemaker 1971). Kimberley and 
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Evanisko (1981) examine the relationship between hospital administrators’ educational level 
and adoption of technological and administrative innovations. They report a positive 
relationship between administrators’ educational level and their willingness to adopt 
technological and administrative innovations.  
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that it is not, the educational specialisation of top 
management team, but their amount of formal education that is positively associated with 
innovation. More educated managers display higher level of organisation innovation, leading 
to higher company growth compared to less educated managers (Norburn & Birley 1988; 
Bantel & Jackson 1989). Similarly, Hitt and Tyler (1991) and Wally and Baum (1994) find 
that executives with higher education display greater cognitive complexity in comparison to 
less-educated managers, which indicates an ability to absorb or create new and innovative 
ideas. On the other hand, Daellenbach et al. (1999) do not report any association between 
CEO education and innovation measured by R & D expenditure. 
Some researchers have attempted to find relationship between the type of education and the 
strategic decision making capabilities of top management personnel. Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) suggest that the MBA program teaches analytical skills to managers to avoid big losses 
or mistakes while running the business. On the other hand, Collins and Moore (1970) argue 
that trained managers are not as innovative or risk prone as compared to self-made managers, 
as business schools are not well-armed to produce innovative managers (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Tyler and Steensma (1998) argue that executives having educational 
background in science and engineering are more inclined to new technology adoption as 
compared to executives from other backgrounds. Barker and Mueller (2002) argue that CEOs 
having formal qualification in business or law may have less inclination towards adopting 
innovative technology, and their empirical research supports the view that CEOs having 
science and engineering backgrounds are associated positively with R & D spending. They 
further report that CEOs with business degrees do not have a significant association and 
CEOs having a law background have a negative association with R & D expenditure, a proxy 
taken to measure innovation. 
The above discussion clearly indicates that extensive research has been conducted by 
numerous researchers to investigate the impact of amount and type of top executive education 
on cognitive complexities but there have been very few studies addressing the relationship of 
top executives’ educational background and financial and social performance. Koufopoulos et 
al. (2008) empirically examine the impact of Chairpersons’ education on the performance of 
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27 Greek corporations and find no significant relationship between the Chairperson’s amount 
of formal education and organisational financial performance. They further report a positive 
correlation between economics degrees and organisational performance and a negative 
relationship between business administration degrees and organisational performance but 
these relations are statistically non-significant. 
Few other researchers (Frank et al.1993; Jones et al.1990; Frank & Schultz 2000; Manner 
2010) have tried to extend the available literature by examining the relationship between top 
executives educational background and corporate social performance. Frank et al. (1993) 
investigate the impact of teaching ‘self-interest model’ based economics on students’ 
behaviour and find that after completing the first semester economics students showed less 
cooperation towards other students and responded less honestly to ethical dilemma questions. 
Other researchers (Jones et al. 1990; Frank & Schultz 2000) also obtained similar findings as 
that of Frank et al. (1993) regarding self-interested behaviour of economics students. 
Although, the researches discussed above indicate that executives having economics and 
business qualifications are less inclined towards achieving social performance, these 
researches do not address directly the impact of managerial educational background on 
corporate social performance. 
Manner (2010) directly addresses the relationship between top executives educational 
background and corporate social performance. He empirically examines the impact of the 
CEO educational background on corporate social performance measured by the KLD ratings. 
He reports that CEOs having a bachelor’s degree in humanities are positively associated with 
corporate social performance while those having bachelor’s degree in economics are 
negatively associated with corporate social performance. 
There is a rich literature providing a strong indication of a possible linkage between top 
executives’ educational background and organisational performance. But, there is scarcity of 
literature that directly addresses the impact of executives’ educational background on 
financial and social performance. This study contributes to the existing literature by 
examining this relationship in the context of an emerging economy. 
3.10.3 Work experience and firm performance: 
Strategic management researchers have conducted extensive research to examine top 
executives’ functional work experience and strategic decisions taken by them. Dearborn and 
Simon (1958) find that when executives from different functional background were given the 
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same problems, they largely defined the problems in the context of their functional 
background, despite being asked to respond from a company perspective as a CEO of the 
organisation. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that the functional-track experience of an 
executive may have some influence on strategic decisions made by that executive. Prior 
researchers (Katz & Kahn 1966; Miles & Snow 1978; Hays & Abernathy 1980; Hambrick & 
Mason 1984) classify functional work experience into three categories: output function 
(marketing, sales and product R&D)- which emphasise growth and the search for new 
opportunities; throughput functions (production, process engineering and accounting)- which 
emphasise improving the efficiency of the transformation process, and peripheral functions 
(law and finance)- which emphasise  administration, coordination and formal planning.  
Norburn and Birley (1988) test the impacts of CEO characteristics and background on 
corporate performance in a sample of 953 top managers from five industries- dairy, footwear, 
tyres, mobile homes and machine tools. They report that top management teams having 
extensive output functional experience outperform other top management teams. They also 
report a positive correlation between executive tenure and the profitability of firms in stable 
industries but witness a negative relationship in turbulent industries. 
In relation to the impacts of executive work experience on corporate social performance, 
Thomas and Simerly (1994) empirically examine the relationship between managerial 
characteristics and corporate social performance in a sample of 350 corporations listed in 
Fortune’s (1989) survey of America’s most admired corporations. Their findings basically 
support the upper echelon theory’s argument that organisations are reflections of their top 
managers. They show that CEOs having longer tenure in the company are associated with 
high corporate social performance as compared to other counterparts having shorter tenure. 
Thus their results support the argument that executives who spend longer periods in a 
company have superior knowledge of stakeholders’ needs and they can design and implement 
policies to address those needs. Similarly, the research of Manner (2010) provides tentative 
support for the argument of a positive relationship between executive position tenure and 
corporate social performance. Manner (2010)  reports that the breadth of decision-makers 
stakeholder experience is positively associated with strong corporate social performance; 
however they do not find any significant relationship between the breadth of shareholder 
experience or general management experience and corporate social performance. 
As the above discussion attests that there is a growing body of literature addressing the 
impacts of work experience on financial and social performance. A very limited number of 
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studies have empirically investigated the influence of work experience on social performance.  
Koufopoulos et al. (2008) look at the position tenure in three different ways: tenure in the 
industry, tenure in the company and tenure in the position. They empirically investigate the 
impacts of these factors on overall (both financial and social) performance and report a 
positive relationship between position tenure and overall performance. 
To get a better understanding of this relationship, there is a strong need to conduct more 
studies in different samples and country contexts. This study adds to existing literature by 
finding evidence of this relationship in the Indian context, dominated by the presence of large 
family owned and controlled companies where most of the CEOs or Chairpersons are 
founders having very long company tenure.  
3.11 Integrated and decoupled performance 
Corporations are subject to multiple pressures to operate in a socially responsible manner and 
to deal with conflicting economic and social objectives (Weaver et al.1999). These pressures 
can be both external and internal such as government requirement (external) and 
commitments of key managers (internal) (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Wood 1991; Greening & 
Gray 1994; Miles 1987). There could be two general effects of these pressures. First, it can 
bring strategic changes that eventually get integrated into the regular affairs of the company 
(Weaver et al., 1999) or alternatively, corporate responses to these pressures for responsible 
behaviour can be just ‘window dressing’ that means their responses can easily be 
disintegrated or decoupled from regular organisational activities (Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
Prior literature addressing integration and decoupling predominantly covers inclusion of 
socially responsible policies and programs in the routine organisational activities. These 
studies convincingly suggest that CSR initiatives integrated into company strategy and 
operations can generate both societal and corporate benefits (Weaver et al., 1999; Grayson 
and Hodges, 2004; Porter and Kramer, 2006). Reviews of literature in this area indicate that 
the available literature is conceptualised at the management ethical and operating level of the 
firm. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the existing literature by extending these 
concepts to the firm-wide governance and performance level in recognition of the very limited 
empirical research that has been conducted to investigate the impacts of family-related control 
and family-impacted board governance on integrated and decoupled corporate performance.  
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The roles of powerful management players’ in designing and implementing firm-level 
strategy in the Indian context have already been discussed in the previous sections of this 
chapter. This thesis also recognises the roles played by the CEO and the Chairperson in the 
context of listed Indian family controlled firms. Therefore, apart from family and governance 
impacts, this thesis also investigates the impacts of powerful management players’ 
demographic characteristics on both integrated and decoupled performance. 
3.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has extensively covered prior literature related to the topic of this thesis and it 
has also identified research gaps in the available literature. The Review of literature indicates 
that ownership type, its impacts on governance mechanism and firm performance has been a 
topic of interest among corporate governance researchers around the globe. Prior researchers 
to a larger extent have reported mixed and inconclusive findings regarding the family impacts 
on governance and these findings are different for different geographical locations, indicating 
that business environment, human values and beliefs also have a possible influence on this 
relationship. This study attempts to investigate the impacts of family control and management 
in the context of the India, an emerging economy where businesses are highly dominated by 
the presence of family owners and managers. 
The upper echelons theory used by organisational researchers mainly emphasise top 
management characteristics and its impact on innovative, strategic decisions made by these 
managers. Recently interdisciplinary research has been conducted to investigate the impacts 
of demographic characteristics on financial and social performance of an organisation. Most 
of these studies have examined this relationship in the Western context. The contribution of 
this study is to test this relationship in the economically important and culturally unique 
context of family businesses in India. This study also adds new dimensions to the upper 
echelon demographic characteristics by examining the impacts of powerful management 
players’ demographic characteristics on integrated and decoupled performance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter first provides a discussion of the theoretical grounds underpinning the 
relationship between variables contained in the research questions. Second, it proposes a 
conceptual framework aimed at investigating effects of controlling family status, family-
impacted board governance and powerful management players’ demographic characteristics 
on financial and social performance of listed Indian family firms.  Finally, the chapter 
presents research questions that address research gaps identified in the previous chapter. 
The extensive review of literature in the previous chapter suggests mixed and inconclusive 
findings for the influence of family ownership and control on firm governance and financial 
performance. Prior researchers have produced different findings for different geographical 
locations and company settings in relation to the impact of family control on financial 
performance. There has been extensive research on the impacts of family control and board 
governance on financial performance. But family control and its impact on firm governance 
and corporate social performance is a comparatively new area of research. A growing body of 
literature clearly suggests a possible relationship between family control and corporate social 
performance. 
4.2 Theoretical perspective of the study 
The empirical objective of this thesis is to develop models and provide evidence to explain 
effects of controlling family status, family-impacted governance and top management 
characteristics on corporate financial and social performance. Embedded in this empirical 
objective is the determination of the following key relationships: 
1- Family-related control (through ownership and status) and its relationship to corporate 
financial and social performance 
2- Family-impacted board governance mechanisms and their relationship to corporate 
financial and social performance 
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3- Powerful management players’ characteristics (specifically the Chairperson and CEO) 
and their relationship to corporate financial and social performance. 
As this thesis deals with multiple relationships, it is necessary to invoke more than one 
theoretical perspective to justify these proposed relationships and interpret the results from 
their data analysis. Several theories used by family business researchers have already been 
discussed in the literature review chapter. In order to develop a theoretical framework in this 
chapter, brief discussion of the major theories is revisited. The next section discusses how 
perspectives on each of the above three groups of relationships can be underpinned by major 
theories used by prior researchers. 
4.2.1 Family ownership status and firm performance- A theoretical perspective 
4.2.1.1 Family ownership status and financial performance 
Agency theory and stewardship theory has been widely used by family business researchers to 
explain the relationship between family related ownership characteristics and financial 
performance (Chrisman et al. 2010). Hiebl (2012) also acknowledges use of these theories for 
explaining the relationship between family business owners and managers.  
Agency theory is based on the possibility of conflicts of interest between principal (owner) 
and agent (manager). The classic study of Berle and Means (1932) addresses the separation of 
ownership from control and its impact on financial performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
highlight the cost of activities associated with aligning principal-agent interests and describe it 
as agency cost. As Chua et al. (2003) argue, divergent interests, informational asymmetries 
and bounded rationality in principal-agent relationships are factors responsible for the agency 
problem. Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that family control 
helps in mitigating the agency problem, hence leading to better financial performance. 
Agency theory for explaining impacts of family related ownership characteristics have been 
the predominant paradigm adopted (Anderson& Reeb 2003, Villalonga & Amit 2006; 
Barontini & Caprio 2006; McConaughy et al. 1998). In the context of Indian family firms, 
Pandey et al. (2011) find that in a sample of 131 listed firms in India, 72.51% have a family 
CEO and 85.19% have a family Chairperson, of which 37.5% hold both positions. These 
statistics clearly indicate that Indian family firms are closely monitored and heavily 
supervised by family members. This could reduce the possibility of conflict between owner- 
manager interests as predicted in agency theory, so family impact on firm performance can be 
explained by agency theory.  
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On the other hand, proponents of stewardship theory emphasise the deep emotional bonding 
of family owners and managers with the firm and their deep concern for business well-being. 
Family managers have a broader vista as compared to non-family managers which help them 
to resolve problems related to ownership and control separation (James 1999). Moreover, they 
also have exceptional concern for firm’s longevity and strong incentives to closely monitor 
management (Andres 2008). Stewardship theorists further argue that family relations are 
largely based on altruism, loyalty and trust. Their belief is that the long-term nature of family 
businesses helps families to build a good reputation with customers and external capital 
providers (Ward 1988; Andres 2008; Anderson & Reeb 2003). 
Although most studies in the past have used either one of these theories to explain the effects 
of family control characteristics on financial performance, Ramachandran and Jha (2007) 
argue that these theories should be used in a complementary way to understand organisational 
behaviour of family businesses. They further state that businesses are mainly driven by the 
principal-agent relationship (agency theory) but family businesses are also driven by 
stewardship principles. They argue that in a family controlled business, family and business 
are fused into an integrated institution. Therefore, a blend of agency and stewardship theories 
can be used to explain the behaviour of family businesses. Given that Indian family 
businesses have some unique characteristics that distinguish them from their global 
counterparts (covered in chapter 2), it is posited in this thesis that both agency and 
stewardship theories need to be invoked to explain why these characteristics may or may not 
affect the performance of these businesses. 
4.2.1.2 Family businesses and social performance 
Multiple theories have also been used in prior studies to explain the logic behind socially 
responsible/irresponsible behaviour of family businesses. Some studies emphasise self-
interest behaviour of family firms and argue that family firms may act in a socially 
irresponsible manner (Banfield 1958; Rosenblatt et al. 1985; Schulze et al. 2001; Morck & 
Yeung 2004). On the other hand, literature related to organisational identity, image, reputation 
and identification suggests that family firms may act in socially responsible manner to earn a 
‘good name’ in the society (Dyer & Whetten 2006).  Berrone et al. (2010) and Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2007) term this reputation and prestige as ‘socio-emotional wealth’ of family firms. 
Scott (1995) proposes institutional theory (normative isomorphism) to explain the link 
between family control and social and environmental performance. He defines an institution 
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as a collection of “cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behaviour”. He further states that the normative element of an 
institution guides its behaviour, primarily through a less explicit system of social norms and 
values. 
Collins et al. (2000) contend that in family businesses members usually share norms and 
values which pressurise family members to conform to normative standards. Scott (1995) 
states that normative business influences can originate from both inside (within a family 
group) and outside of a family (e.g. Social network, government, professional organisation). 
Leaptrott (2005) argue that normative isomorphism results from an organisational need to 
obtain and maintain legitimacy. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that when an organisation 
enhances its social acceptance or legitimacy, it helps in increasing its access to resources and 
exchange possibilities with other organisations which eventually increases its livelihood for 
survival. So it can be argued on the basis of institutional theory that family businesses tend to 
achieve better social and environmental performance in order to obtain social acceptance and 
a better business image for coming generations. Later generations would keep it alive by 
following family norms and values. 
Some studies have used resource dependency theory and instrumental stakeholder theory to 
suggest that achieving better social performance may be helpful for family firms to generate 
goodwill or beneficial resources for the future (McGuire et al. 2012; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; 
Hadani 2007; Niehm et al. 2008).  
The above discussion indicates that prior research has used alternative theories to explain the 
motivation of family firms to act in a socially responsible manner. This thesis will draw on 
multiple theories to underpin its empirical modelling of relationships between family firm-
specific characteristics and socially and environmental performance.  
4.2.2 Corporate governance and firm performance 
4.2.2.1 Corporate governance and financial performance 
Prior researchers (Jacking & Johl 2009; Nicholson & Kiel 2007) have acknowledged that a 
single theory cannot explain a varied and complex link between corporate governance and 
financial performance. Dalton et al. (2003) also support a multi-theoretic approach to 
understand why corporate governance mechanisms could enhance the performance of an 
organisation. Literature review chapter identified the widespread use of agency theory and 
 106 
 
resource dependency theory to explain the impact of board governance on financial 
performance. This thesis also applies these theories to explain findings related to board 
governance and financial performance.   
Agency theory from the board governance perspective emphasises proper board monitoring 
and supervision to provide adequate protection to shareholders from managers’ conflict of 
interest (Kiel & Nicholson  2003). Thus agency theory prescribes a highly independent board 
having a majority of outside directors and chaired by an independent director. Agency theory 
contains a notion that outsiders on boards will look after the interest of shareholders and will 
provide more confidence to the capital market. Dalton et al. (2003) state that in addition to 
agency theory other  theoretical perspectives such as resource dependence theory and 
stewardship theory have been used by corporate governance researchers as complementary 
approaches to explain the impact of board governance on organisational behaviour and 
performance. Resource dependency theory assumes that organisations need to acquire and 
maintain resources from environment for their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Sheppard 
1995). Dalton et al. (2003) state that outside directors provide access to the resources needed 
by the firm that enhance organisational functioning, firm performance and survival. Some 
other researchers have used stewardship theory (as discussed in the previous section) for 
explaining the role of insiders in achieving financial performance (Davis et al. 1997). 
4.2.2.2 Corporate governance and social performance 
In contrast to the extensive literature addressing the link between corporate governance 
mechanisms and financial performance, scant attention has been paid to developing 
theoretical perspectives to explain how governance mechanisms affect socially responsible 
behaviour of corporations (Rowley & Berman 2000; Ullman 1985). The majority of studies 
on social performance have concentrated on investigating the relationship between corporate 
social responsibility and corporate financial performance (Rowley & Berman 2000; Walsh et 
al. 2003; Campbell 2007). 
Garriga and Mele (2004) consolidate theoretical approaches adopted internationally by others 
to explain socially responsible behaviour of corporations. They find that these explanations 
are full of theories and rapidly growing new approaches which are controversial, complex and 
unclear. They broadly classify these theories and approaches into four groups: (1) 
instrumental theories, which explain socially responsible behaviour of businesses as a 
strategic tool to achieve economic goals; (2) political theories, which explain power of a 
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corporation in the society and its responsibility towards society; (3) integrative theories, 
which argue that businesses are dependent on society for their existence thus integrate social 
demands and social values in their functioning; and (4) ethical theories, which focus on 
ethical responsibility of businesses in the society. 
Some researchers have also explained the socially responsible behaviour of corporations by 
using a broader perspective of agency theory. Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) argue that strong 
corporate governance practices help boards to have control over management and are 
positively associated with greater concern for firms’ social responsibilities. Similarly, taking 
the agency theory argument, some researchers state that board independence is positively 
associated with social and environmental performance (Dunn & Sainty 2009; Webb 2004; 
Johnson & Greening 1999; Coffey & Wang 1998). Therefore, broader agency theory takes the 
point that better monitoring and governance will force management to look after the interests 
of a wide range of stakeholders including society and its environment. 
Therefore, similar to the variety of theories explaining the linkage between corporate 
governance and financial performance, the relationship between governance and social 
performance can be explained by more than one theoretical perspective.  
4.3 Powerful management players’ characteristics and performance 
4.3.1 Powerful management players’ characteristics and financial performance 
This thesis also has a primary objective to investigate impacts of powerful management 
players’ demographic and experiential characteristics on financial performance. This is a 
growing area of research, needing empirical findings to explain these phenomena. In the past 
institutional theory (normative isomorphism) and upper echelons theory has been used by 
researchers working in this area. 
Institutional theory (normative isomorphism) has already been explained in the previous 
section of this chapter. In relation to the norms that are inferred from demographic and 
experiential characteristics of top executives and directors, proponents of normative 
isomorphism (drawn from institutional theory) state that formal education, professional 
affiliation, experience and learned values put normative pressure on these top executives and 
directors to follow expected professional (or family) behaviour (DiMaggio & Powell 1991; 
Greenwood et al. 2002). 
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Upper echelon theory argues that organisation outcomes can be seen as reflections of the 
values and cognitive bases of the powerful actors in the organisation (Hambrick & Mason 
1984). Hambrick and Mason (1984) emphasise the impacts of observable managerial 
characteristics such as age, tenure in the organisation, functional background, education, 
socioeconomic roots and financial position on organisational strategy and effectiveness. This 
thesis models and empirically tests the relationship between Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) 
powerful actors and financial performance of family firms.  
4.3.2 Powerful management players’ characteristics and social performance 
Although there is a growing body of research explaining the linkage between normative 
characteristics of powerful actors and financial performance, very little has been done to find 
the impact of these characteristics on social performance. One study, Manner (2010) has used 
propositions from upper echelon theory to investigate the impact of CEO characteristics on 
corporate social performance. This thesis will be follow a similar approach to investigate the 
effects of powerful actors’ observable demographic and experiential characteristics– age, past 
experience, position tenure and qualification (which are assume to reflect their cognitive 
frames) – on corporate social performance. 
4.4 Development of conceptual framework and research questions 
In family owned and managed firms, family members will be actively involved in strategic 
decision making. Most of the major decisions impacting firm performance are likely to be 
made by family members. This study proposes a conceptual model suggesting the existence of 
three layers in family-owned and managed firms. These three layers are: family control 
(through ownership and socio-economic status), family-impacted board governance, and 
normative influences of powerful management players. This conceptual framework shown in 
the Figure 4.1 has been designed to investigate impacts of these layers on both decoupled and 
integrated financial and social performance. Moreover, this conceptual framework typically 
addresses large Indian family businesses as this framework has been designed by blending 
theoretical perspectives used in prior studies for application in the context of peculiar 
historical/cultural features of Indian family businesses. 
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Fig 4.1: Conceptual Framework 
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The first layer of the framework given in Figure 4.1 is the nucleus of the controlling families 
power (i.e., its extent of ownership and socio-economic status). This model proposes that 
controlling family status is the most dominant factor in deciding strategy and performance 
(both social and financial). This model suggests that family controlling status can be 
measured by the degree of family reputation, family shareholding, family generation, family 
business group affiliation and family social background. The conceptual framework suggests 
investigation of the impact of family controlling status on both decoupled and integrated 
financial and social performance. This leads to the first research question to be investigated by 
this thesis: 
Research question 1:  
What is the impact of family controlling status (family reputation, family shareholding, family 
generation, family business group affiliation, family social background) on the financial and 
social performance, whether as decoupled or integrated performance, of listed family firms in 
India? 
Fig 4.2: Family controlling status and its impact on decoupled and integrated 
financial and social performance 
 
 
The second layer (i.e., mid layer) refers to family impacted board governance characteristics 
which are a blend of board governance characteristics identified by prior researchers and 
family members involvement on board as an inside director, CEO or Chair. This model 
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suggests that family-impacted board governance characteristics can be measured by the 
degree of family CEO, family chair, founder on board, family members on board, gender 
diversity, insiders’ involvement, outsiders’ involvement, insiders’ reputation, outsiders 
reputation, board size, board independence, board philosophy, CEO duality, total no. of 
committees and board meeting frequency. The conceptual framework proposes the 
investigation of the impact of family-impacted governance on decoupled and integrated 
financial and social performance. This leads to the second research question to be explored by 
this thesis: 
Research question 2: 
What is the impact of family-related and other board governance characteristics (family 
CEO, family chair, founder on board, family members on board, gender diversity, insiders’ 
involvement, outsiders’ involvement, insiders’ reputation, outsiders reputation, board size, 
board independence, board philosophy, CEO duality, total no. of committees, board meeting 
frequency) on the financial and social performance, whether as decoupled or integrated 
performance, of listed family firms in India? 
Fig 4.3: Family-impacted board governance and its impact on decoupled and 
integrated financial and social performance 
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The third layer (i.e. the outermost layer) takes into consideration the role of powerful actors in 
the family and their impact on corporate financial and social performance as suggested by the 
proponents of normative isomorphism and upper echelons theory. Similar to prior studies, this 
model can be used to investigate the impacts of measurable normative characteristics of 
directors such as their reputation, extent of education, holding an MBA, humanities/science-
engineering/business qualification, foreign qualification, age, career experience, and tenure. 
This leads to the third research question to be investigated by this thesis: 
Research question 3: 
What is the impact of the normative influences on top management, namely, the CEO and 
Chairperson, (their reputation, extent of education, holding an MBA, humanities/science-
engineering/business qualification, foreign qualification, age, career experience, and tenure) 
on financial and social performance, whether as decoupled or integrated performance, of 
listed family firms in India? 
Fig 4.4: Normative influences on key executives and its impact on decoupled and 
integrated financial and social performance 
 
 
Therefore, to conclude, this conceptual framework proposes a three layer study to investigate 
impacts of family controlling status and family-impacted governance on both decoupled and 
integrated financial and social performance as stated in the objective of this thesis. Moreover, 
this conceptual framework contributes to the existing family business and governance 
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research by investigating the impacts of the above mentioned variables on integrated financial 
and social performance. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Prior literature as discussed in the literature review chapter clearly reveals mixed results and 
ambiguity in explaining the impacts of family control characteristics, family related 
governance and normative characteristics of powerful family actors on financial performance. 
Moreover, it has been revealed by prior literature that some of these relationships are 
country/geographical location specific. To investigate the impact of these characteristics on 
the performance of listed companies in India this thesis also incorporates some variables 
significant in the Indian family context such as family reputation and family social 
background, which makes this study more relevant to the Indian business environment. In 
addition, prior literature reveals that very little empirical research has been done to find the 
impact of these characteristics on corporate social performance. Therefore, in order to address 
these issues and to fill the research gap this thesis proposes a model to study the impact of 
these characteristics on both corporate financial and social performance and to investigate 
factors leading to integrated and decoupled financial and social performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the research methods used in this study for investigating 
the effects of controlling family status, family-impacted governance and powerful 
management players’ demographic characteristics on financial and social performance of 
listed Indian family-controlled firms. This chapter also covers an explanation of the data 
analysis techniques and quantitative methods used in this study. 
As discussed in the Chapter 2, the context of Indian family-controlled large businesses is a 
relatively under-research area lacking systematic quantity research. Although extensive 
family business research has been conducted in the West, predominantly by researchers from 
the USA, their findings are not readily transferable to Indian family-controlled listed firms 
because of peculiar characteristics specific to the cultural-socio-economic setting in India. 
Moreover, prior researches conducted in this area have investigated family businesses from 
only financial perspective. As described in the Chapter 4, this thesis is an extensive study 
investigating the impact of three layers of family businesses i.e. family ownership, 
governance and top management normative characteristics on both financial and social 
performance. Therefore, due to lack of prior literature in the Indian context, this thesis adopts 
an exploratory approach.  
This chapter is divided primarily into three sections. First section briefly discusses 
philosophical basis of the research methodology adopted in this thesis. Second section 
includes a discussion on critical scrutiny of secondary data analysis, content analysis and 
quantitative methods used in this thesis. Third section comprises a detailed discussion on 
sample selection, data source, variable measurement and models used in this study followed 
by conclusion. 
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5.2 Research Methods 
5.2.1 Philosophical basis of research methodology used 
Bunniss and Kelly (2010) state that academic research arises from a philosophical tradition of 
systematic knowledge development.  Lingard (2007) states that researchers’ epistemology and 
the kind of knowledge they want to contribute decide the shape of research questions to be 
investigated by them. The question of what should be assumed as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline is an epistemological issue, especially the applicability of principles, procedures 
and ethos of the natural sciences in the social world (Bryman & Bell 2007, p.16). Chua (1986) 
explains three research paradigms: positivism, interpretvism and critical theory.  Bunniss and 
Kelly (2010) mention four research paradigms: positivism, post positivism, interpretivism and 
critical theory. Table 5.1 describes ontological, epistemological and methodological 
differences among these research paradigm used by researchers. 
For several decades’ theory construction and development in the mainstream accounting 
research literature has been predominantly conducted within the positivist paradigm (Chua, 
1986; Bisman, 2010). Oler et al. (2010) investigate the use of positivism in accounting journal 
articles published in top tier accounting journals and find that published articles in these 
journal have heavily used a positivism approach.   
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) state that modern positive accounting research started when 
researchers such as Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) started applying empirical 
finance methods to financial accounting. Subsequently, accounting researchers started 
following the premise that accounting numbers supply information to a variety of users for 
investment decision making which can be investigated by using empirical methods (Watts & 
Zimmerman 1990). The positive theory draws behavioural assumptions from rational 
economics that managers, shareholders and regulators are rational and try to maximise their 
utility (Riahi-Belkaoui 2004). Positive theory is mainly used to explain and predict 
management’s choice of adopting a standard by conducting cost-benefit analysis of a 
particular financial disclosure for the wide range of users (Riahi-Belkaoui 2004). 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, agency theory has predominantly underpinned 
the work of prior researchers in the area of family business and corporate governance and it is 
considered a highly influential accounting research approach in explaining current practices 
and predicting future outcomes in accounting policy choices. 
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Table 5.1: Ontological, epistemological and methodological differences among research 
paradigms 
 
                                                                                  (Source: Bunniss and Kelly 2010) 
In line with prior literature on family business and corporate governance, this thesis also 
follows a positivist paradigm. This thesis takes a mainly deductive empirical approach which 
starts with the formulation of wider research questions developed on the basis of research 
gaps identified in the literature review chapter. It then seeks to model and operationalize the 
concepts in the research questions in order to test specific relationships arising from the 
research questions. Quantitative analysis is employed on secondary data collected for this 
study. 
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5.2.2 Secondary data analysis 
To explore the impacts of family control, board governance and top managers’ demographics 
on corporate financial and social performance, this study uses secondary data analysis. 
Secondary data analysis is a form of ex post facto archival method. It is a method of data 
collection and analysis used widely and extensively in corporate governance research.  
Boslaugh (2007) differentiate between primary data and secondary data. She states that data 
collected by researcher (or team of researchers) for specific purpose or analysis is called 
primary data whereas secondary data is collected from information available from other 
available sources that has been collected for some other purpose.  Quantitative researchers in 
accounting and finance disciplines have a long tradition of using publicly available data for 
explaining the relationships between variables that they model. This study also uses publicly 
available data on Indian family companies in order to investigate the relationships between 
family controlling status, family-impacted governance mechanisms, and demographics of 
powerful corporate management players, on the one side, and corporate financial and social 
performance on the other side. 
5.2.2.1 Advantages of secondary data analysis 
 Prior researchers have identified both advantages and disadvantages of using secondary data 
for quantitative analysis. Some of the major advantages are: 
1- Larger sample size: Devine (2003) argue that availability of secondary data can 
provide access to larger sample size as compared to primary data. Further, Devine 
(2003) contends that statistical analysis is much more straightforward in larger 
samples as compared to smaller samples collected by primary data collection. 
2- Economic advantages: Boslaugh (2007) identifies economy as one of the major 
advantages of using secondary data for statistical analysis. Since the data is publicly 
available in electronic format, therefore, the researcher does not have to pass through 
the long and costly process of designing and implementing the research instruments 
and conducting fieldwork (Devine 2003). 
3- Scope for new research: Devine (2003) recognises intellectual advancement as one of 
the major advantages of secondary data analysis. She argues that since the researcher 
has not collected data for any specific purpose, then analysing data from different 
perspectives can discover new relationships between variables and help in creating 
new knowledge. 
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4- Greater breadth: secondary data is more useful in conducting cross cultural and time 
series analysis research because of easy availability of data (Devine 2003).  Collection 
of primary data for these types of researches is comparatively harder as compared to 
secondary data. 
5.2.2.2 Disadvantages of secondary data analysis 
1- Purpose: Boslaugh (2007) argues that existing secondary data sources do not collect 
data to answer your specific research questions. Moreover, unavailability of secondary 
data may force the researcher to change his or her research objectives, thereby 
restricting further research possibilities. 
2- Data quality: unreliable secondary data sources may provide wrong, incomplete, 
obsolete information which may have a negative impact on research outcomes. 
3- Sampling error probability: The probability of selecting an unrepresentative sample 
for secondary data analysis can cause sampling error. The sampling error issue is 
equally problematic in primary data collection as well. 
Although like other research methods secondary data analysis has its advantages and 
disadvantages, by looking at the large sample size and complex models needed for this study, 
secondary data analysis is the most suitable research technique for this thesis. To mitigate the 
impacts of drawbacks mentioned above, thorough care has been taken in selecting data from 
reliable data sources and making sure that the sample is highly representative of the 
population. 
5.2.3 Content analysis 
This thesis uses content analysis as a research technique to quantify the content of corporate 
governance philosophy from the mission and vision statements of the sampled firms. Content 
analysis is also used in this thesis to quantify qualifications of top management of the sampled 
firms. 
White and Marsh (2006) states that content analysis is a highly flexible research method 
which has its root in mass communication studies conducted in 1950s. They further state that 
today content analysis is being used by researchers in many fields, including management, 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, political sciences and library and information studies. 
Content analysis has been dominantly used by social and environmental accounting 
researchers for collecting empirical evidence from corporate social and environmental reports 
(Cowen et al.1987; Gray et al. 1995; Guthrie & Parker 1990; Guthrie & Abhaysekara 2006; 
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Parker 2005). Krippendorff (2004, p.18) defines content analysis as “a research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the context 
of their use”. Guthrie and Abhaysekara (2006) state that content analysis is a technique of 
gathering data that includes codification of both quantitative and qualitative information as 
per the pre-defined criteria. They further mention three requirements to make this technique 
an effective research technique. First, the clear and operational definition of categories of 
classification used for content analysis, second systematic data capture and third, reliability 
and validity of content analysis. 
Like any other research technique, content analysis has its advantages and disadvantages. 
First advantage is that it can be managed with little expenditure of time, money or person 
power (Adler & Clark 2011). Second, it is a safe method; researcher can change coding 
scheme if flaws are detected during the course of study (Woodrum 1984; Tallerico 
1991).Third, it is unobtrusive and non-intrusive, and therefore, the researcher’s demand bias 
does not have any impact on the content (Woodrum 1984; Adler & Clark 2011). Fourth, it is 
helpful in conducting longitudinal studies by comparing changes in the content in corporate 
disclosures over a period of time (Weber 1990). 
Adler and Clark (2011) refer to some of the disadvantages of content analysis. First, this 
research technique is applicable only if content is available in the form of reports, disclosures 
and documentations.  Second, validity of content analysis is doubtful as it looks only at the 
information without looking deep in the context of that information. Third, it is difficult to 
apply in the documents containing complex texts. 
Apart from its several disadvantages this research technique has been widely popular among 
social and environmental accounting researchers and more recently among researchers 
working in the area of intellectual capital. This study mainly uses content analysis to find out 
sustainability related information in the corporate governance philosophy and organisations’ 
mission and vision statements. 
5.2.4 Quantitative Research Methods: A justification 
As discussed previously that positivist paradigm approach has been used predominantly by 
prior corporate governance researchers. The research method which is usually based on a 
positivist paradigm is quantitative method which holds that behaviour can be explained 
through objective facts (Firestone 1987). Quantitative research aims to determine the 
relationship between two or more given variables (Hopkins 2008). This research approach 
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describes, tests and examines cause and effect relationship between independent and 
dependent variables by using a deductive approach to establish new knowledge (Burns & 
Grove 1987; Duffy 1985).  
This thesis investigates the effects of controlling family status, family impacted governance 
and normative influences of top management players’ on financial and social performance of 
the top 500 family firms listed on the BSE. This thesis develops models to explain the 
relationships among 40 independent variables and two dependent variables in a sample 
containing more than 12,000 observations collected from several sources. Therefore, the 
sample size and large number of variables used in this thesis justify the use of quantitative 
method for investigating these relationships. In order to explain the relationship between 
independent and dependent variables, this study uses comparison of means t-tests, correlation 
analysis and regression analysis to analyse data collected for this study. SPSS version 18.0 is 
used as the statistical software to analyse the data collected for the purpose of this thesis.  
5.3 Sample 
The sample of the companies for this study has been derived from the population of 5067 (as 
of March 2010) companies listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (referred to BSE).  The BSE 
is the oldest stock exchange of Asia having the largest number of listed companies in the 
world. According to the BSE website the equity market capitalisation of the companies listed 
on the BSE was US$ 1 trillion as of December 2011 which make it the 6th largest stock 
exchange in Asia and 14th largest in the world. As of March 2012, there are a total of 5133 
companies (excluding permitting companies) and 9232 scrips listed on the BSE14. 
In the first step of data collection, top 500 companies listed in the BSE are separated from the 
population of 5067 companies in the order of their market capitalisation. These top 500 
companies, known as BSE 500, represent nearly 93% of the total market capitalisation on 
BSE15. The following bar chart shows representation of different types of ownership in the top 
500 firms listed on BSE. 
 
 
 
                                                             
14http://www.bseindia.com/about/st_key/list_cap_raised2012.asp 
15http://www.bseindia.com/about/abindices/bse500.asp 
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Fig 5.1: Type of ownership representation in the BSE 500 (IMNC= Indian 
Multinationals, MNC= Multinationals, PSU= Public Sector companies, PVT= 
Private companies) 
 
 
 
The above bar diagram indicates that out of top 500 firms, 101 firms are Indian multinational 
companies, 36 firms are multinational companies, 66 are public sector companies and 297 are 
public companies trading domestically. The top 300 family firms for the purpose of this study 
are selected from 398 firms (297+101) by following the approach of Miller et al. (2007), Saito 
(2008) and Pandey et al. (2011), who define a family firm as those in which founder or 
descendent or their blood or marriage relationship is chairperson or chairperson emeritus or 
CEO or Promoter (s) and/or founder’s family is largest shareholder in the company. Private 
family owned banks and financial companies are excluded from the sample as accounting 
rules for these financial institutions are different from other types of companies and the nature 
of capital and investment in these companies is different from other corporations (Gugler et 
al. 2008). The sample contains a good spread of Indian industries as indicated in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.2: Industry classification of the sample 
Industry 
No of Companies in 
sample Percentage 
Auto Ancillaries 11 4% 
Automobiles 8 3% 
Cement 13 4% 
Paints and Chemicals 16 5% 
Construction and Infrastructure 23 8% 
Diversified 9 3% 
Electric and Electronic Equipment 11 4% 
Engineering and Machinery 22 7% 
Fertilizers and Pesticides 6 2% 
FMCG and Consumer Durables 12 4% 
Food and Food Processing  11 4% 
IT Software and Education 14 5% 
Diamond and Jewellery 7 2% 
Entertainment and Media 6 2% 
Metals and Minerals 35 12% 
Oil and Gas  7 2% 
Packaging and Plastics 11 4% 
Pharmaceuticals, Drugs and Health 
care 18 6% 
Power Generation and Supply 5 2% 
Shipping and Logistics 6 2% 
Sugar 8 3% 
Telecommunication Services 5 2% 
Textiles 24 8% 
Trading 7 2% 
Paper  2 1% 
Hospitality 3 1% 
 Total 300 100% 
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There are several primary sources of data used in this study. Corporate governance data such 
as board size, board meetings and attendance, number of committees and cross-directorships 
are collected from annual reports of the companies in the sample. The data related to 
demographic characteristics of the key family personnel such as the CEO and Chairperson are 
collected from companies’ websites and the directorsdatabase, a comprehensive database 
containing directors’ information maintained by the BSE. The data related to the family 
shareholdings, directors’ family link and family presence on the board is collected from 
annual reports, the directorsdatabase and from corporate information available from the BSE 
website. The financial data required for calculating measures of financial performance is 
taken from a number of financial databases such as the prowess and the equity market 
databases. The social responsibility ratings used for measuring social performance are taken 
from the karmayog website. 
5.4 Research Model 
The conceptual model described in chapter 4 of this thesis is divided into three models for 
systematic study of the impacts of controlling family status, governance and top management 
characteristics on financial and social performance.  
Research Model:  The following three regression models are developed for systematic study 
of the effects of controlling family status, family-impacted governance characteristics and 
powerful management players’ normative influences on financial and social performance of 
listed Indian family controlled businesses.  
Model 1: 
Model 1 investigates the impacts of controlling family status on financial and social 
performance: 
FP or CSP = f (controlling family status variables + control variables (industry, firm size, 
firm age)  …………… Eq.1 
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Fig 5.2: Model 1 for investing impacts of family controlling status on financial and 
social performance 
 
 
 
The following two equations are derived from the above model: 
FP= a + b1 (FREP) + b2 (FSHOLD) + b3 (FGEN)+ b4 ( FBGAFFI) +b5 (FSBACK)+ 
b6(INDUS)+b7 (FAGE) + b8 (FSIZE)  + b9 ( LAGFP) + ɛ                     ………….eq 1a16 
CSP= a + b1 (FREP) + b2 (FSHOLD) + b3 (FGEN) +b4 (FBGAFFI) + b5    (FSBACK) + b6 
(INDUS) +b7 (FAGE) + b8 (FSIZE)+b9 (FP)+ɛ   ………….eq 1b 
 
Model 2 investigates the impacts of family and board governance on financial and social 
performance: 
FP or CSP = f (family governance and board governance variables) + control variables 
(industry, firm size, firm age) 
 
 
  
                                                             
16 Variables and their meanings are explained later in the next section  
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Fig 5.3: Model 2 for investing effects of family impacted governance on financial and 
social performance 
 
 
 
The following two equations are derived from the above model- 
FP= a +b1 ( FCEO) +b2 ( FCHAIR)+ b3 ( FOUNOB) + b4 (FMOB) + b5 (BGENDER) 
+b5(ININVOLVE)+ b6 ( OUTINVOLVE) + b7   (INREP) +  b8 ( OUTREP) + b9 (BSIZE) + 
b10 (BINDEP) +b11(BPHIL)+ b12 ( BDUAL) + b13    (TCOM) + b14 (BMEET) +b15(INDUS) 
+ b16 ( FAGE) + b17(FSIZE)+b18 (LAGFP)                    ………….eq 2a 
CSP= a +b1 ( FCEO) +b2 ( FCHAIR)+ b3 ( FOUNOB) + b4 (FMOB) + b5 (BGENDER) 
+b5(ININVOLVE)+ b6 ( OUTINVOLVE) + b7   (INREP) +  b8 ( OUTREP) + b9 (BSIZE) + 
b10 (BINDEP) +b11(BPHIL)+ b12 ( BDUAL) + b13    (TCOM) + b14 (BMEET) +b15(INDUS) 
+ b16 ( FAGE) + b17(FSIZE)+b18 (FP) + ɛ                      ………….eq 2b 
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Model 3: 
Model 3 investigates the impacts of key executives’ demographic characteristics on corporate 
financial and social performance. 
FP or CSP = f (CEO’s and Chairperson’s normative influences from demographic and other 
background variables + control variables ( industry, firm size, firm age). 
 
Fig 5.4: Model 3 for investing effects of normative influences of powerful 
management players on financial and social performance 
 
 
The following four equations are derived from the above model: 
FP= a + b1 (CEOREP) + b2 (CEOAMT) + b3 (CEOMBA) +b4(CEOFQ)+ b5 ( CEOAGE) + 
b6 (CEOTEXP) + b7 (CEOTENURE) +b8(CEOHUMA)+ b9 ( CEOSCI)+ b10(CEOBUS) 
+b11    (INDUS) + b12 (FAGE)  + b13 ( FSIZE) + b14 ( LAGFP) +  ɛ  …….eq 3a 
CSP= a + b1 (CEOREP) + b2 (CEOAMT) + b3 (CEOMBA) +b4(CEOFQ)+ b5 ( CEOAGE) + 
b6 (CEOTEXP) + b7 (CEOTENURE) +b8(CEOHUMA)+ b9 ( CEOSCI)+ b10(CEOBUS) 
+b11    (INDUS) + b12 (FAGE)  + b13 ( FSIZE) + b14 ( FP) +  ɛ      ………….eq 3b 
FP= a + b1 (CHREP) + b2 (CHAMT) + b3 (CHMBA) +b4(CHFQ)+ b5 ( CHAGE) + b6 
(CHTEXP) + b7 (CHTENURE) +b8(CHHUMA)+ b9 ( CHSCI)+ b10(CHBUS) +b11    
(INDUS) + b12 (FAGE)  + b13 ( FSIZE) + b14 ( LAGFP) +  ɛ      ………….eq 3c 
CSP= a + b1 (CHREP) + b2 (CHAMT) + b3 (CHMBA) +b4(CHFQ)+ b5 ( CHAGE) + b6 
(CHTEXP) + b7 (CHTENURE) +b8(CHHUMA)+ b9 ( CHSCI)+ b10(CHBUS) +b11    
(INDUS) + b12 (FAGE)  + b13 ( FSIZE) + b14 ( FP) +  ɛ      ………….eq 3d 
 127 
 
5.5 Variables: their meaning, measurement and sources for collecting data 
5.5.1 Independent variables 
FREP: refers to family reputation. Reputed business families are identified by using multiple 
sources: Piramal (2003), Forbes List of Indian family businesses and Business today 
magazine published from India. After consulting from these sources top 40 business families 
were identifies. Then, 71 firms owned by these families are marked as reputed family 
businesses.  
For the purpose of this study, this variable is quantified as a binary variable, where 1 and 0 
represent reputed and non-reputed family business. 
FSHOLD: it refers to family shareholding that is a percentage of shares owned by family 
members, their relatives, trust and companies owned by family. According to the Clause 49 
requirement, Indian companies are required to submit their shareholding pattern to the BSE 
corporate information which is publicly available on the BSE website. This information is 
used as a source of data for family shareholding. For the purpose of this study, the percentage 
of shares owned by promoters and promoters’ group as on 31st March 2012 is taken as a 
proxy for family shareholding. 
FGEN: refers to the current generation of family firms. Family generations are identified 
from founding history of the company available in the company website. Family relations are 
identified from the information available from the directorsdatabase where companies are 
required to disclose relationship between directors.  All founder run businesses in the sample 
are quantified as first generation businesses. Similarly, second and third generations are 
represented by 2 & 3 for the purpose of quantitative analysis.  
FBGAFF:  refers to the family business group affiliation. This is a binary variable, where 1 
represents the controlling families’ business group affiliation i.e. family is controlling a group 
of businesses.  
FSBACK : refers to family social background. For the purpose of this study, family social 
background refers to the caste of owner/ controlling shareholder. For the purpose of this 
study, family social background is quantified as a binary variable, where 1 represents that the 
owner is from trading community. 
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FCEO :It refers to a situation where family firm in the sample is headed by family CEO. For 
the purpose of this study, this variable is quantified as a binary variable that is taken 1 if the 
family firm in the sample is headed by family CEO and 0 if headed by non-family CEO. The 
data for this information is collected from several publicly available sources such as annual 
report, directorsdatabase, company history and management profile available from 
company’s website. 
FCHAIR : It refers to a situation where the board is chaired by a family chairperson. For the 
purpose of this study this variable is quantified as a binary variable that is taken 1 if the 
family firm in the sample is headed by family chairperson and 0 if headed by non-family 
chairperson. The data for this information is collected from several publicly available sources 
such as annual report, directorsdatabase, company history and management profile available 
from the company’s website. 
FOUNOB: refers to the founder’s presence on the company board. For the purpose of this 
study, this variable is quantified as a binary variable where 1 represents the founder’s 
presence on board and 0 otherwise. The data for this information is collected mainly from two 
sources: corporate governance reports available from the annual report and company history 
available from companies’ websites.  
FDUAL: Means family duality that refers to a situation where the CEO and the chairperson 
are from the family owning the firm in the sample. Lam and Lee (2008) argue that if both the 
roles are occupied by members of same controlling family than splitting of these roles will not 
enhance monitoring of management. Generally in family controlled firms these two roles are 
either held by the same individual from controlling family or two individuals from same 
family (Cheung et al. 2004; Lei and Song 2004). For the purpose of this study, this variable is 
quantified as a binary variable that is 1 if both the CEO and the chairperson are from same 
family owning the firm and 0 otherwise. The data for this information is collected from 
several publicly available sources such as annual report, directorsdatabase, company history 
and management profile available from company’s website. 
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Table 5.3: Variables and their meaning 
Variables  Meaning 
FREP Family reputation 
FSHOLD Family shareholding 
FGEN Family generation 
FBGAFFI Family business group affiliation 
FSBACK Family social background 
FCEO Family CEO 
FCHAIR Family Chair 
FOUNOB Founder's presence on board 
FMOB Family members on board 
BGENDER Gender diversity on board 
ININVOLVE Insiders' involvement; attendance in board meetings 
OUTINVOLVE Outsiders' involvement; attendance in board meetings 
INREP Insiders reputation; cross directorships 
OUTREP Outsiders' reputation; cross directorships 
BSIZE Board size 
BINDEP Board independence 
BPHIL Board corporate governance philosophy 
DUAL CEO duality 
TCOM Total numbers of board committees 
BMEET Frequency of board meetings 
CEOREP CEO's reputation 
CEOAMT CEO's amount of education 
CEOMBA CEOs having MBA qualification 
CEOFQ CEOs having foreign qualification 
CEOAGE age of the CEO 
CEOTEXP Total experience of the CEO 
CEOTENURE Tenure of the CEO 
CEOHUMANITY CEOs having bachelor’s degree in humanity/social sciences 
CEOSCI CEOs having bachelor’s degree in science and engineering 
CEOBUS CEOs having bachelor's degree in business and accounting 
CHREP Chairperson's reputation 
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CHAMT Chairperson's amount of education 
CHMBA Chairperson with MBA qualification 
CHFQ Chairperson with foreign qualification 
CHAGE age of the chairperson 
CHTEXP Total experience of the Chairperson 
CHTENURE Tenure of the chairperson 
CHHUMANITY Chairpersons having bachelor’s degree in humanity/social 
sciences 
CHSCI Chairpersons having bachelor’s degree in science and engineering 
CHBUS Chairpersons having bachelor's degree in business and accounting 
FP Financial performance 
CSP Corporate Social performance 
INDUS Industry 
FAGE Firm Age 
FSIZE Firm Size 
LAGFP Last year financial performance 
 
FMOB: Means family presence on the board. This refers to total number of family members 
on the board. This data is collected mainly from two sources: corporate governance report and 
the directorsdatabase. 
BGENDER: means gender diversity on boards. This refers to the number of female directors 
on boards of family firms in the sample. The source for this data is the corporate governance 
report available as a part of annual report. 
ININVOLVE: means insiders’ attendance in board meetings. This refers to average board 
meeting attendance of the inside directors that is total number of attendance of insiders’ 
divided by the total number of inside directors on the board. The data is taken from the 
corporate governance report available in the annual report. For the purpose of this study, 
inside director is a director who is either a family member or an executive director appointed 
by the controlling family. Executive directors appointed by controlling families are taken as 
insiders in this study because literature suggests that Indian family businesses have a long 
tradition of appointing close relatives/ loyal employees as executive directors on boards of 
family owned companies.  
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OUTINVOLVE:  means outside directors’ attendance in board meetings. This refers to 
average board meeting attendance of the outside directors that is total number of attendance of 
outsiders’ divided by the total number of outside directors on the board. The data is taken 
from the corporate governance report available in the annual report. For the purpose of this 
study outsiders refer to the independent directors on board. The definition of independent 
director in the Indian context is explained in the chapter 3. 
INREP: means inside directors’ reputation. This refers to average cross-directorships held by 
the inside directors of the companies selected in the sample that is total number of cross 
directorships held by insiders divided by the total number of inside directors on the board. 
The data is available from corporate governance reports available in the annual report of the 
company. 
OUTREP: means outside directors’ reputation. This refers to average cross-directorships held 
by the outside directors of the companies selected in the sample that is total number of cross 
directorships held by outsiders divided by the total number of outside directors on the board. 
The data is available from corporate governance report available in the annual report of the 
company. 
BSIZE: means board size. This refers to total number of directors on the board of family 
firms in the sample. The source for this data is the corporate governance report available as a 
part of the annual report. 
BINDEP: means board independence. This refers to the percentage of independent directors 
on the board.  The source of this data is the corporate governance report available in the 
annual report.   
BPHIL: means board corporate governance philosophy. In India, as per the Clause 49 listing 
rules, listed firms are required to include a brief statement on corporate governance 
philosophy in their report on corporate governance. For the purpose of this study, BPHIL is a 
binary variable that is taken 1 if companies’ corporate governance philosophy is sustainability 
oriented, otherwise 0. For example, in the sample, Tata Steel’s BPHIL is coded as 1 on the 
basis of following corporate governance philosophy: 
“In accordance with the Tata Steel Group Vision, Tata Steel Group (‘the Group’) aspires to 
be the global steel industry benchmark for value creation and corporate citizenship. The 
group expects to realise its Vision by taking such actions as may be necessary in order to 
 132 
 
achieve its goal of value creation, safety, environment and people.” (Tata Steel annual report 
2010, p. 95) 
DUAL: means board duality that refers to a situation when the position of the CEO and the 
chairperson is held by the same person. For the purpose of this study, this variable is 
quantified as a binary variable that is 1 if the position of the CEO and the chairperson is held 
by the same person and 0 otherwise. The source of the data is the corporate governance report 
available in the annual report. 
CEOREP: means CEO reputation that refers to the number of cross directorships held by the 
CEO. The source of this data is the corporate governance report. 
CEOAMT: means CEO total amount of education that refers to total amount of qualifications 
held by the CEO. For the purpose of this study, qualification scheme is as follows: 
0 = No university degree or school level qualification 
1= Bachelor degree 
2= Master degree 
3= PhD 
An extra weightage of 0.5 is given for any additional qualification such as degree, diploma 
and professional qualification. For example, if a CEO has bachelor degree in science with a 
diploma in computer science then weightage for his qualification will be 1.5. 
CEOMBA: means CEO’s MBA qualification. For the purpose of this study, this is a binary 
variable scored as 1 if the CEO has an MBA qualification or equivalent qualification 
(PGDBA), otherwise 0. 
CEOFQ: means CEO’s foreign qualification. For the purpose of this study, this is a binary 
variable scored as 1 if the CEO has received one of his university degrees from universities in 
the West, otherwise 0. 
CEOAGE: means age of the CEO. The sources of data are the directorsdatabse and the 
board of directors’ profile available in the companies’ websites. 
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CEOTEXP: means CEO total experience. It refers to the CEO total experience in terms of 
number of years. The data sources for this information are companies’ websites and the 
directorsdatabase. 
CEOTENURE: means CEO position tenure. It refers to the length of the CEO tenure in the 
sample company. The sources of this information are the directorsdatabase and companies’ 
websites. 
CEOHUMANITY: means CEO Humanities background. For the purpose of this study this is 
taken as a binary variable scored as 1 if the CEO has bachelor degree in humanities, otherwise 
0. 
CEOSCI: means CEO science and engineering background. This is a binary variable scored 
as 1 if the CEO is having bachelor degree in science and engineering, otherwise 0. 
CEOBUS: means CEO business background. This is a binary variable taken as 1 if the CEO 
is having bachelor degree in accounting, economics, business and finance, otherwise 0. 
CHREP: means Chairperson’s reputation that refers to the number of cross directorships held 
by the chairperson. The source of this data is the corporate governance report. 
CHAMT: means Chairperson’s total amount of education that refers to total amount of 
qualification held by the chairperson. For the purpose of this study, the scoring scheme is as 
follows: 
0 = No university degree or school level qualification 
1= Bachelor degree 
2= Master degree 
3= PhD 
An extra weightage of 0.5 is given for any additional qualification such as degree, diploma 
and professional qualification. For example, if a Chairperson has bachelor degree in science 
with diploma in computer science then weightage for his qualification will be 1.5. 
CHMBA: means Chairperson’s MBA qualification. For the purpose of this study, this is a 
binary variable, scored as 1 if the Chairperson holds an MBA qualification or equivalent 
qualification (PGDBA), otherwise 0. 
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CHFQ: means Chairperson’s foreign qualification. For the purpose of this thesis this is a 
binary variable scored as 1 if the Chairperson has received one of his university degrees from 
universities in the West, otherwise 0. 
CHAGE: means age of the chairperson. The sources of data are the directorsdatabse and the 
board of directors’ profile available in the companies’ websites. 
CHTEXP: means Chairperson’s total experience. It refers to the chairperson’s total 
experience in terms of number of years. The data sources for this information are companies’ 
websites and the directorsdatabase. 
CHTENURE: means Chairperson’s position tenure. It refers to the length of the 
chairperson’s tenure in the sample company. The sources of this information are the 
directorsdatabase and companies’ websites. 
CHHUMANITY: Means Chairperson’s Humanities background. For the purpose of this 
study this is taken as a binary variable refers to 1 if the chairperson have bachelor’s degree in 
humanities, otherwise 0. 
CHSCI: means the chairperson’s science and engineering background. This is a binary 
variable scored as 1 if the chairperson is having bachelor’s degree in science and engineering, 
otherwise 0. 
CHBUS: means chairperson’s business background. This is a binary variable taken as 1 if the 
chairperson is having bachelor’s degree in accounting, economics, business and finance, 
otherwise 0. 
5.5.2 Control variables 
FAGE: Means firm age. It refers to the age of the firm in the sample. The data for age of the 
firm in the sample is collected from company history available from company’s website. Firm 
age is taken as control variable for the purpose of this study because prior researches have 
provided empirical evidences of the influence of firm age on firm’s financial and social 
performance (Ang et al. 2000; Rashid et al. 2010; Erhemjamts et al. 2011). 
Although prior literature (as mentioned above) suggest a linkage between firm financial 
performance and age of the firm but the direction of this relationship is unclear. Loderer and 
Waelchli (2010) argue that older firms are more rigid as an organisation as compared to newer 
firm. They empirically find that profitability of a firm declines as it grows old. Investors’ 
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uncertainty reduces as the firm grows (Pastor & Veronesi 2003; Adams et al. 2005; Cheng 
2008). Ang et al. (2000) argue that because of the effects of learning curve and survival bias 
older firms are more efficient as compared to start-up firms.  
In relation to the impact of firm size on corporate social performance, Moore (2001) reports a 
positive relationship between age of the firm and corporate social performance in a study of 
the UK supermarket industry. Erhemjamts et al. (2011) find that there is a significant positive 
relationship between firm age and CSR strength and concerns. 
The above discussion clearly indicates that the firm age has an impact on both financial and 
social performance. Therefore, similar to other past governance studies this study also takes 
firm age as one of the control variables. Unlike other studies that count firm age as number of 
years from the date of listing  (Shumway 2001; Pastor & Veronesi 2003; Fama & Fench 2004; 
Chun et al. 2008; Loderer & Waelhli 2010), this study follows the approach of Singh and 
Gaur ( 2009) for measuring age of the firm which is number of years since foundation to 
2010. 
FSIZE: Refers to size of firm measured in terms of total assets. Prior literature ( Huang 2010; 
Stanwick & Stanwick 1998) provides evidences of influence of firm size on both financial 
and social performance. Singh and Gaur (2009) state that firm age and firm size are used as 
standard control variables in studies investigating impacts on performance.   
There is conflicting evidence of the direction of relationship between firm size and financial 
performance. Proponents of the competitive advantage theory suggest that bigger size 
provides incremental advantages to the firm by raising the barriers of entry to the potential 
entrants and attaining profitability by achieving economies of scale (Ramasamy et al. 2005; 
Chrystal & Lipsey 1997). Huang (2010) argue that large firms have more resources and can 
afford aggressive growth strategies for achieving better performance. In contrast, other 
researchers suggest larger firms are difficult to manage due to higher bureaucratisation (Ahuja 
& Majumdar 1998) and lack of coordination (Downs 1967) that may lead to the negative 
association between firm size and financial performance (Whittington 1980; Ramasamy et al. 
2005).  
In relation to the impact of firm size on corporate social performance, Pavelin and Porter 
(2008) propose that firm size is positively related to corporate social performance. Similarly, 
Erhemjamts et al. (2011) find empirically that there is a significant positive relationship 
between firm size and CSR strength and concerns. Other researchers also find that Firm size 
 136 
 
has an impact on CSR (McGuire et al. 1988; Waddock & Graves 1997; McKendall et al. 
1999; McWilliams & Siegel 2000; Uhlaner et al. 2004).  
Several past studies have taken firm size as one of the control variables when looking at the 
impacts of board governance on corporate financial and social performance ( Manner 2010; 
Jackling & Johl 2009). Manner (2010) states that firm size is more typically measured in 
terms of the natural log of either total sales or total assets. This study also measures firm size 
as the natural log of total assets as on 31st March 2010. 
5.5.3 Dependent Variables 
FP: Means financial performance. For the purpose of this study, a modified version of the 
approximate Tobin’s q given by Chung and Pruitt (1994) is used for measuring financial 
performance. They conduct a series of regression analyses before coming to a conclusion that 
their approximate q provides a more theoretically correct model as compared to q defined by 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and explains 96.6% variability of Tobin’s q. Following Chung 
and Pruitt (1994), this study calculates Tobin’s q as: 
Tobin’s q = (MVS + D)/ TA 
Where, MVS = market value of outstanding shares (number of outstanding shares x share 
price) 
D= book value of total debt 
TA= Total assets 
Thirty years after the introduction of the concept of Tobin’s q by Brainard and Tobin (1968) 
and Tobin (1969), this measure of performance has become the most widely used measure of 
firms’ incentives to invest (Erickson & Whited 2006). A wide number of corporate 
governance studies investigating impacts of governance on firm performance have used 
Tobin’s q as a measure of financial performance (Gompers et al 2003; Yermack 1996; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003; Jackling & Johl 2009; Pandey et al. 2011). Other measures of 
performance e.g. ROA, ROS and ROE are also consistently used in corporate governance 
research (Jackling& Johl 2009;Muth & Donaldson 1998; Singh and Gaur 2009;  Lam & Lee 
2008; Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994 ). 
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CSP: Means corporate social performance that refers to both social and environmental 
performance for the purpose of this thesis. There have been numerous attempts to define 
corporate social and environmental performance from different dimensions. According to 
Wartick and Cocharan (1985), CSP suggests that a firm, whose very existence is predicted on 
society’s sanction and support, has the obligation to be an economically and socially 
responsible citizen and act in a publicly responsible way. Wood (1991) defines it as “a 
Business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of 
social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the 
firm's societal relationship”. Igalens and Gond (2005) define it as “it can be interpreted as 
progressively maturing product of ongoing thinking on responsibility (CSR)”, justifying “the 
emphasis from the construct's level of definition to its management and finally to its 
measurement”. Dyer  and Whetten (2006) suggest two dimensions of CSP: first, the positive 
contribution to improve society (e.g. charity and social welfare), second, avoiding activities 
which might raise social concern (e.g. polluting environment, breaking laws). Godfrey (2005) 
argues that firms who fail to address these two dimensions may face economic, social and 
legal sanctions from stakeholders and society in general.   
Prior empirical researchers have commonly used two types of proxies for measuring 
corporate social performance (referred to as CSP from here onwards). First, reputation 
indices and social ratings evaluated by external agencies such as KLD, S&P ESG, Reputex 
index etc. Second, a disclosure index developed by content analysis of corporate publications 
containing social and environmental disclosures. The first empirical study that relied upon 
externally produced ratings of CSP was conducted by Shane and Spicer (1983).They argued 
that externally produced data is superior as compared to voluntary disclosures made by an 
organisation itself. Most of the prominent studies published in quality accounting journals 
have used social performance ratings provided by independent agencies such as KLD database 
and CEP (Cowen et al. 1987; Roberts 1992; Albinger & Freeman 2000; Bendheim et al.1998; 
Griffin & Mahon 1997; Johnson & Greening 1999; Ruf et al. 2001; Manner 2010). Chatterji 
et al. (2009) compare social ratings with credit ratings and argue that social ratings aim to 
provide social investors accurate and transparent information about socially responsible 
behaviour of firms evaluated by these agencies. They further state that KLD’s ratings are the 
oldest and most influential ratings, have been used most widely by academics. Some other 
studies have used Fortune database as a measure of corporate social performance (McGuire et 
al. 1988; Wartick 1988; Thomas & Simerly 1994).  
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The other predominantly used method of measuring corporate social performance is by 
developing a disclosure index based on content analysis of corporate social and environmental 
disclosures. This has also been widely used by social and environmental accounting 
researchers in social accounting literature (Cowen et al. 1987; Gray et al. 1995; Guthrie & 
Parker 1990; Guthrie & Abhaysekara 2006; Parker 2005). Although KLD ratings are 
predominantly used by the prior researchers, one of the problems with the use of reputed 
external agencies indices and ratings is that these ratings are only available for a few countries 
(Turker 2008). Most of the time they are only for firms located in developed countries.  
Since the context of this thesis is an emerging economy, India, where reputed external 
agencies’ corporate social performance ratings are not available for the whole sample,  this 
thesis therefore uses corporate social and environmental performance ratings by a local rating 
agency Karmayog (please refer to Appendix 2 for rating criteria and other information about 
this organisation). 
The social responsibility rating used for measuring social performance is taken from the 
Karmayog website. This rating combines social and environmental aspects of performance. 
The scores given by the independent rating agency have been corroborated by conducting a 
correlation between scores given by Karmayog and other ratings agencies well known 
worldwide (please refer to Appendix 3). The following are details of tests conducted to cross-
check the credibility of the Karmayog rating: 
(1) The Karmayog and Asian Sustainability Ratings (ASR) index. The ASR rating is a 
well-known sustainability rating that uses a proprietary set of 100 indicators grouped 
into four categories, General, Environmental, Social and Governance.17 Correlation 
analysis was performed as it provides evidence of the strength of a linear relationship 
between two variables. Correlation analysis suggests a very significant positive 
correlation (r= 0.684, p= 0.002) between the Karmayog corporate social responsibility 
rating and the ASR ESG rating. This is confirmation of the creditability of the 
Karmayog ratings.  
(2) The Karmayog and S&P ESG Rating- The S&P ESG India provides investors with 
exposure to 50 of the best performing stocks in the Indian market as measured by 
environmental, social, and governance parameters18. Correlation analysis was 
                                                             
17 www.asiansr.com/Methodology.html 
18http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-esg-india/en/us/?indexId=sp-esg-india 
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performed between the Karmayog rating and S&P ESG rating for a similar set of 
companies. Correlation analysis suggests a significant positive correlation (r=0.614, 
p= 0.079) between these two ratings. 
(3) Moreover for further reliability testing, a correlation analysis was performed between 
the amount of donations to charities given by sampled firms and the Karmayog ratings 
of these firms. This also reveals a highly significant positive correlation (r= 0.182, p= 
0.002) between the amount donated and Karmayog ratings. This further provides 
evidence for the credibility of the Karmayog ratings adopted in this thesis as a measure 
of corporate social performance. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the research methods used in this thesis to investigate the impacts of 
controlling family status, family-impacted governance and normative influences of powerful 
management players on corporate financial and social performance of listed large Indian 
family firms. The discussion in the chapter justifies the use of the positivist approach for this 
thesis. This chapter also discusses sample size, data sources, variables used and the 
specification of models employed to test sets of relationships. Further, this chapter explains in 
detail the proxies taken for measuring financial and social performance including the 
credibility testing for the Karmayog social and environmental performance ratings.  
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to quantitatively analyse sample data, present the results and 
discuss the findings. This chapter also compares findings of this thesis with prior literature. 
Furthermore, the discussion also addresses the research contribution made by this study 
backed up by the evidence from the results presented. 
This chapter extends the content of chapters 4 and 5, where the conceptual framework and 
research methods have been presented. It quantitatively analyses the sample data by using 
both univariate and multivariate data analysis as discussed in the research methods chapter.  
The sample data for this study have been analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) version 18. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section covers descriptive characteristics 
of the data used in this thesis. The second section presents the findings of the impacts of 
controlling family status, family related board governance characteristics and normative 
influences of top management on financial and social performance. This section also 
discusses and explains key findings of this thesis. The third section extends these findings to 
explain impacts of these factors on integrated and decoupled corporate performance followed 
by the conclusion. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This thesis explores the effects of controlling family status, family-impacted board 
governance and normative influences of top management on financial and social performance 
of listed Indian family firms. Therefore, for a better understanding of data characteristics the 
descriptive statistics are divided into three sections. The first section covers controlling status 
variables, the second section covers family-impacted board governance variables and the third 
section covers variables related to demographic backgrounds that shape normative influences 
on powerful management players. The data source, industry classification and measurement 
of the variables used in this study have already been discussed in the research methods 
chapter.  
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6.2.1   Family ownership, culture, social background and status 
Table 6.1 given below provides descriptive statistics related to family ownership 
characteristics of large listed Indian family firms used in the sample. This frequency table 
reveals that average family shareholding is above 50% that means business families in India 
maintain a high ownership in the businesses controlled by them. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for family ownership status characteristics 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median  
Standard 
deviation 
FREP 0 1 0.24 0 0.43 
FSHOLD 9.70 95.70 53.20 52.12 16.30 
FGEN 1 5 1.66 1 0.93 
FBGAFFI 0 1 0.62 1 0.49 
FSBACK 0 1 0.62 1 0.49 
 
Table 6.1 further reveals that firms are owned (i.e. the controlling shareholder) or managed 
(the Chairperson or CEO) by family members from a family generation ranging from first to 
fifth. Figure 6.1 diagrammatically shows multiple generations in these Indian family-
controlled listed companies, as well as the presence of multiple generations of Chief 
Executive Officers. 
Fig 6.1: Presence of multiple generations in Indian family firms 
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Table 6.1 further reveals the strong presence of family business groups (62%) in the 
environment of the Indian family-controlled listed companies.  Moreover 24% of the family 
businesses in the sample are owned and managed by families with a high profile family 
reputation. Other statistics, not reported in Table 6.1 reveal that a majority (77.3%) of these 
firms have mission and vision statements directly related to financial goals, while 81.7% of 
these businesses mention financial objectives in their value statements.  
In terms of ethnicity, Figure 6.2 reveals that most of the family businesses are owned by 
Hindus (88.7%) coming from the ethnic grouping that is historically identified as the 
successful operators of  trading communities (62%). 
Fig 6.2: Dominant presence of Hindu and trading community owners 
 
In summary, these descriptive statistics confirm the typical characteristics of Indian family 
businesses such as high shareholdings, presence of multiple generations and dominance of 
Hindu owners from trading communities of Indian family businesses as outlined in the 
chapter 2. 
6.2.2 Family governance and board governance characteristics 
Descriptive statistics of family related board governance characteristics of the sampled firms 
are shown in Table 6.2. This table indicates that listed Indian family businesses are largely 
managed by family CEOs and Chairpersons as descriptive statistics reveals with 73% of 
sampled firms headed by family CEOs and 90% headed by family Chairpersons. Table 6.2 
also provides an evidence of founding family members’ strong presence on the board as 
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26.81% of the board members, on average, belong to the founding families. Further, 67% of 
the firms are managed by a CEO and Chairperson belonging to founding family. In terms of 
board leadership, 55% of the sampled firms are headed by an executive Chairperson while 
45% are chaired by a non-executive director. Of these Chairpersons, only 6% of the sampled 
firms have an independent Chairperson. 
Furthermore Table 6.2 further reveals a relatively high duality of role of CEO and the 
Chairperson with 34.7% of the sampled firms having the CEO also playing the role as a 
Chairperson. This fairly high incidence of duality in large family-controlled listed firms exists 
despite the BSEs listing rule recommending an independent Chairperson. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for family governance characteristics 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median  SD 
FCEO 0 1 0.73 1 0.443 
FCHAIR 0 1 0.9 1 0.301 
FOUNCEO 0 1 0.29 0 0.455 
FOUNCHAIR 0 1 0.53 0.5 0.701 
CHEXE 0 1 0.55 1 0.499 
FDUAL 0 1 0.67 1 0.47 
DUAL 0 1 0.35 0 0.477 
FMOB 0 57.14 26.81 25 12.48 
BGENDER 0 36.36 4.14 0 6.44 
INSIDERS   10 76.92 44.04 44.44 10.45 
OUTSIDERS   23.08 90 55.96 55.55 10.45 
BPHIL 0 1 0.36 0 0.481 
BSIZE 4 21 9.9 10 2.96 
BMEETING 2 28 6.74 6 3.23 
BAATEND 1.67 24.5 5.04 4.57 2.36 
ININVOLVE 1 22 5.25 4.79 2.47 
OUTINVOLVE 1 18.33 4.58 4.33 1.96 
BREP 0 13.67 4.79 4.7 2.34 
INREP 0 15.67 4.43 3.95 2.68 
OUTREP 0 16.5 4.1 3.87 2.68 
TCOM 1 8 3.74 3 12.8 
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In relation to the presence of independent directors on boards of Indian listed firms, the 
Clause 49 listing rules impose a mandatory obligation on listed companies in India to appoint 
at least 50% of independent directors on board. Descriptive statistics of the sampled data 
reveals that the average percentage of independent directors on boards of listed Indian family 
firms is 55.96%. Therefore, it can be said that on average boards of listed Indian family firms’ 
are more independent than the regulatory requirement. 
In relation to the women representation on the board, descriptive statistics clearly indicates 
weaker women representation on the boards of the sampled firms. Table 6.2 shows that the 
average women representation on the boards of sampled firms’ is only 4.14%. This figure 
supports the male dominated peculiar characteristic of Indian family businesses.   
Furthermore, Table 6.2 also provides descriptive statistics for the board governance variables 
such as board size, board meetings including board attendance, directors’ cross-directorships 
and presence of board committees. Table reveals that on average listed Indian family firms 
have larger boards as the average board size of the sampled firms’ is 9.9. 
Fig 6.3 Board Governance Characteristics 
 
In relation to the number of board meetings, Clause 49 listing requirements impose a 
mandatory obligation on Indian family firms to hold at least four board meetings in a financial 
year. Descriptive statistics reveals that on average the sampled firms hold 6.74 board meetings 
in year that exceeds the minimum mandatory requirement imposed by Clause 49. This thesis 
further explores the impact of the board of directors’ attendance on corporate financial and 
social performance. Table further reveals that the average attendance of directors at board 
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meetings is 75%. Insiders (77.89%) are found to participate more in the board processes 
compared to outsiders (67.95%). 
In relation to the average cross-directorships of directors of the sampled firms, Table 6.2 
indicates that the average cross-directorships of the board of family-controlled companies in 
India is 4.79 with Insiders (4.43) holding more cross directorships compared to outsiders 
(4.1). Furthermore, Table 6.2 also specifies that on average the boards of family-controlled 
companies in India have more board committees (3.74 per firm) compared to BSE’s 
recommended minimum of 2 per firm.  
Fig 6.4: Board meetings and average attendance of the board of directors 
 
In relation to the board governance philosophy as disclosed in the corporate governance 
report, Table 6.2 reveals that on average only 36% of the sampled firms mention 
sustainability related objectives of maintaining good governance. Majority of the sampled 
firms (64%) declare achieving financial objectives by following good governance.   
In summary, descriptive results on family and board governance characteristics clearly 
provide evidence of family dominance on the boards of family-controlled listed Indian firms. 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 reveal  that founding families not only maintain high shareholdings but also 
uphold  powerful representation on the board by appointing a family CEO, family 
Chairperson and family members on board. These tables also indicate that the board 
governance characteristics of the Indian listed family firms exceed the mandatory 
recommendations imposed by Clause 49. 
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6.2.3 Descriptive statistics for powerful management players’ demographic 
characteristics 
Powerful management players’ and top management for the purpose of this thesis refer to the 
CEOs and Chairpersons of family-controlled listed Indian companies. Table 6.3 provides a 
statistical description of demographic characteristics of the family CEO and the family 
Chairperson. 
Table 6.3: demographic characteristics of family key executives 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median  SD 
CEOREP 0 33 6.08 5.00 5.19 
CEOAMT 0 6 1.96 1.50 1.18 
CEOTYPE 0 6 2.65 3.00 1.73 
CEOMBA 0 1 0.29 0.00 0.63 
CEOFQ 0 1 0.24 0.00 0.43 
CEOAGE 30 82 53.63 53.00 9.54 
CEOEXP 5 54 28.30 27.00 9.14 
CEOTENURE 1 52 16.28 16.00 9.86 
CHREP 0 33 6.73 6.00 4.90 
CHAMT 0 6 1.80 1.00 1.27 
CHTYPE 0 6 2.24 2.00 1.68 
CHMBA 0 1 0.15 0.00 0.37 
CHCA 0 1 0.05 0.00 0.21 
CHFQ 0 1 0.26 0.00 0.44 
CHAGE 29 90 62.15 62.00 11.78 
CHEXP 5 65 35.38 34.00 11.36 
CHTENURE 1 70 20.81 21.00 10.48 
 
Table 6.3 shows that CEOs and Chairpersons of listed Indian family-controlled businesses 
hold high number of cross directorships. Table depicts that on average CEOs and 
Chairpersons of family-controlled firms in India hold more than five cross directorships in 
other listed companies.  
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In relation to the specialised qualifications of powerful management players, Figure 6.5 
reveals interesting facts about their educational backgrounds. Figure depicts  that majority of 
powerful management players have science and engineering background  as 39% of  
Chairpersons and 45.7% of CEOs have completed their Bachelor’s degree in science and 
engineering. In relation to the business and accounting related qualification of powerful 
executives, Figure shows that 35.3% of Chairpersons and 40% of CEOs of the sampled firms 
have completed their bachelors’ degree in business or accounting. Figure further reveals that 
15.7% of Chairpersons and 7.3% of CEOs of the sampled firms come from humanities and 
social science background.  
Fig 6.5: Educational Background of powerful management players 
 
 
In relation to the MBA qualification of key executives, Table 6.3 reveals that majority of 
these executives do not have MBA qualification. The table indicates that 28.7% of CEOs are 
MBA qualified compared to 14.6% MBA qualified Chairpersons, thus revealing that more 
CEOs are MBA qualified compared to Chairpersons.  
In relation to the level of education of Chairpersons’, Figure 6.6 reveals that 9.7% of 
Chairpersons have only school level qualification, 54.3% have bachelor’s degree, 28.7% have 
a master’s degree, 3% have a doctorate and 4.3% have professional accounting qualifications 
such as CA and CMA.  CEOs have comparable qualification levels,4.3% of CEOs have no 
university degree while 50% have bachelor’s degree, 37.7% have a master’s degree, 3.3% 
hold a doctorate and 4.7% have professional accounting qualifications such as CA and CMA. 
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Qualification statistics further reveals that a large section of the CEOs and Chairpersons of the 
sampled firms are qualified in foreign universities especially in the American universities. 
Figure 6.7 shows that 25.7% of Chairpersons and 24.7% of CEOs are foreign qualified. 
Fig 6.6: Powerful management players’ level of education 
 
In relation to other demographic characteristics such as key executives’ age, experience and 
tenure, Table 6.3 reveals that on average Chairpersons are more aged, more experienced and 
have longer average tenure as compared to CEOs.  
Fig 6.7: Powerful management players’ professional qualification 
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family Chairpersons. All women family Chairpersons are from founding family. Second, for 
CEOs, a similar pattern is found. Non- family CEOs are more qualified, more aged and have 
specialised managerial qualification (i.e. MBA) compared to family CEOs. But family CEOs 
on average have longer tenure as compared to non-family CEOs. Similar to Chairpersons 
demographics, most of the firm CEOs are founding family members. There are no other 
substantial differences among other demographic characteristics of family and non-family 
Chairpersons or CEOs.  
In summary, descriptive statistics provide up-to-date demographic information on the two key 
players, Chairpersons and CEO, managing family-controlled Indian listed companies. 
Demographics reveal that majority of key executives are male, belong to founding families, 
come from a science and engineering background and are foreign qualified. On average, 
CEOs are slightly more highly qualified compared to Chairpersons. Most of the CEOs come 
from a science and engineering background with 29% of them holding an MBA degree. 
6.2.4 Descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables 
Variables, their definitions, measurement and the logic behind their selection have been 
covered in the Chapter 5. Table 6.4 below presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
control variables used in this study. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for dependent and control variables 
 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Median  SD 
FP 0.07 16.14 2.13 1.47 2.01 
CSP 0.00 4.00 1.35 1.00 1.05 
LAGFP 0.10 9.87 1.27 0.91 1.06 
FAGE 5.00 105.00 37.21 28.00 23.01 
INDUS 0.00 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.37 
FSIZE 6.11 199665.30 4481.25 1605.86 13610 
LOGFSIZE 1.21 5.30 3.26 3.20 0.51 
LEVERAGE -18.47 16.80 1.14 0.87 1.96 
RNDEXP 0.00 0.12 0.011 0.002 0.023 
CAPEXP 0.00 1.19 0.09 0.05 0.14 
 
Table 6.4 reveals that the dependent variable FP (financial performance), has an average value 
of Tobin’s Q for the year 2010 of 2.13 as compared to 1.27 in the year 2009. The lower value 
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of Tobin’s Q in 2009 as compared to 2010 can be explained as an impact of global financial 
crisis on the financial performance of the sampled firms. Table 6.4 further shows that the 
sample comprises a diversity of firms in terms of their age. The range is 5 and 105 years old 
firms. In terms of industry, there is low diversity in the sample, with 84% of the sampled 
firms coming from manufacturing industry.  
6.3 Normality of data 
This chapter will subsequently undertake data analysis using the independent samples t-test, 
correlation analysis and ordinary least-square regression analysis. These are parametric 
statistical tests that assume data is normally distributed in the population. Therefore, testing 
the normality of the data for variables to be modelled is necessary. 
Normality requires the data frequency to be distributed in the approximate shape of a 
symmetrical, bell shaped curve (Gravetter and Wallnau,2000,p.52). Coakes and Ong (2011) 
explain several ways for testing normality both graphically and statistically. Following 
Coakes and Ang (2011), this thesis uses the histogram (shown in Fig. 6.8) and normal Q-Q 
curves approaches (not shown) to test the normality of data for variables used in this study. 
Although normality testing has been done for all variables used in this study, some of them 
are shown in Figure 6.8. Based on these tests, in order to achieve improved normality, certain 
variables namely FAGE (age of the firm) and FSIZE (size of the firm) are replaced by their 
natural logarithmic values. For other variables, a small number of outliers were statistically 
detected and removed from data in order to further achieve normality of data. 
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Fig 6.8: Normality of data 
 
 
6.4 Controlling family status and its impact on financial and social 
performance 
This section directly addresses the first research question and explores the impacts of 
controlling family status such as family reputation, family shareholdings, family generation 
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and family social background on financial and social performance. In order to investigate the 
impact of family ownership status on corporate financial and social performance, this thesis 
uses t-test, correlation analysis and regression analysis by using SPSS. These analytical 
techniques and findings are given below: 
6.4.1 Independent sample t-test 
To investigate the impacts of the controlling family status characteristics such as family 
reputation, family generation and family social background, as well as family shareholding, 
on the firm’s financial and social performance, respectively, this study first dichotomises the 
data of independent variables and applies independent samples t-tests. Table 6.5 shows results 
of these tests. Panel A results reveal the impact of controlling family status on corporate 
financial performance and panel B shows the impact of these characteristics on corporate 
social performance. 
Panel A shows that there is a significant difference (p=0.016) in the mean values of highly 
reputed families’ financial performance (Mean= 0.29) as compared to the financial 
performance of less reputed family firms (Mean= 0.17). This reveals that firms controlled by 
more highly reputed families have significantly better financial performance compared to 
those having lower reputation.  
Panel A also reveals that there is a highly significant difference ( p= 0.005) in the means of 
financial performance for businesses owned by families from trading communities 
(mean=0.54) and non-trading communities (mean=0.70). This is a counter-intuitive result in 
that it suggests that businesses run by families from non-trading communities are better 
financial performers compared to the businesses run by trading communities. However, this 
result may be an artefact of the very small number of sampled firms in the non-trading group. 
Other findings in Panel A are that the levels of family shareholding and family business group 
affiliations are not significantly different in their impacts on financial performance. 
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Table 6.5: Independent samples t-test comparing differences in financial and social 
performance based on dichotomized groupings of family ownership status variables 
Family 
ownership 
characteristics 
Panel A-Financial Performance Panel B- Social Performance 
Mean Mean Difference t Sig. Mean 
Mean 
Difference t Sig. 
FREP                 
Low 0.17       0.14       
    -0.117 2.482 0.016   -0.22 -4.589 0.000 
          High 0.29       0.36       
FSHOLD                 
Low 52.36       55.75       
    -1.96 -1.043 0.298   5.89 3.206 0.002 
High 54.32       49.86       
FGEN                 
Older 1.63       1.47       
    -0.076 -0.806 0.483   -0.445 -4.215 0.000 
Newer 1.7       1.92       
FBGAFFI                 
Non affiliation 0.61       0.52       
    -0.002 0.708 0.978   -0.215 -3.876 0.000 
Affiliation 0.61       0.74       
FSBACK                 
Non Trading 0.7       0.63       
    0.157 0.911 0.005   0.02 0.343 0.731 
Trading 0.54       0.61       
 
Panel B in Table 6.5 shows a significant difference (p=0.000) in the mean values of reputed 
families social performance (Mean=0.36) compared to family firms controlled by lower 
reputed families (Mean= 0.14). Thus revealing that firms controlled by highly reputed 
families have better social performance compared to firms controlled by lower reputed 
families. 
The Panel B further indicates that the group of firms with larger family shareholdings (mean= 
55.75) have weaker social performance compared to group of firms having low family 
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shareholdings (mean= 49.86). Thus revealing that increase in family shareholding is 
associated with lower social performance. 
Panel B also reveals a significant difference in the means of group affiliated (mean= 0.74) and 
unaffiliated (mean= 0.52) family firms for corporate social performance, revealing that family 
firm’s business group affiliation have positive impact on corporate social performance. 
Furthermore, in relation to the impact of family generation on corporate social performance, t-
test results reveal that there is a significant difference (p=0.000) in the mean values of older 
generation (mean=1.47) and new generation (mean=1.92) for corporate social performance. 
Thus, suggesting that newer family generation is more socially responsible as compared to the 
older family generation. Moreover, Independent sample t-test does not reveal any significant 
difference in the means of family social background, indicating that family social background 
does not have any impact on firm’s social performance. 
6.4.2 Correlation Analysis 
In order to further investigate the impact of controlling family status characteristics on 
financial and social performance, a correlation analysis was performed. Before conducting 
correlation analysis, preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. The results of correlation analysis 
are shown in the table 6.6 given below. 
Correlation analysis reveals a highly significant, positive correlation between family 
reputation and corporate social performance (r= 0.295, p= 0.000). However unlike 
independent sample t-test results, correlation analysis does not suggest any association 
between family reputation and financial performance. The correlation analysis further 
suggests a significant positive correlation between family shareholdings and financial 
performance (r= 0.143, p= 0.013) and a highly significant and negative correlation between 
family shareholding and corporate social performance (r= -0.224, p= 0.000). The analysis 
further reveals a positive and highly significant correlation (r= 0.202, p= 0.000) between 
family firm’s business group affiliation and corporate social performance. The table also 
suggests that family firm’s business group affiliation does not influence its financial 
performance.  In contrast to the t-test findings, correlation analysis does not suggest any 
significant relationship between family social background and corporate financial and social 
performance. 
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In summary, correlation analysis results suggest that family reputation and family business 
group affiliation have significant positive impact on corporate social performance. However 
these factors do not have any significant impact on corporate financial performance. The 
analysis further reveals that family shareholding has a significant positive impact on financial 
performance and negative impact on social performance. 
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Table 6.6: Correlation analysis 
  FREPO FSHOLD FGEN FBGAFF FSBACK FP CSP INDUS FAGE FSIZE LAGFP 
FREPO 1                     
FSHOLD -0.064 1                   
FGEN .320** -0.074 1                 
FBGAFF .391** 0.018 .268** 1               
FSBACK .131* 0.052 -0.082 0.064 1             
FP 0.086 .143* 0.093 -0.002 -0.112 1           
CSP .295** -.224** .257** .202** 0.004 .263** 1         
INDUS -.142* -0.031 0.106 0.011 0.069 -.141* -0.038 1       
FAGE .229** -.144* .447** .140* -0.068 .135* .181** .119* 1     
FSIZE .345** -.154** 0.02 .117* 0.025 0.073 .365** -.183** 0.02 1   
LAGFP 0.022 0.084 -0.017 -0.047 -.133* .770** .268** -.132* 0.067 .258** 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 157 
 
6.4.3 Regression analysis 
6.4.3.1 Impact of controlling family status on financial performance 
A one-stage least-squares regression analysis is conducted to further explore the impact of 
controlling family status characteristics on corporate financial and social performance. Table 
6.7 shows results of regression analysis for the impact of family ownership characteristic on 
financial performance.  
Table 6.7: Regression analysis showing the impact of controlling family status 
characteristics on financial performance 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, Tobin’s Q 
β T sig tol VIF 
FREP 0.124 1.901 0.026 0.616 1.622 
FSHOLD 0.091 1.673 0.087 0.875 1.142 
FGEN 0.03 0.741 0.459 0.755 1.325 
FBGAFFI 0.007 0.117 0.907 0.821 1.218 
FSBACK -0.016 -0.291 0.771 0.885 1.13 
INDUS -0.027 -0.471 0.639 0.791 1.264 
FAGE 0.027 0.493 0.623 0.858 1.166 
FSIZE -0.048 -0.761 0.448 0.671 1.491 
LAGFP 0.822 15.074 0.000 0.880 1.406 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.688, Adj R2 = .677 
                                 ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
Regression results reveal that family reputation positively and significantly influences firms’ 
financial performance (β= 0.124, p= 0.026). It further indicates that family shareholding is 
positively and significantly related to financial performance ( β= 0.091, p= 0.087). In contrast 
to t-test findings, but similar to correlation analysis results, regression analysis also reveals 
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that family social background and its business group affiliation have no influence on financial 
performance of the sampled firms. 
Table 6.7 also provides a summary of the model used to investigate the impacts of controlling 
family status characteristics on financial performance. Model fit analysis indicates that model 
significance is .000 and R2= 0.688, which means that model is highly significant and it 
explains 68.8% of the variance of relationship between family ownership characteristics and 
financial performance. Moreover, variance inflation factors (VIF) of explanatory variables is 
between 1 and 2 that indicates there is no significant level of multicollinearity among 
explanatory variables.  
In summary, regression analysis suggests a significant and positive impact of family 
reputation and family shareholding on financial performance. The analysis further reveals that 
control variables industry, age of the firm and firm size do not have a significant impact on 
corporate financial performance. However, the control variable, lag of financial performance 
i.e. past year financial performance significantly influences corporate financial performance. 
6.4.3.2 Controlling family status and corporate social performance 
In order to explore the impact of controlling family status characteristics on corporate social 
performance, a regression analysis was conducted as explained in Equation 1 (b) in the 
research methods chapter. 
 Table 6.8 summarizes the regression analysis used to investigate the impacts of controlling 
family status characteristics on social performance. Similar to t-test and correlation analysis’s 
findings, regression analysis also reveals that family shareholding has a significant negative 
(β= -0.198, p= 0.000) impact on corporate social performance.  Further, similar to the t-test 
result, Table 6.8 indicates that family generation has a significant positive (β= 0.153, p= .008) 
impact on corporate social performance of the sampled firms. Model summary given in the 
table reveals a satisfactory model fit with R2= 0.433 and sig.= .000. 
Regression results further reveal that similar to financial performance, corporate social 
performance is also not influenced by a family’s business group affiliation or its social 
background. However, these findings are in contrast with the findings revealed by the t-test 
and correlation analysis results.  Further, there is no problem of multi-collinearity between 
independent variables as VIF value is between 1 and 2. 
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Table 6.8: Regression analysis showing the impacts of controlling family status 
characteristics on corporate social performance 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, Corporate Social Performance 
β T sig tol VIF 
FREPO 0.074 1.207 0.228 0.654 1.523 
FSHOLD -0.198 -3.786 0.000 0.938 1.066 
FGEN 0.153 2.672 0.008 0.756 1.323 
FBGAFFI 0.102 1.341 0.182 0.822 1.217 
FSBACK 0.066 0.896 0.372 0.880 1.137 
INDUS 0.013 0.172 0.864 0.790 1.265 
FAGE -0.059 -0.795 0.428 0.854 1.171 
FSIZE 0.32 3.873 0.000 0.691 1.447 
FP 0.364 4.983 0.000 0.887 1.127 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.433, Adj R2 = .396 
                       ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
In summary, regression analysis suggests that an increase in family shareholding of the 
controlling family have negative impact on corporate social performance. Further, it suggests 
that the newer generation of controlling family is more socially responsible as compared to 
the older generation. 
6.4.4 A summary of the impact of controlling family status characteristics on 
corporate financial and social performance 
The above section addressed Research Question 1 whose objective was to provide evidence 
on the impact of controlling family status (family reputation, family shareholding, family 
generation, family business group affiliation, family social background) on the firm’s 
financial and social performance. The table 6.9 given below presents the overall findings of 
the impact of family controlling status characteristics on both corporate financial and social 
performance.  
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Table 6.9: Controlling family status and its impact on financial and social performance 
Controlling family status Financial Performance     Social Performance        
Family Reputation Positive, Significant Non-Significant 
Family Shareholding Positive, Significant Negative, Significant 
Family Generation Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
Family Business Group Affiliation Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Family Social Background Non-Significant Non-Significant 
 
6.4.4 Discussion: This section compares findings of this study with prior literature and 
provides an explanation of these findings in the Indian business context. 
6.4.4.1 Reputation and its impacts on financial and social performance 
Corporate reputation and its impact on different measures of financial performance have been 
covered extensively in the past literature. Wang and Smith (2008), Tan (2007), Lei (2010) and 
Ghose et al. (2009) report a positive relationship between corporate reputation and financial 
performance. Although this study is looking at the impacts of family reputation rather than 
corporate reputation, it is posited that family reputation eventually comes from corporate 
reputation. This view has been supported by Dyer and Whetten (2006) who states that due to 
identity overlap between family and business, the business reputation becomes family 
reputation. Therefore, similar to the findings of Wang and Smith (2008), Tan (2007), Lei 
(2010) and Ghose et al. (2009), this study also finds a positive relationship between family 
reputation and financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
There has been limited research on the topic addressing the relationship between family 
reputation and social performance. This study does not find any evidence to support the 
arguments of Dyer (2006) who state that family firms are socially responsible actors to protect 
their image and reputation as bad reputation may have a disastrous impact on a family’s 
wealth-generating capability. 
Further this study also analyses the impacts of firm size on the relationship between family 
shareholding and social performance and reports that for both smaller and larger firms family 
reputation does not have any impact on social performance.  
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Based on prior research, this study has selected thirty five most reputed family businesses in 
India. These include globally known families such as Tata, Birla, Singhania, Ambani etc. 
These families are classified as reputed families solely on the basis of their financial status in 
the society, not on the basis of their involvement in philanthropic activities. Most of these 
reputed families run their own trust/foundation for philanthropic activities generally 
supervised by family women. Whether running these foundations provides them competitive 
market advantage or not, this question is out of scope of this study. Although t-test and 
correlation analysis results provide an indication that more reputed families are more involved 
in social activities as compared to less reputed families, regression analysis does not confirm 
this relationship. Hence, the regression results in this study report no significant relationship 
between family reputation and social performance. 
6.4.4.2 Impacts of family shareholdings on financial and social performance 
The relationship between family shareholding and financial performance has been highly 
ambiguous in the prior literature. This study specifically reports in the Indian context that 
family shareholding is positively associated with financial performance as measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Similar to Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Villalonga 
and Amit (2006), Miller et al. (2007), and Andres (2008) this thesis reports that family 
shareholding is positively associated with financial performance. Therefore, this thesis 
provides support for the agency theory argument of Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that family control helps in mitigating the agency conflict problem and 
hence leads to better financial performance. This study also supports the findings of Pandey et 
al. (2011) who report a significant positive relationship between family shareholding and 
financial performance in the Indian business context. 
Although regression analysis and other tests used in this thesis provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between family shareholding and financial performance, a better understanding of 
the pattern of variation between financial performance and family shareholding can be 
observed in Figure 6.8. This shows a curvilinear relationship between family shareholding 
and financial performance. This non-linearity of relationship is also witnessed by McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998), Short and Keasey (1999), Thomson and Pedersen (2000), 
and Gugler et al. (2008).  
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Fig 6.9: Graphical representation of the impact of family shareholding on financial 
performance 
 
Similar to Morck et al. (1988), Figure 6.9 reveals that the financial performance of a firm 
increases initially with the increase in number of shares held by the controlling family 
(alignment effect) but decreases when the controlling family’s shareholding increases after a 
certain level which leads to an entrenchment effect. The figure gives support to the argument 
that with an increase in family ownership the firm’s financial performance also increases 
(alignment effect) but beyond 80% ownership managers become entrenched and promote 
their own interest at the expense of other shareholders (entrenchment effect). The 
entrenchment effect has never been witnessed by prior researchers in the Indian context; 
therefore, this study makes an original contribution to the existing literature by providing 
evidence of the presence of an entrenchment effect in the Indian family business context.  
The relationship of family shareholding and corporate social performance is less complicated 
and more straightforward as compared to its relationship with financial performance. Both 
quantitative and graphical analyses suggest a well-defined inverse relationship between 
family shareholding and social performance. This relationship has been depicted in Figure 
6.10. 
In relation to the impact of family shareholding on social performance this study supports the 
‘amoral familism’ phenomenon identified by Banfield (1958), who states that families mainly 
look for their self-interest and are less inclined to be involved in socially responsible 
behaviour. Similar to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), Morck and Yeung (2004) and Dam and 
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Scholtens (2012), this thesis provides empirical evidence to support the existence of self-
interest dominance among family firms which negatively influences their social performance. 
Fig 6.10: Indian family shareholding and corporate social performance 
 
Prior literature contains quite limited research that has been conducted to systematically 
address the relationship between family shareholding and corporate social performance. 
Moreover, the few findings that have been reported are largely anecdotal, mixed and 
inconclusive. This thesis contributes to existing literature by examining this relationship for 
the first time in the context of large listed family firms in India. 
6.4.4.2.1 Family shareholding and firm performance: an endogeneity issue 
Prior studies suggest that empirical relationships between family control and financial 
performance suffer from the problem of endogeneity (Andres 2008). Endogeneity in the 
context of family business refers to reverse causality of relationship between family related 
variables and financial performance. Findings in this thesis indicate that some family control 
characteristics are significantly positively related to financial performance. But, the question 
is whether family control leads to better financial performance or whether a firm’s better 
performance works as an incentive to adopt a family ownership structure. Andres (2008) and 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) raise a question on the validity of the argument that strong 
financial performance leads family members to increase their control. They argue that 
although undoubtedly families have information advantages concerning their firm’s future 
prospects, it is illogical to believe that these families have the ability to predict performance 
over many generations. Andres (2008) looks into the pattern of family ownership across 
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several generations in the sample of 275 German listed firms and finds that these firms were 
maintaining an average shareholding of 60% throughout the sample period of seven years 
(1998-2004) and on average for about 82 years that shows that families stick to their 
businesses even in bad economic conditions. Therefore, he suggests that the relationship 
between family ownership and financial performance is forward-oriented one-way 
relationship that means family ownership leads to superior performance. Andres (2008) and 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) conducted statistical tests to investigate this issue and do not 
report endogeneity in the relationship between family ownership and financial performance, 
thus, confirming that family firms are superior performers. Similarly, Gugler and Weigand 
(2003) also provide empirical evidence of the exogeneous impact of the largest shareholder on 
corporate financial performance.   
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) state that although the issue of endogeneity theoretically seems a 
valid argument, in practice it has not received much attention because in most countries 
ownership patterns change very slowly over time. This gradual change can be due to several 
factors other than financial performance. They further state that due to this reason none of the 
existing empirical study has empirically established the reverse causality in the relationship 
between family ownership and financial performance. 
In India concentrated ownership has always been a peculiar characteristic of family 
businesses due to reasons discussed in chapter 2. These families have maintained high 
shareholdings for multiple generations. In order to explore change in ownership in the Indian 
family business context, this thesis compares average family shareholdings for the period of 
five years, 2006-2010. Following the approach of Andres (2008), Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
and Sarkar and Sarkar (2000), this thesis also investigates change in average family 
shareholding over five year period. The following table shows average family shareholding of 
family businesses in 2006, 2008 and 2010. 
Table 6.10: Average family shareholding over five year period in India 
Year Average family shareholding of controlling family 
2006 52.13 (Sample size=300) 
2008 49.26 (Sample size=135) 
2010 53.20 (Sample size=300) 
                                                              (Sources: Johl et al. 2010; Pandey et al.2011)  
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Table 6.10 indicates that there has been a very small change in family shareholding over a 
period of five years. Moreover, this period includes 2009, the year of the global financial 
crisis. Therefore, similar to Andres (2008) it can be concluded that families stick to their 
shareholdings in both good and bad economic conditions. That infers better financial 
performance does not motivate firms to adopt higher family shareholdings. Thus, in line with 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Andres (2008), this thesis also concludes that the relationship 
between family ownership and financial performance is exogeneous.     
6.4.4.3 Family generation and its impact on financial and social performance 
Prior literature (mostly US based studies) addresses the impact of family succession on 
financial performance. It predominantly reports the superiority of founder run and controlled 
firms on descendent controlled firms (Anderson& Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; 
Miller et al.2007). Some other researchers (Morck et al.2000; McConaughy et al. 1998)  also 
report positive founder effect in other contexts. Unlike these studies, this thesis finds no 
significant relationship between family generation and financial performance in the context of 
large listed Indian family firms. 
Unlike developed countries, there is a lack of systematic empirical research addressing the 
family generational impact on financial performance in the India. This thesis makes a 
contribution to the existing literature by providing evidence in the Indian context.  
Family generation and its impact on social performance has never been empirically analysed 
in the past literature. This study makes an original contribution to the existing literature by 
providing evidence of the impact of family shareholding on social performance in the Indian 
context. Moreover, this thesis also extends the applicability of the available literature on the 
relationship between family generation and financial performance, to the social performance. 
This study is the first to give evidence that later family generations are more socially 
responsible as compared to founding family generation. The inference is that descendants are 
more socially responsible as compared to founders.   
In summary, on one hand the overall findings of this thesis provides a notion of socially 
irresponsible behaviour of family businesses but on the other hand, they also reveal a positive 
attitude of founding families’ successors towards social performance. It is concluded that later 
generation family businesses are more socially responsible as compared to founder run family 
businesses. So it can be argued that in the Indian family business context, Scott’s (1995) 
viewpoint of normative isomorphism is supported by later generation family businesses. But, 
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overall findings of this thesis provide strong evidence of ‘amoral familism’ among Indian 
family firm and witness that family firms in India are associated with negative social 
performance. 
6.4.4.4 Family social background and its impact on financial and social performance 
Family social background and its impact on financial and social performance has never been 
analysed in the prior literature. This study reports that family social background does not have 
an impact on financial and social performance. However, it is a common belief in India that 
trading communities have expertise in running businesses successfully due to inherent 
characteristics such as business skills developed over generations. But, this study finds that, 
contrary to popular belief, families from India’s recognised trading communities are not 
significantly associated with better financial performance. 
This study also provides first time evidence on the possible impact of family businesses’ 
belongingness to trading communities on corporate social performance. It is found that 
trading communities have no impact on social performance. The reason could be size and 
scale of businesses. The sample of this study comes from 300 top listed family firms in India 
in terms of market capitalisation. Listed firms follow rules and regulations imposed by 
regulatory agencies thus leaving limited flexibility to impose the norms and believe of 
traditional communities. Therefore, it could be argued that small unlisted businesses may be 
more governed by norms and believes of trading communities, which would require analysis 
by future research studies. 
In summary, this thesis makes an original contribution to the family business research by 
providing evidence on the impact of trading business communities on financial and social 
performance of Indian family businesses.  Most Indian industrialists belong to trading 
business communities (Lamb 1955). Therefore, studies investigating the impact of family on 
financial performance will be incomplete until they include the impact of trading business 
community. Thus, this thesis also opens a door for future researchers studying performance of 
family businesses in the Indian context. 
6.4.4.5 Business group affiliation and its impacts on financial and social performance 
Prior literature suggests ambiguity and contention regarding the relationship between firm’s 
business group affiliation and its financial performance (Carney et al. 2011). Based on the 
findings of the independent-samples t-test, correlation analysis and regression analysis, this 
study reports that business group affiliation has no impact on the financial performance of 
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listed Indian family firms. These results are in contradiction to prior literature that reports a 
significant impact of business group affiliation on financial performance (Almeida & 
Wolfenzon 2006; Chang & Hong 2000; Bertrand et al. 2002; Khanna& Yafeh 2005). 
Business group affiliation and its impact on financial performance have been substantially 
covered by prior researchers. However, this literature is silent about its impact on social 
performance. This study makes an original contribution to the existing literature by reporting 
the impact of business group affiliation on social performance in the context of Indian family 
businesses. Although correlation analysis and independent sample t-test reveal that firms 
affiliated to the business groups have better social performance as compared to non-affiliated 
family firms, regression analysis finds a non-significant relationship between business group 
affiliation and social performance. 
6.5 Family-impacted board governance and its effect on financial and social 
performance 
This section addresses the second research question whose objective is to explore the 
relationships between family governance and board governance variables and financial and 
social performance. This section also uses findings from the independent-samples t-test, 
correlation analysis and regression analysis. 
6.5.1 Independent samples t-test 
Independent samples t-test is used to compare the means of financial and social performance 
between groups of dichotomized data for family-impacted board governance variables. 
Results are shown in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11: Independent samples t-test comparing differences in financial and social 
performance based on dichotomized groupings of family and board governance 
variables 
 
Family and board governance 
characteristics 
Panel A-Financial Performance Panel B- Social Performance 
Mean Mean Difference t Sig. Mean 
Mean 
Difference T Sig. 
FCEO Non Family 0.77       0.76       
    0.084 1.641 0.102   0.072 1.405 0.161  Family 0.69       0.69       
FCHAIR Non Family 0.91       0.88       
    0.028 0.806 0.421   -0.054 -1.555 0.121  Family 0.89       0.93       
FOUNOB No 0.27       0.3       
    0.037 0.728 0.467   0.108 2.134 0.034  Yes 0.24       0.19       
FMOB Below average 0.27       0.28       
    0.029 2.095 0.036   0.053 4.029 0.000  Above average 0.24       0.23       
BGENDER Less Diversity 0.41       0.42       
    -0.019 -0.26 0.795   -0.005 -0.074 0.942  More Diversity 0.43       0.42       
ININVOLVE Low involvement 4.84       4.76       
    0.006 0.041 0.967   -0.147 -0.895 0.377  High involvement 4.83       4.91       
OUTINVOLVE Low involvement 4.39       4.12       
    0.247 1.544 0.124   -0.349 -2.197 0.029  High involvement 4.14       4.47       
INREP Less reputed 4.11       3.98       
    -0.295 -0.895 0.37   -0.656 -1.989 0.048  Highly reputed 4.4       4.63       
OUTREP Less reputed 3.92       3.7       
    -0.291 -0.967 0.335   -0.852 -2.861 0.005  Highly reputed 4.41       4.55       
BSIZE Smaller board 9.45       9.16       
    -0.718 -2.206 0.028   -1.568 -4.874 0.000  Bigger Board 10.17       10.73       
BINDEP Less independent 0.55       0.55       
    -0.008 -0.693 0.489   -0.016 -1.324 0.192  More independent 0.56       0.57       
BPHIL Economic 0.39       0.32       
    0.056 0.999 0.319   -0.098 -1.751 0.081  Sustainable 0.33       0.42       
TCOM Less committee 3.42       3.4       
    -0.203 -1.71 0.088   -0.301 -2.536 0.012  More committee 3.62       3.7       
DUAL Non Duality 0.37       0.36       
    0.036 0.643 0.191   0.042 0.752 0.454  Duality 0.33       0.32       
BMEET Less Meetings 6.17       6.05       
    0.255 1.311 0.521   -0.003 -0.015 0.988  More meetings 5.91       6.05       
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Panel A shows the impacts of family governance and board governance characteristics on 
financial performance. Panel A reveals that the family CEO and Family Chairperson’s 
presence on the board have no impact on financial performance of family-controlled Indian 
listed firms. Panel A also reveals that the founder’s presence on board have no impact on 
financial performance. Furthermore, in relation to the impact of family members’ presence on 
financial performance, Panel A reveals that the presence of family members’ on board does 
not have an impact on financial performance. In relation to the impact of board governance 
characteristics on financial performance, Panel A reveals that the group of family-controlled 
firms having a larger board (mean=10.17) have substantially better performance compared to 
firms having smaller board (mean=9.45). Panel A further reveals that the group of family-
controlled firms having a large number of board committees (mean=3.62) perform better 
compared to firms having a small number of board committees (mean=3.42).  
In relation to the impact of board meetings and directors’ attendance on financial 
performance, Panel A reveals that the number of board meetings held in a year and directors’ 
presence at meetings have no impact on financial performance. Results also reveal that 
directors’ reputation and their independence have no impact on financial performance of 
family-controlled firms. Finally, Panel A reveals that the CEO duality and sustainability 
oriented corporate governance philosophy of the firm also have no impact on financial 
performance. 
Turning to Panel B, it shows the effects of family governance and board governance 
characteristics on social performance. Similar to Panel A’s findings, Panel B reveals that the 
family CEO and family Chairperson’s presence on the board have no impact on social 
performance. In contrast with Panel A’s findings,  Panel B reveals that the founder’s presence 
on board has a substantial negative impact on social performance. It also reveals that the 
higher presence of family members on board has a significant negative effect on social 
performance. 
In relation to the effects of board governance characteristics on social performance, Panel B 
reveals that the group of firms having highly reputed directors on the board outperform the 
group of firms having less reputed directors on board. Furthermore, it also reveals that the 
group of firms having high attendance of outsiders at board meetings have substantially better 
social performance compared to the group of firms having low attendance of outsiders. In 
relation to the impact of board size on social performance, Panel B reveals that the group of 
family controlled firms having larger boards have a significantly greater impact on social 
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performance compared to firms having a smaller board. In relation to the impact of number of 
board committees on social performance, Panel B reveals that the group of family controlled 
firms having a larger number of board committees is significantly higher rated on social 
performance compared to those having a smaller number of board committees. Panel B 
further reveals that group of family controlled firms having a sustainability-oriented corporate 
governance philosophy, significantly outperform those firms having financially-oriented 
governance philosophy. Finally, Panel B reveals that insiders’ attendance, board 
independence, CEO duality, board gender diversity and number of board meetings in a year 
have no substantial impact on social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms.     
In summary, Panels A and B reveal that the presence of powerful management players in the 
board of family controlled companies in India do not have impact on financial and social 
performance. However, increase in family members’ presence on the board has negative 
impact on both financial and social performance. Panel B further reveals that the founder’s 
presence on the board has negative impact on social performance of listed family-controlled 
firms in India. The independent-samples t-test also reveals that board governance 
characteristics have more influence on social performance compared to financial performance, 
thus suggesting that controlling families take financial decisions and boards are mainly 
involved in designing strategy for achieving better social performance.  
6.5.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis is used to further explore the impact of family governance and board 
governance characteristics on financial and social performance of family controlled listed 
Indian firms. Table 6.12 shows results of correlation analysis. 
Table 6.12 reveals that family involvement on the board (family CEO, family Chair, founder 
on board, family members on board)  are negatively associated with financial performance but 
this association is not significant. However, family CEO ( r= -0.153, p<0.01), founder on 
board (( r= -0.149, p<0.01 and family members on board ( r= -0.322, p<0.01) have significant 
negative impact on social performance. Most of these results are consistent with the 
independent samples t-test’s findings shown in Table 6.11. Similar to t-test findings, 
correlation analysis also suggests that the presence of a family Chairperson on board has a 
non-significant (although positive) impact on social performance. 
In relation to the impacts of board governance characteristics, consistent with the findings of 
t-tests, correlation analysis reveal that larger boards have a significant positive correlation 
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with both financial (r=0.161, p<0.01) and social performance (r=0.150, p<0.01). Likewise, 
Table 6.12 reveals that a larger number of board committees have significant positive 
correlation with both financial (r=0.186, p<0.01) and social performance (r=0.240, p<0.01). 
Furthermore, outside directors’ attendance at board meetings have significant positive 
correlation with social performance (r= 0.124, p<0.05). In relation to outsiders reputation, 
Table 6.12 further reveals that outside directors’ reputation has a significant positive 
correlation with social performance(r= 0.150, p<0.05). Finally, Table 6.12 does not suggest 
any significant correlation of number of board meetings, gender diversity, CEO duality and 
board independence with financial and social performance of family controlled listed Indian 
firms. 
In summary, correlation analysis suggests that the founder’s and family members’ presence 
on the board have no impact on financial performance, but have a negative impact on social 
performance. In relation to board governance characteristics, analysis suggests that board size 
and total number of board committees have a significant positive impact on both financial and 
social performance. Furthermore, it also suggests board independence has a significant 
positive impact on social performance. 
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Table 6.12: Correlation analysis showing impacts of family and board governance variables on financial and social performance 
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FCEO 1                                         
FCHAIR 0.101 1                                       
FOB .351** .194** 1                                     
FMOB .360** -0.033 0.088 1                                   
BG 0.066 .168** 0.025 0.06 1                                 
ININVOLVE -0.111 -0.055 0.058 0.023 -.142* 1                               
OUTINVOLVE -0.062 -0.03 -0.044 -0.027 -.124* .504** 1                             
INREP 0.018 0.004 -0.015 -0.073 0.094 -0.044 -.140* 1                           
OUTREP -.167** -0.036 -.162** -.153* -0.067 -0.023 -0.041 .209** 1                         
BSIZE -0.047 0.09 -.166** -.416** .229** -.131* 0.015 .123* 0.084 1                       
BINDEP -0.018 .122* 0.054 -.233** 0.009 0.093 -0.075 0.069 0.073 -.128* 1                     
BPHIL 0.028 0.088 0.026 -0.08 -0.037 0.011 -0.027 0.086 -.117* 0.039 0.05 1                   
TCOM -0.113 -0.059 0.051 -0.035 0.024 0.116 .138* -0.041 -0.039 0.091 -0.044 .155** 1                 
DUAL .408** .219** .622** 0.054 0.048 -0.004 -.137* 0.03 -0.053 -0.106 0.1 0.052 -0.041 1               
BMEET -0.095 -0.107 -0.011 -0.023 -.141* .687** .518** -0.092 -0.011 0 0.026 -0.035 .131* -0.044 1             
FP -0.103 -0.019 -0.052 -0.082 0.035 0.019 -0.028 0.031 0.034 .161** 0.013 -0.068 .186** -0.078 -0.048 1           
CSP -.153** 0.089 -.149** -.322** 0.062 0.009 .124* 0.095 .150** .333** 0.1 0.11 .240** -0.047 -0.024 .263** 1         
INDUS .127* 0.036 -0.059 0.034 -0.055 0.003 0.068 -0.062 0.048 0.039 -0.036 0.005 -0.083 -0.045 -0.024 -.141* -0.038 1       
FAGE -.165** 0.054 -.270** -.142* 0.034 -0.033 -0.04 0.068 0.103 .145* .119* -0.007 0.01 -0.044 -0.08 0.099 .163** .180** 1     
FSIZE -0.09 0.068 -0.024 -.340** 0.026 .130* .136* 0.049 .122* .312** -0.006 0.053 .278** -0.02 0.116 0.073 .365** -.183** -0.006 1   
LAGFP -0.108 0.034 0.08 -.140* 0.063 0.08 0.009 -0.061 0.008 .183** 0.09 -0.003 .148* -0.005 -0.047 .770** .268** -.132* 0.024 .258** 1 
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6.5.3 Regression analysis 
To address the second research question, multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
explore the effects of family-impacted board governance characteristics on financial and 
social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. Regression results for the sampled 
firms are presented in Tables 6.13 and 6.14. Both of these tables reveal a satisfactory level of 
explanatory power of Adjusted R-square for the models used to explore effects of family-
impacted board governance on financial and social performance. Further, these tables also 
depict that there is no multicolinearity between independent variables as VIF is well below 
the acceptable limit. Table 6.13 reveals that the control variables, industry (INDUS), firm age 
(FAGE) and firm size (FSIZE) do not have a significant impact on corporate financial 
performance. However, the control variable, last year’s financial performance (LAGFP) is 
significant. Furthermore, Table 6.14 reveals that the control variables, industry (INDUS) and 
firm age (FAGE) do not have a significant impact on corporate social performance. However, 
the control variables, firm size (FSIZE) and financial performance (FP) have significant 
impact on social performance of listed family controlled firms in India. 
Table 6.13 reveals that the founder’s presence on the board negatively influences financial 
performance (β=-0.018, p=0.098). This table also reveals that insiders’ active involvement in 
the board process has a significant negative impact on financial performance (β=-0.193, 
p=0.035). Furthermore, Table 6.13 reveals that insiders’ reputation have a significant positive 
impact on financial performance (β=0.138, p=0.043). In relation to the impact of board 
committees, Table 6.13 reveals that large numbers of committees on boards have a significant 
positive impact on financial performance (β=0.188, p=0.014). Finally, regression analysis 
results reveal that sustainability oriented corporate governance philosophy of the board have 
significant negative impact on financial performance (β=-0.144, p=0.023). 
In relation to the effects of family-impacted board governance variables on social 
performance, Table 6.13 reveals that the founder’s presence on the board negatively 
influences social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms (β= -0.202, p=0.020). 
The table also reveals that board size (β=0.247, p=0.011), number of board committees 
(β=0.231, p=0.011) and board independence (β=0.249, p=0.004) are positively related to 
social performance of family controlled listed firms in India. In relation to the impact of 
number of board meetings on social performance, findings reveal that frequency of board 
meetings is inversely related to social performance (β=-0.246, p=0.021). Furthermore, the 
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analysis confirms that boards having sustainability oriented corporate governance philosophy 
have a positive impact on social performance (β=0.167, p=0.025).   
In summary, this thesis reports that the founder’s presence on the board has negative impact 
on both financial and social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. In relation 
to the board governance characteristics, this thesis reports that they have more influence on 
corporate social performance compared to financial performance. A detailed discussion on 
individual findings is covered in the next section.  
Table 6.13: Regression analysis showing impacts of family and governance variables on 
financial performance 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable, Tobin’s Q 
β T sig tol VIF 
FCEO 0.057 0.729 0.468 0.569 1.758 
FCHAIR -0.011 -0.155 0.877 0.737 1.356 
FOUNOB -0.108 -1.675 0.098 0.823 1.215 
FMOB 0.033 0.375 0.708 0.439 2.280 
BGENDER -0.093 -1.271 0.208 0.637 1.570 
ININVOLVE -0.193 -2.148 0.035 0.422 2.367 
OUTINVOLVE 0.012 0.148 0.883 0.503 1.990 
INREP 0.138 2.056 0.043 0.756 1.323 
OUTREP 0.040 0.592 0.555 0.753 1.329 
BSIZE 0.081 0.997 0.322 0.513 1.517 
BINDEP 0.040 0.552 0.583 0.659 1.517 
BPHIL -0.144 -2.322 0.023 0.889 1.125 
DUAL 0.060 0.994 0.321 0.486 2.059 
TCOM 0.188 2.516 0.014 0.612 1.635 
BMEET 0.104 1.152 0.253 0.420 2.380 
INDUS -0.096 -1.235 0.220 0.569 1.758 
FAGE 0.043 0.652 0.516 0.781 1.280 
FSIZE -0.070 -0.927 0.357 0.605 1.654 
LAGFP 0.846 12.447 0.000 0.741 1.349 
MODEL  SUMMARY 
R2 =.733, Adj R2 = .667 
                ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
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6.5.4 Discussion 
An overall summary of findings discussed in this section is shown in Table 6.14. Each of 
these findings is discussed, in turn, in the sub-sections below. 
6.5.4.1 Family CEO and founder’s impact on financial and social performance 
Family CEOs and the founder’s impact on financial performance have been empirically 
analysed by prior researches but with inconsistent findings. Unlike other researchers who find 
positive impact of family CEO on financial performance (Adams et al. 2009; Anderson & 
Reeb 2003; Bartonini & Caprio 2006; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Fahlenbrach 2009), this thesis 
does not report any significant impact of the family CEO on financial performance in the 
context of family controlled listed firms in India. 
In relation to the founder’s impact on financial performance, prior researchers have 
consistently reported the superiority of founder run and controlled firms on descendent 
controlled firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga and Amit 2005; Miller et al. 2007). 
Contrary to these findings this thesis reports that the founder’s presence in the board have 
negative impact on financial performance. Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that the 
founder’s presence in the family firm enhances firm value but in the absence of control 
enhancing mechanism such as multiple share classes with differential voting rights, pyramids, 
and crossholdings or voting agreements which facilitate expropriation of non-family 
shareholders. These control enhancing mechanisms as referred by Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
are inherent characteristics of family controlled businesses in India. Therefore, it can be said 
that in India, investors perceive founders presence on the board as family’s excess control 
over board, hence they negatively react to the situation. 
Prior researchers have also reported the superiority of non-family managed firms as compared 
to family managed firms (Burkart et al 2003; Coleman 1990; Pandey et al. 2011). These 
researchers argue that family CEOs are less productive as compared to non-family CEOs. 
Unlike these studies, this thesis does not find any significant relationship between family 
CEO’s presence on the board and financial performance. In addition, this thesis does not find 
any evidence of superiority of non-family CEOs as compared to family CEOs. 
Unlike the above discussion explaining the impact of the family CEO and the founder’s 
presence on financial performance, the family CEO and the founder’s impact on social 
performance is a relatively new area of research. Researcher could find only one academic 
article (McGuire et al. 2012) which empirically addresses the impact of the family CEO on 
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social performance. Similar to the findings of McGuire et al. (2012), this study does not find 
any relationship between the presence of the family CEO on social performance. 
The founder’s presence on the board and its impact on corporate social performance has never 
been analysed before. This thesis is believed to be the first study that reports a highly 
significant negative relationship between founder’s presence on the board and corporate social 
performance. This finding supports findings discussed in the previous section (RQ 1, family 
ownership status characteristics and their impacts on financial and social performance) that 
reports a positive relationship between family successive generations and corporate social 
performance. This study suggests that founders, first generation entrepreneurs, are less 
concerned about social performance compared to later generations.   
6.5.4.2 Family Chairperson and firm performance 
The Chairpersons’ role in influencing financial and social performance has not been widely 
anaylzed by corporate governance researchers. One reason is that the issue has not been 
viewed as important because corporate governance studies have largely come from the US 
and European business environments where most of the Chairpersons are either non-
executives or an independent directors. But, in the Indian scenario especially in the case of 
Indian family businesses the role of family Chairperson cannot be neglected due to his or her 
strong presence on the board either as founder or executive Chairperson. Piramal (1996, p.14) 
depicts the powerful position of Mr Dheerubhai Ambani, the Chairperson of a well- known 
Indian family business, Reliance: 
“He freed himself from day-to-day operational management of the group’s manufacturing 
facilities the moment his sons, Mukesh and Anil, joined the family firm in the mid-‘80s. At the 
beginning of the ‘90s, he moved away from the chief executive’s post (though technically he 
still holds that position) to conceptualise the company’s long term goals as also to spend a 
little more time with the family………………….Despite the shorter hours and the inevitable 
distancing, his is a crucial role, beyond that of visionary and strategist………..Asked if he had 
ever thought of retirement, Dhirubhai reposted instantly: ‘Never till my last breath I will 
work. To retire there is only one place-the cremation ground’.” 
Descriptive statistics on the family Chairperson also reveal that 90% of the Indian family 
businesses are headed by family Chairpersons, out of which 54.7% are executive chairman. 
Pandey et al. (2011) empirically analyse the influence of family Chairperson’s presence on 
financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q in a sample of 131 top listed Indian family 
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firms and report non-significant relationships between the existence of a family Chairperson 
and both accounting and market based performance measures. This study supports the 
findings of Pandey et al. (2011) regarding the influence of family Chairperson on financial 
performance.   
Table 6.14: Impacts of family and governance variables on corporate social performance 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, CSP 
β T sig tol VIF 
FCEO -.014 -0.155 0.877 0.587 1.703 
FCHAIR -0.041 -0.520 0.604 0.745 1.342 
FOUNOB -0.202 -2.367 0.020 0.633 1.580 
FMOB -0.157 -1.553 0.124 0.454 2.204 
BGENDER 0.011 0.136 0.892 0.679 1.472 
ININVOLVE 0.148 1.438 0.154 0.434 2.307 
OUTINVOLVE 0.070 0.721 0.473 0.495 2.022 
INREP -0.032 -0.423 0.673 0.786 1.272 
OUTREP 0.041 0.525 0.601 0.768 1.301 
BSIZE 0.247 2.617 0.011 0.520 1.924 
BINDEP 0.249 2.964 0.004 0.654 1.529 
BPHIL 0.167 2.282 0.025 0.868 1.152 
DUAL 0.137 1.623 0.106 0.486 2.056 
TCOM 0.231 2.606 0.011 0.586 1.706 
BMEET -0.246 -2.348 0.021 0.421 2.374 
INDUS 0.014 0.150 0.881 0.565 1.771 
FAGE -0.058 -0.755 0.453 0.790 1.266 
FSIZE 0.376 4.337 0.000 0.614 1.628 
FP 0.155 2.033 0.045 0.795 1.258 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.635, Adj R2 = .547 
                            ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
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Family Chairperson’s impact on social performance have not been systematically analysed by 
prior corporate governance researchers. Although, descriptive analysis provide evidence of a 
dominant presence of family chairs on boards of family controlled  listed companies in India, 
this study finds evidence of no significant relationship between the family Chairperson’s 
presence on the board and corporate social performance.  
6.5.4.3 Family presence on the board and firm performance 
This study measured family presence on the board by calculating percentage of family 
members on the board. Findings of this thesis clearly reveal that family member’s presence on 
the board have no impact on financial performance of listed Indian family firms. This thesis 
supports the findings of Corbetta and Minichilli (2006) who also report no influence of family 
members’ presence on financial performance measured by stock market performance. They 
mainly express two reasons of their  findings; 1- excess representation of family members on 
board limits the potential contribution of outside directors, 2- excess representation provide 
less opportunity for independent director to control management. 
In the context of India, boards of family firms are highly represented by family members of 
the founding family as descriptive statistics clearly show that on average over a quarter of 
board members belong to founding families (26.81%). Therefore, such a dominant presence 
of family members on the board does not leave much opportunity for outsiders to counsel 
family members and insiders, thus leading to the neutral relationship. Similarly, this thesis 
does not report any linkage between family members’ presence on the board and corporate 
social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. Although regression analysis 
suggests negative impact of family members’ presence on corporate social performance but 
this influence is not significant. The relationship between family members’ presence on the 
board and corporate social performance has never been addressed by prior corporate 
governance researchers. This is the first study investigating this relationship and reporting that 
family members’ presence on board does not have a significant impact on social performance. 
6.5.4.4 Gender diversity and firm performance 
In relation to the impact of gender diversity on financial performance, this study does not find 
any evidence of the influence of board gender diversity on financial performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q. This finding is in contradiction with the findings of Smith et al. (2006) who report 
a significant positive impact of gender diversity on firm performance.  
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Researchers in the past have witnessed positive impact of board gender diversity on corporate 
social performance (Ibrahim & Angelidis 1995; Williams 2003). They report that female 
directors on the board are more inclined towards corporate philanthropic activities compared 
to male directors. Contrary to these findings, this study does not report any significant impact 
of female directors’ presence on corporate social performance of family controlled listed 
Indian firms.  
In the Indian family business context these findings are similar to what was expected. As 
discussed, most of the family controlled listed Indian firms are owned by trading communities 
who are conservative and orthodox, do not allow their daughters and daughter-in laws to 
work. Piramal (1996, p.166) states women’s status in a traditional Marwari business family- 
“…..in a traditional Marwari family, the baton passes from father to son. Females do not 
count except in dowry exchanges……….Like most Marwari families, the Birlas saw no point 
in teaching girls skills beyond those needed in a well behaved corporate wife: a basic 
graduate degree, cooking and flower arranging”. 
Thus, traditionally trading communities did not promote their ladies to participate in the 
family business. But this approach is slowly changing now. A detailed descriptive analysis of 
the sample reveals that women on the board of family firms in India are mostly from founding 
families and have a very small representation on boards of listed Indian family firms (approx. 
4%). This underrepresentation may be the cause of insignificant impact of gender diversity on 
financial and social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. 
6.5.4.5 Board meeting frequency, directors’ attendance and firm performance 
Although prior literature addresses the impacts of board meeting frequency on financial 
performance, the impact of directors’ attendance on performance has not been empirically 
studied in a systematic manner. In contradiction to the prior researches that provide evidence 
of a positive relationship between board meeting frequency and financial performance (Lipton 
& Lorsch 1992; Conger et al.1998), this study finds a non-significant relationship between 
board meeting frequency and financial performance. Nevertheless, this finding is supported 
by other studies conducted in the Indian context (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Pandey et al. 2011), 
who also report no significant relationship between board meeting frequency and corporate 
financial performance.  
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Additionally, findings of this thesis contribute to the existing corporate governance literature 
by providing empirical evidence of the relationship between directors’ attendance and 
financial performance. Board meeting is an opportunity for independent directors to monitor 
management and to provide independent advice for firm betterment. In case of family firms, 
families’ excessive involvement in the board process provides less opportunity for outside 
directors to participate effectively and provide independent advice. Balasubramanian (2010, 
p.121) states that traditionally in India outside directors are included on the board to fulfil 
compliance requirements. Therefore, they have little or no impact on firm performance. This 
study supports his argument that the contribution of outside directors to improving firm 
performance is minimal, by finding no significant relationship between outsiders’ 
involvement and financial performance. However, regression analysis reveals that insiders’ 
excessive involvement in the board process negatively influences firm financial performance 
which means a family’s excessive involvement is perceived by investors as a control 
enhancing mechanism (Villalonga & Amit 2006) that eventually reduces market value of the 
firm.     
Corporate governance literature mainly addresses the effects of board meeting frequency on 
financial performance. However, this literature lacks quantitative empirical evidence on the 
relationship between frequency of board meetings and corporate social performance. The only 
evidence is found in qualitative studies conducted by Ricart et al. (2005) and Zahra (1989) 
who provide an indication that directors formally discuss firm sustainability policies in the 
board meetings which positively impacts social performance. These two studies further state 
that now-a-days most businesses have integrated sustainable development into their core 
strategy and sustainability discussions at internal board meetings. 
Contrary to the above findings this thesis reports a significant negative relationship between 
board meeting frequency and corporate social performance. In order to investigate the impact 
of firm size on this relationship, this study splits sample according to firm size (Table not 
included). This study witnesses a negative relationship between board meeting frequency and 
social performance but only for smaller firms. For larger firms, there is no significant 
relationship between frequency of board meeting and social performance.  
Why do smaller firms show a negative association between board meeting frequency and 
social performance? Descriptive analysis of the sample (table not included) reveals that 
smaller firms have comparatively larger family shareholdings (mean= 55.53) as compared to 
the bigger firms (50.90). Descriptive analysis further indicates that boards of bigger firms 
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hold board meetings more frequently (mean= 6.28) as compared to smaller firms (mean= 
5.80). Furthermore, descriptive analysis also suggests that most of the smaller firms are first 
generation enterprises mainly managed by the founder. Descriptive analysis clearly suggests 
that smaller firms have excessive family control as compared to bigger firms, which 
eventually provides more power to the founding family in deciding agenda for board meeting. 
Our previous analysis reveals that family control in terms of shareholdings is negatively 
related to social performance. Therefore, smaller family firms exhibit an inverse relationship 
between board meeting frequency and corporate social performance. This study also reports 
that insiders’ and outsiders’ attendance in board meetings has no significant impact on firms’ 
social performance.   
6.5.4.6 Board reputation and its impact on firm performance 
Board members’ cross-directorship (referred as reputation and busyness by past researchers) 
and its impact on firm performance is one of the widely addressed topics in corporate 
governance research. Prior studies explaining the impact of directors’ cross-directorships on 
financial performance provide conflicting results (Gilson 1990; Core et al. 1999; Fich & 
Shivdasani 2006; Pombo & Gutierrez 2011). However, none of the studies in the past have 
empirically investigated the impacts of insiders’ and outsiders’ reputation (cross-
directorships) on financial performance. Therefore, this thesis makes an original contribution 
to the available literature by investigating this relationship in the context of family controlled 
listed Indian firms. Findings of this thesis reveal that reputation of outside directors’ has no 
impact on financial performance of family controlled firms in India. These findings further 
support the puppet board arguments given by Balasubramanian (2010) and Dutta (1997) in 
the context of family controlled businesses in India. 
In relation to the impact of insiders’ reputation on financial performance, this thesis reports a 
significant positive impact of insiders’ reputation on financial performance. Thus, in relation 
to insiders’ cross-directorships this thesis supports the resource dependency theory which 
hypothesises a positive relationship between multiple directorships held by directors and 
financial performance. Therefore, it can be said that insiders’ reputation helps family 
controlled firms in India in collecting necessary resources for effective running of the 
business (Jiraporn et al. 2008; Fama & Jensen 1983), which eventually has a positive impact 
on financial performance. 
 182 
 
There has been limited research looking at the impact of directors’ reputation on social 
performance. This study contributes to the existing corporate governance literature by 
providing evidence in the Indian family business context. Unlike a prior study conducted by 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), who report a positive relationship between numbers of 
directorships held by outside directors and firm social performance, this thesis does not report 
any significant impact of insiders’ and outsiders’ cross-directorships on social performance. 
Therefore, unlike financial performance, these findings do not provide any evidence in 
support of resource dependency theory.  
6.5.4.7 Board size and firm performance 
Prior corporate governance researchers are not unanimous on the relationship between board 
size and firm performance (Shaw1981; Gladstein 1984; Goodstein et al.1994; Dalton et al. 
1998; Jackling & Johl 2009; Pandey et al. 2011). This thesis finds that board size has no 
impact on financial performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. This finding is in 
contrast with some of the earlier findings that provide empirical evidence of a positive 
relationship between board size and financial performance and support resource dependency 
theory (Dalton et al. 1999; Coles et al. 2008; Jackling & Johl 2009; Pandey et al.2011).  
However, this study supports the findings of Hu et al. (2010) who suggest that ownership 
concentration in family firms puts a hindrance on the governance and supervision role of 
directors, making them unable to influence financial performance. Descriptive statistics in this 
study reveal that average family shareholdings in family owned listed firms in India is 
52.13%. Therefore, excess family shareholding could be responsible for the board’s 
ineffectiveness as argued by Hu et al. (2010). These findings are in direct contrast with the 
findings of Pandey et al. (2011) who provide empirical evidence in support of a bigger board 
in the Indian family business context. However, findings of this thesis support puppet board 
arguments proposed by Balasubramanian (2010) and Dutta (1997). 
A limited number of studies have investigated the impacts of board size on corporate social 
performance with inconsistent findings. Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) empirically determine 
that larger boards are more chaotic and less effective in monitoring and motivating managers 
to comply with environmental regulations as compared to smaller boards. On the other hand 
Said et al. (2009) and Sahin et al. (2011) report no significant relationship between board size 
and corporate social performance. But, neither of these studies has investigated this 
relationship in the context of listed family businesses. 
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This study is the first empirical study to provide evidence on the relationship between board 
size and corporate social performance in the context of family businesses. Contrary to the 
findings mentioned above, this thesis reports a positive relationship between board size and 
corporate social performance for the overall sample. This finding infers that family business 
owners in India are more dependent on boards to provide them resources for social 
performance compared to financial performance.   
6.5.4.8 Board independence and firm performance 
The relationship between board independence and financial performance has been widely 
addressed in the prior corporate governance research with inconsistent findings (Chung et al. 
2003, Hossain et al. 2000; Bhagat & Black 2002; Bhagat & Bolton 2008; Jackling & Johl 
2009; Pandey et al. 2011). Findings of this thesis are consistent with the findings of Vafeas 
and Theodorou (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Erickson et al. (2005) and Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) who also report no significant relationship between board independence and 
financial performance. 
Moreover, this finding is consistent with other studies looking at the impact of board 
independence on financial performance in the Indian context. Similar to Jackling and Johl 
(2009) and Pandey et al. (2011), this thesis also reports that inclusion of independent directors 
on the board of family owned firms in India does not improve financial performance of the 
firm. Therefore, this thesis suggests that business families appoint independent directors on 
the board as a ritual for fulfilling legal compliance imposed by the Clause 49 requirements, 
thus not effectively contributing in improving financial performance. 
Social and environmental accounting researchers in the past have consistently argued in 
favour of a higher percentage of independent directors on board to improve organisational 
social and environmental performance (Johnson & Greening 1999; Coffey & Wang 1998; 
Wang & Dewhrist 1992) and have provided empirical support for these arguments ( Dunn & 
Sanity 2009; Barako & Brown 2008; Sahin et al. 2011). In support of these studies, this thesis 
also finds a positive relationship between board independence and corporate social 
performance. These findings suggest that family controlled businesses in India are more 
dependent on outside directors for resources related to social performance as compared to 
financial performance.  
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6.5.4.9 Firm corporate governance philosophy and performance 
As per Clause 49 listing requirements, Indian listed firms are required to include a brief 
statement on the company’s philosophy in their code of governance. This is the first study to 
investigate the impact of disclosing sustainability dominant governance philosophy (which 
underlines achieving sustainability related objectives by governance) on financial and social 
performance.  
Findings reveal that family controlled firms disclosing sustainability dominant corporate 
governance philosophy have a negative impact on their financial performance. That means 
Indian investors negatively respond to sustainability dominant governance philosophy 
disclosed in the corporate governance section of the annual report. 
On the other hand, in relation to the impact of sustainability oriented corporate governance 
philosophy on social performance, this thesis reports that disclosure of sustainability 
dominant corporate governance philosophy has a positive impact on corporate social 
performance. That indicates that businesses having sustainability oriented governance 
philosophy are more concerned about social performance compared to other businesses.  
6.5.4.10 Number of board committees and firm performance 
Board committees and their role in maintaining good governance has been widely recognised 
in past literature. Board committees enhance effectiveness of the board, particularly of the 
non-executive directors (Bosch Committee, 1990). Balasubramanian (2010) states that board 
committees help the board in discharging its responsibilities in governing the corporation for 
the benefit of its stakeholders. Findings of this thesis also support this viewpoint by obtaining 
a significant positive relationship between total number of board committees and financial 
performance. An inference is that a higher number of board committees are perceived as 
providing a better monitoring mechanism by investors in the market. Although Clause 49 of 
the listing requirements imposes a mandatory obligation on Indian listed companies to have at 
least an Audit Committee and Investor Protection Committee, descriptive statistics suggest 
that on average Indian family firms have more committees than the mandatory requirement 
imposed by Clause 49. Findings of this thesis lend support to this approach of having 
additional Board Committees which can be used by effectively in family controlled firms. 
Together with the positive impact of board committees on financial performance, this study 
also reports a positive relationship between total number of board committees and corporate 
social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms. These results confirm that family 
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businesses tend to use board committees in an effective way to achieve better financial and 
social performance.  
This is the first study to provide evidence on the relationship between the total number of 
board committees and corporate social performance. Therefore, this thesis extends the 
corporate governance literature on effectiveness of board committees to corporate social 
performance. 
6.5.4.11 CEO duality and financial performance 
Although CEO duality and its impact on financial performance have been covered extensively 
in the prior corporate governance literature, there remains a lack of empirical research on this 
issue in the context of family controlled businesses. This thesis finds no significant impact of 
CEO duality on financial performance. This finding is supported by the findings of Lam and 
Lee (2008) who also report no significant association between CEO duality and market 
performance for the family owned listed companies in Hong Kong. Other researchers have 
witnessed a similar relationship in the context of other types of ownership (Baliga et al. 1996; 
Dalton et al. 1998; Dulewicz & Herbert 2004). 
As discussed above, traditionally in India, founding families maintain the highest family 
shareholding which provides them power to appoint their own directors on the board. Prior 
studies have consistently argued that CEO duality makes the CEO more powerful and 
provides him greater authority in taking and implementing his or her decision without any 
confusion, which eventually can lead to enhanced financial performance (Donaldson & Davis 
1991; Anderson & Anthony 1986; Baliga et al.1996; Alexander et al.1993). This argument 
may not hold in those firms managed under excess family control.  However, in the case of 
family controlled listed firms in India, the majority of CEOs are powerful family patriarchs 
who do not need any additional power to impose their decisions on the firms managed by 
them. Therefore, the dual CEO/Chair enhanced power argument is not applicable in the Indian 
family business context. 
There have been a few studies that have investigated the impacts of CEO duality on corporate 
social performance. Studies conducted by Barktus et al. (2003), Said et al. (2009) and Sahin et 
al. (2011) find no significant impact of CEO duality on corporate social performance. These 
studies give support to this thesis’ finding of no significant impact of CEO duality on 
corporate social performance. 
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6.5.4.12 Summary 
In summary, the above discussion suggest that board governance characteristics such as board 
size, number of board committees, board independence, board reputation and board 
philosophy positively influence social performance of family controlled Indian listed firms. 
Findings also suggest that family governance factors have a negative impact on social 
performance and have little impact on financial performance. The Table 6.15 shows the 
overall effects of family-impacted board governance variables on financial and social 
performance of listed family controlled firms in India. 
Table 6.15: Overall findings showing impact of family governance and board 
governance characteristics on financial and social performance 
Family Related Governance 
Characteristics 
Financial 
Performance      Social Performance 
Family CEO Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Family Chairperson Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Founder on Board Negative, Significant Negative, Significant 
Family Members on Board Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Gender Diversity on Board Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Insiders Involvement Negative, Significant Non-Significant 
Outsiders Involvement Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Insiders Reputation Positive, Significant Non-Significant 
Outsiders Reputation Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Board Size Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
Board Independence Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
Board Philosophy Negative, Significant Positive, Significant 
CEO Duality Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Total Number of Board Committees Positive, Significant Positive, Significant 
Board Meeting Non-Significant Negative, Significant 
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6.6 Powerful management players’ demographic characteristics and their 
effect on financial and social performance 
This section addresses the research question 3 and explores the effect of powerful 
management players’ demographic characteristics such as reputation, level of education, 
foreign qualification, age, total experience, tenure and educational background, and financial 
and social performance of firm managed by them. Consistent with the methods of analysis in 
previous sections, this study also uses an independent samples t-test, correlation analysis and 
one-stage linear regression analysis for testing the strength and direction of the relationships 
between top management characteristics and firm performance. 
6.6.1 Independent Samples t-test 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare CEOs’ and Chairpersons’ 
dichotomized demographic characteristics on the basis of the means of financial and social 
performance. Results of the independent samples t-test are shown in Tables 6.16 and 6.17. 
Panel A of Table 6.16 reveals that the group of family controlled firms having a highly 
qualified CEO have better financial performance compared to the group of firms having less 
qualified CEOs. Panel A further reveals that the group of family firms having foreign 
qualified CEOs perform better compared to the group having locally qualified CEOs. Finally 
panel A reveals that CEOs other demographic characteristics have no impact on financial 
performance. Similarly, in relation to the Chairperson, results in Panel B of Table 6.17 reveal 
that the Chairperson’s amount of education and foreign qualification has a positive impact on 
financial performance. In addition, Table 6.17 also reveals that the group of firms having 
MBA qualified Chairpersons are significantly better performers compared to those having 
non-MBA Chairpersons. Finally, similar to panel A of table 6.16, table 6.17 reports that the 
Chairperson’s other demographic characteristics have no impact on financial performance. 
In relation to social performance, panel B of tables 6.16 and 6.17 reveal that group of firms 
having reputed foreign qualified CEOs and Chairpersons have better social performance 
compared to group having less reputed and locally qualified CEOs and Chairpersons. Finally, 
these tables show that powerful management players’ other demographic characteristics have 
no impact on corporate social performance of listed Indian family-controlled firms.  
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Table 6.16: Independent samples t-test comparing differences in financial and social 
performance based on dichotomized groupings of CEO characteristics variables 
CEO Demographic  
Characteristics 
Panel A-Financial Performance Panel B- Social Performance 
Mean Mean Difference t Sig. Mean 
Mean 
Difference t Sig. 
CEOREP Low 5.37       5.23       
     -0.782 -1.523 0.129   -1.237 -2.408 0.017 
 High 6.15       6.47       
CEOAMT Low 1.84       1.87       
     -0.251 -1.845 0.066   -0.203 -1.484 0.139 
 High 2.09       2.077       
CEOMBA Without MBA 0.27       0.29       
     -0.051 -0.949 0.343   -0.012 -0.218 0.828 
 With MBA 0.32       0.3       
CEOFQ No 0.2       0.18       
     -0.089 -1.789 0.075   -0.14 -2.814 0.005 
 Yes 0.29       0.32       
CEOAGE Younger CEOs 54.21       53.14       
     1.072 0.968 0.334   -1.125 -1.01 0.313 
 Older CEOs 53.14       54.26       
CEOTEXP Less Experienced 0.52       0.513       
     0.01348 1.182 0.238   -0.0093 -0.816 0.415 
 Highly Experienced 0.52       0.522       
CEOTENURE Shorter Tenure 0.31       0.302       
     0.02851 1.491 0.137   0.00647 0.336 0.737 
 Longer Tenure 0.28       0.295       
CEOHUMA Non-Humanity Qual 0.08       0.08       
     0.006 0.183 0.855   -0.008 -0.255 0.797 
 With Humanity Qual 0.07       0.08       
CEOSCI Non-Science Qual 0.43       0.42       
     -0.067 -1.152 0.25   -0.076 -1.317 0.189 
 With Science Qual 0.49       0.5       
CEOBUS Non- Business Qual 0.36       0.36       
     0.049 0.897 0.37   0.059 1.069 0.286 
 With Business Qual 0.31       0.3       
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Table 6.17: Independent samples t-test comparing differences in financial and social 
performance based on dichotomized groupings of Chairpersons characteristics 
Chairman Demographic 
Characteristics 
Panel A-Financial Performance Panel B- Social Performance 
Mean 
Mean 
Difference t Sig. Mean 
Mean 
Difference t Sig. 
CHREP Low 6.27       5.99       
     -0.506 -0.987 0.324   -1.189 -2.332 0.020 
 High 6.77       7.18       
CHAMT Low 1.57       1.703       
     -0.4874 -3.353 0.001   -0.2317 -1.565 0.119 
 High 2.05       1.935       
CHMBA With MBA 0.1       0.12       
     -0.103 -2.429 0.016   -0.061 -1.431 0.153 
 Without MBA 0.2       0.18       
CHFQ No 0.15       0.18       
     -0.225 -4.574 0.000   -0.185 -3.707 0.000 
 Yes 0.37       0.36       
CHAGE Younger 62.58       61.47       
     0.922 0.672 0.502   -1.565 -1.139 0.255 
 Older 61.66       63.04       
CHTEXP Less Experienced 0.56       0.56       
     0.01204 1.108 0.269   0.0034 0.301 0.764 
 Highly Experienced 0.56       0.55       
CHTENURE Shorter Tenure 0.341       0.336       
     0.0141 0.829 0.408   0.0064 0.374 0.709 
 Longer Tenure 0.327       0.329       
CHHUMA Non-Humanity Qual  0.15       0.16       
     0.011 0.278 0.782   0.028 0.679 0.498 
 With Humanity Qual 0.14       0.13       
CHSCI Non-Science Qual 0.36       0.35       
     -0.066 -1.16 0.247   -0.086 -1.506 0.133 
 With Science Qual 0.43       0.44       
CHBUS Non- Business Qual 0.35       0.31       
     0.043 0.783 0.434   -0.027 -0.488 0.626 
 With Business Qual 0.3       0.34       
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6.6.2 Correlation analysis 
Results of correlation analysis are shown in Tables 6.18 and 6.19, with statistically significant 
correlations indicated at the 1% and 5% levels. Table 6.18 reveals that contrary to the 
independent samples t-test findings, correlation analysis does not find any significant 
association of the CEO total amount of education and the CEO foreign qualification with 
financial performance. Similarly, Table 6.19 reveals that the Chairpersons total amount of 
education and foreign qualification is not correlated with financial performance. Similar to t-
test findings, correlation analysis does not find any correlation between powerful management 
players’ other demographic characteristics and financial performance. 
In relation to the impact of powerful management players’ demographics characteristics on 
corporate social performance, Tables 6.18 and 6.19 reveal that powerful management players’ 
reputation has significant positive correlation with corporate social performance. Correlation 
analysis further suggests that powerful management players’ foreign qualification has also a 
significant correlation with corporate social performance. Moreover, correlation analysis also 
reveals a positive and significant association between CEO amount of education and 
corporate social performance. In relation to the educational background of powerful 
management players, correlation analysis shows a significant but weak association between 
Chairpersons’ science and engineering background and corporate social performance.  
Finally, similar to the t-test findings, correlation analysis also suggests that other demographic 
characteristics of powerful management players’ have no impact on corporate social 
performance. 
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Table 6.18: Correlation analysis showing relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance 
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CEOREP 1                            
CEOAMT 0.045 1                          
CEOMBA 0.068 .471** 1                        
CEOFQ .125* .347** .379** 1                      
CEOAGE -0.063 -0.047 -.122* -0.018 1                    
CEOTEXP 0.035 -.146* -.136* -0.083 .716** 1                  
CEOTENURE .196** -.137* -0.085 0.041 .180** .306** 1                
CEOHUMA -0.038 0.03 0.026 0.033 -0.018 0.051 0.053 1              
CEOSCI 0.021 .240** 0.041 .165** .164** 0.044 -0.022 -.270** 1            
CEOBUS 0.083 -.166** -0.066 -.155** -.178** -0.042 -0.014 -.209** -.648** 1          
INDUS -0.004 -0.041 0.002 0.036 0.081 0.047 .151** 0.028 0.017 0.039 1        
FAGE 0.015 0.099 0.106 .269** .177** 0.101 0.017 -0.022 0.097 0.019 .180** 1      
FSIZE .159** .158** 0.078 0.064 -0.028 0.002 -0.036 -0.027 0.057 -0.013 -.183** -0.006 1   
FP -0.05 0.089 0.02 0.069 -0.014 -0.029 -0.084 -0.048 0.072 -0.06 -.141* 0.099 0.073  1  
CSP .142* .146* 0.045 .122* 0.076 0.08 -0.029 0.067 0.074 -0.059 -0.038 .163** .365** .263** 1 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).          
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).          
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Table 6.19: Correlation analysis showing relationship between Chairperson Characteristics and firm performance 
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CHREP 1                             
CHAMT 0.086 1                           
CHMBA 0.098 .407** 1                         
CHFQ .143* .472** .447** 1                       
CHAGE -0.11 -.158** -.242** -0.035 1                     
CHTEXP -.156** -.155** -0.108 -0.057 .578** 1                   
CHTENURE 0.009 -.128* -0.11 -0.005 0.113 .277** 1                 
CHHUMA -0.056 0.083 0.01 -0.028 .126* .121* -0.089 1               
CHSCI 0.065 .237** 0.008 .281** 0.061 0.05 0.112 -.293** 1             
CHBUS 0.079 -0.008 0.009 -.178** -.242** -.141* -0.074 -.287** -.538** 1           
INDUS -0.047 -0.053 -.119* -0.056 .147* 0.104 0.09 -0.102 0.032 0.03 1         
FAGE 0.081 0.011 0.037 .264** .254** .193** .294** -0.003 0.029 -0.071 .180** 1       
FSIZE .129* 0.091 .176** .128* -0.038 -0.023 .139* -0.033 0.092 0.018 -.183** -0.006 1     
FP 0.013 .197** 0.072 .212** 0.019 -0.014 -0.073 0.001 0.051 -0.05 -.141* 0.099 0.073 1   
CSP .193** 0.094 0.091 .236** 0.08 0.048 0.03 -0.056 .121* 0.05 -0.038 .163** .365** .263** 1 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).          
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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6.6.3 Regression analysis 
To further investigate the impacts of key executives’ demographic characteristics on financial 
and social performance of family controlled listed Indian firms, a one-stage linear regression 
was performed. Tables 6.20, 6.21, 6.22 and 6.23 show the regression results for the 
relationships between the two powerful players’ demographic characteristics and 
performance. All tables reveal a satisfactory level of explanatory power of Adjusted R-square 
for the models used to investigate impacts of CEO and Chairpersons’ demographic 
characteristics on both financial and social performance. Further these tables also depict that 
there is no multicollinearity between the independent variables as VIF is well below the 
acceptable limit. 
Regression analysis showing the impacts of CEOs demographic characteristics on financial 
performance is given in Table 6.20. Contrary to the findings of the t-test and correlation 
analysis, regression analysis does not show any significant impact of CEO amount of 
education and foreign qualification on financial performance. Regression analysis reveals that 
CEO MBA qualification has a negative impact (β =-0.100, p=0.022) on financial performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Moreover, consistent with the t-test and correlation analysis, 
regression analysis suggests no impact of other CEO demographic variables on financial 
performance. In relation to the impact of CEO characteristics on social performance, Table 
6.21 reveals a positive impact of CEO reputation on social performance (β=0.107, p=0.059). 
This finding is similar to the findings of t-test and correlation analysis. Contrary to t-test and 
correlation analysis findings, regression analysis shows no impact of CEO foreign 
qualification on corporate social performance. 
Regression analysis showing the impact of the Chairperson’s demographic characteristics on 
financial and social performance is shown in Tables 6.22 and 6.23. Table 6.22 reveals that the 
Chairperson’s foreign qualification has a significant positive impact (β=0.139, p=0.007) on 
financial performance. Table 6.21 further reveals that similar to the CEO, Chairperson’s MBA 
qualification negatively impacts financial performance. In relation to social performance, 
Table 6.22 reveals that the Chairperson’s reputation has significant positive impact (β=0.113, 
p=0.036) on social performance. The table also reveals that the Chairperson’s foreign 
qualification has a significant positive impact (β=0.139, p=0.043) on social performance. 
Further, consistent with the correlation analysis, regression analysis exhibits a significant 
positive relationship (β=0.178, p=0.035) between Chairpersons’ science and engineering 
background and social performance. In addition, regression analysis reveals that the 
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Chairperson having a bachelor’s degree in business and related subjects such as accounting, 
economics and finance has a significant positive impact on social performance. 
Table 6.20: Regression analysis showing the impacts of CEO demographic 
characteristics on financial performance 
Independent Variable 
Dependent Variable, Tobin’s Q 
β T sig tol VIF 
CEOREP 0.044 1.124 0.262 0.864 1.157 
CEOAMT -0.052 -1.156 0.249 0.633 1.579 
CEOMBA -0.100 -2.303 0.022 0.694 1.441 
CEOFQ 0.066 1.557 0.121 0.73 1.369 
CEOAGE -0.003 -0.064 0.949 0.433 2.311 
CEOTEXP -0.033 -0.588 0.557 0.422 2.368 
CEOTENURE -0.052 -1.309 0.192 0.817 1.224 
CEOHUMA -0.018 -0.395 0.693 0.630 1.588 
CEOSCI 0.067 1.09 0.277 0.347 2.88 
CEOBUS 0.018 0.301 0.764 0.371 2.692 
INDUS -0.081 -2.132 0.034 0.893 1.119 
FAGE 0.072 1.859 0.064 0.859 1.164 
FSIZE -0.107 -2.765 0.006 0.874 1.144 
LAGFP 0.811 21.348 0.000 0.904 1.106 
MODEL  SUMMARY 
R2 =.653, Adj R2 = .635 
ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
6.6.4 Discussion 
6.6.4.1 CEOs’ educational qualification and its relationship to financial and social 
performance 
For investigating the effects of educational qualification, this study examines the influence of 
total amount of qualification and educational background on financial and social performance. 
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Both regression analysis and the independent sample t-test reveal no significant impact of 
CEO total qualification and educational background on financial and social performance.  
Table 6.21: Regression analysis showing the impacts of CEO characteristics on social 
performance 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, CSP 
β T sig tol VIF 
CEOREP 0.107 1.893 0.059 0.873 1.145 
CEOAMT 0.079 1.196 0.233 0.641 1.559 
CEOMBA -0.071 -1.112 0.267 0.693 1.442 
CEOFQ 0.027 0.431 0.667 0.738 1.356 
CEOAGE 0.058 0.723 0.470 0.437 2.288 
CEOTEXP 0.053 0.662 0.508 0.430 2.326 
CEOTENURE -0.065 -1.104 0.270 0.818 1.222 
CEOHUMA 0.064 0.96 0.338 0.630 1.587 
CEOSCI -0.016 -0.174 0.862 0.347 2.878 
CEOBUS -0.004 -0.044 0.965 0.370 2.704 
INDUS 0.032 0.577 0.565 0.884 1.132 
FAGE 0.104 1.807 0.072 0.850 1.177 
FSIZE 0.347 6.246 0.000 0.909 1.1 
FP 0.231 4.221 0.000 0.938 1.066 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.249, Adj R2 = .210 
                  ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
Prior researches provide evidence of a positive relationship between executives’ total amount 
of education and financial performance (Norburn& Birley 1988; Bantel & Jackson 1989; 
Hambrick & Mason 1984). Although independent samples t-test and correlation analysis 
confirm the above mentioned findings, regression analysis does not find any significant 
evidence of a positive impact of key executives’ total amount of education on financial 
performance. Therefore, this thesis does not suggest a possible linkage between powerful 
management players’ total amount of education and its impact on financial and social 
performance.  
Findings of this thesis supports Bhagat et al. (2010), who do not find a significant systematic 
relationship between CEO education and long term form performance. Similar to Bhagat et al. 
(2010) this thesis also raises a concern for adopting total amount of education as a proxy for 
powerful management players’ ability to perform in their positions. Moreover, in the context 
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of Indian family businesses, the majority of powerful management players (the CEO and the 
Chairperson) are family members. Descriptive analysis of the sample used in this study 
reveals that 73% of sampled firms are headed by family CEOs and 90% headed by family 
Chairpersons. Therefore, it could be argued that primarily being a family member provides 
them opportunity to get appointed as a powerful management player. The level and quality of 
education may not play a significant role in their selection as powerful management players. 
So CEO education per se is not found to significantly affect corporate performance outcomes.    
Table 6.22: Chairman Characteristics and financial performance 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, FP 
β T sig tol VIF 
CHREP -0.005 -0.131 0.895 0.926 1.08 
CHMBA -0.074 -1.766 0.079 0.638 1.567 
CHAGE 0.016 0.352 0.725 0.556 1.797 
CHTEXP -0.039 -0.887 0.376 0.573 1.744 
CHTENURE -0.059 -1.55 0.122 0.781 1.281 
CHHUMA 0.03 0.643 0.521 0.530 1.886 
CHSCI 0.032 0.573 0.567 0.369 2.712 
CHBUS 0.075 1.398 0.163 0.394 2.537 
INDUS -0.067 -1.889 0.060 0.892 1.341 
FAGE 0.063 1.63 0.104 0.746 1.2 
FSIZE -0.12 -3.275 0.001 0.833 1.122 
LAGFP 0.822 23.307 0.000 0.903 1.108 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.692, Adj R2 = .628 
              ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
Similarly, in relation to the impact of powerful management players’ demographic 
characteristics on social performance, this thesis reports that total amount of education have 
no impact on social performance. A search of current literature could not find a prior study on 
the relationship between the amount of education and corporate social performance. 
Therefore, this study makes an original contribution to the existing research by providing 
empirical evidence of relationship between powerful management players’ demographic 
characteristics and corporate social performance. 
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6.6.4.2 Powerful management players’ educational background and its impact on 
financial and social performance 
This study further investigates whether key managements’ educational background has an 
effect on financial and social performance of their firm. It considers educational discipline 
(i.e. humanities and social sciences, science and engineering and business and accounting) on 
financial and social performance. This study also examines the holding of an MBA degree 
and its effect on financial and social performance. 
There is a growing body of literature that investigates the impacts of key executives’ MBA 
degree on financial performance. Although, both t-test and correlation analysis do not find 
any significant association between CEOs MBA degree and performance, regression analysis 
indicates that CEOs’ MBA qualification has a significant negative impact on financial 
performance. In relation to the impact of CEO MBA qualification on financial performance, 
Bhagat et al. (2010) find that hiring new CEOs with MBA qualification only leads to short 
term improvements in operating performance. However, they do not report any significant 
systematic relationship between CEO MBA qualification and long term performance 
measured by both Return on Assets (ROA) and Stock Returns.  Unlike findings of Bhagat et 
al. (2010) this thesis empirically suggests a significant negative impact of CEO MBA 
qualification on financial performance measured by Tobin’s Q.  This result may have been 
due to a confounding influence of family dynamics in Indian companies. In this study, 73% of 
sampled CEOs are a family member. Several of these family CEOs are likely to have studied 
for an MBA in a western country. It is possible that management tension becomes heightened 
between the CEO’s new ideas as acquired from the MBA and the business thinking of family 
members on the board and in senior management ranks. This could create some dysfunctions 
in strategic decision-making and in the implementation of strategies, bringing about poorer 
financial performance.  
By comparison, the results of independent samples t-test, correlation analysis and regression 
analysis suggest that CEOs MBA qualification does not have any impact on social 
performance. Descriptive analysis suggests that average age of CEOs in the sample of this 
study is 54 years. This means that as per the Indian standards these CEOs have completed 
their MBA degrees around 30 years before i.e. in 1980s, during that time sustainability and 
corporate social responsibility was probably not part of the MBA curriculum. Therefore, this 
study witnesses a non-significant relationship between CEO’s MBA qualification and social 
performance.  
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Table 6.23: Chairperson Characteristics and social performance 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent Variable, CSP 
β T sig Tol VIF 
CHREP 0.113 2.107 0.036 0.927 1.079 
CHAGE 0.058 0.835 0.404 0.558 1.793 
CHTEXP 0.072 1.057 0.291 0.575 1.74 
CHTENURE -0.073 -1.258 0.209 0.785 1.274 
CHHUMA 0.081 1.156 0.249 0.544 1.838 
CHSCI 0.178 2.122 0.035 0.375 2.666 
CHBUS 0.221 2.742 0.007 0.408 2.449 
INDUS 0.030 0.545 0.586 0.882 1.134 
FSIZE 0.349 6.361 0.000 0.880 1.136 
FP 0.221 4.078 0.000 0.900 1.111 
MODEL  
SUMMARY 
R2 =.284, Adj R2 = .247 
ANOVA, Sig.f= .000, N=300 
 
6.6.4.3 Powerful management players’ educational background and performance 
Prior studies have mostly addressed the impact of key executives’ educational background on 
innovation measured by R & D expenditure or initiations taken for adopting new technology. 
A very limited number of researchers have empirically analysed the impact of educational 
background on organisational financial performance. Supplementary analysis undertaken in 
this study has been able to use data obtained on R & D expenditure by companies in the 
sample. This has enabled a correlation analysis to be performed between the CEOs’ and 
Chairpersons’ educational background and their companies’ innovation (proxied by R&D 
expenditure). The results are given in Table 6.24 below. The results first provide 
contradictory evidence regarding a possible linkage between key executives’ science and 
engineering background and innovation. Correlation analysis reveals a significant positive 
correlation between Chairpersons’ science and engineering background and innovation, thus 
providing support for Barker and Mueller (2002). However, there is no significant correlation 
between CEOs’ science and engineering background and innovation. Second, correlation 
analysis in Table 6.24 shows that key executives’ having an educational background in 
humanities and business have a non-significant negative correlation with innovation. 
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Table 6.24: Chairman Qualification and innovation 
 CHHUMA CHSCI CHBUS CEOHUMA CEOSCI CEOBUS INNO 
CHHUMA 1       
CHSCI -.293** 1      
CHBUS -.287** -.538** 1     
CEOHUMA .329** -.059 -.125* 1    
CEOSCI -.115* .365** -.176** -.270** 1   
CEOBUS -.173** -.232** .388** -.209** -.648** 1  
INNO -.103 .265** -.109 -.086 .110 -.099 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
 
In terms of financial performance, Koufopoulous et al. (2008) report a positive association 
between Chairpersons’ economics degree and financial performance. Both univariate and 
multivariate analysis conducted in this study finds no significant impact of educational 
background on financial performance. Therefore, unlike Koufopoulos et al. (2008), this study 
does not find evidence of a relationship between key executives’ educational background and 
financial performance. In relation to the social performance, this study reports different 
findings for CEOs and Chairpersons. Both univariate and multivariate analysis reveal no 
significant relationship between CEOs educational background and corporate social 
performance. Correlation and regression analysis of Chairpersons’ educational background 
and social performance reveal a significant positive association between Chairpersons’ having 
a bachelor degree in science and corporate social performance. Regression analysis further 
finds that Chairpersons’ having a bachelor degree in business, accounting, economics and law 
are significantly associated with positive corporate social performance. These findings are in 
contradiction to the past literature that suggests a negative association between executives’ 
bachelor degree in business and economics and social performance (Frank et al. 1993; Frank 
& Schultz 2000; Manner 2010). Contrary to Manner (2010), this study does not find evidence 
of a positive relationship between key executives’ having a bachelor degree in humanities and 
corporate social performance. 
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6.6.4.4 Powerful management players’ foreign qualification and performance 
Descriptive analysis discussed in the beginning of the chapter provides evidence of the strong 
presence of foreign qualified key executives on the board. This study may be the first to 
investigate whether these foreign qualified key executives have an effect on financial and 
social performance of listed family owned Indian firms. This study provides evidence of a 
strong positive relationship between key executives foreign qualification and both financial 
and social performance.  
This finding raises several questions to future researchers: What makes foreign qualified 
directors different from directors who have attained their qualification from Indian 
universities? How is the thinking pattern of foreign qualified executives different from local 
qualified executives? Research into these questions can provide deeper insights to explain the 
positive effect of foreign qualified top executives and directors on financial and social 
performance. 
6.6.4.5 Powerful management players’ age and firm performance 
Prior psychology literature provides evidence of a possible connection between age and 
decision making ability of an individual (Carlsson & Karlsson 1970; Chown 1960; Child 
1974). More recently, a few other researchers have sought to examine the impact of age on 
executives’ decision making abilities and reported mixed findings (Williams et al. 1995; 
Koufopoulos et al. 2008). Contrary to these findings, this study reports no significant 
association between key executives age and financial and social performance. 
Table 6.25: Key executives’ age and its impact on firm growth, risk and innovation 
  CEOAGE CHAGE RND GROWTH Risk 
CEOAGE 1         
CHAGE .250** 1       
RND -0.021 0.041 1     
GROWTH -.171** -0.105 -0.009 1   
RISK 0.001 -0.003 -0.108 -0.002 1 
 
Further investigation of the impact of key executives’ age on firm growth, risk and R&D 
expenditure has been undertaken by performing correlation analysis between these variables. 
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Similar to Hart and Melon (1970), this study also reports that younger CEOs are more 
associated with corporate growth. Unlike Carlsson and Karlsson (1970), Hambrick and 
Mason (1984) and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), this study does not find that younger 
executives are more risk taking as compared to older executives. Moreover, unlike Barker and 
Mueller (2002) this study does not find any relationship between key executives age and 
R&D expenditure. 
6.6.4.6 Powerful management players’ functional background and performance 
Thomas and Simerly (2004) and Manner (2010) empirically show that executives having 
longer tenure in the company are associated with high corporate social performance as 
compared to other counterparts having shorter tenure. The argument behind their findings is 
that executives spending longer duration in the company have superior knowledge of 
stakeholder’s needs which can help them in designing and implementing policies to address 
those needs. Unlike Thomas and Simerly (2004) and Manner (2010), Koufopoulos et al. 
(2008) do not find any significant relationship between executives’ longer tenure in the 
company and overall (both financial and social) performance. They further report a positive 
relationship between position tenure and overall performance. But, unlike these findings this 
thesis does not find a significant systematic impact of key executives’ total functional 
experience and position tenure on corporate social performance. One of the possible reasons 
could be less pressure on these executives from stakeholders in India compared to Western 
countries. A second reason for not finding any significant relationship could be related to one 
of the limitations of this study. This thesis only considers total functional experience and 
position tenure of key executives. It could be possible that strategic decisions are made by the 
whole management team and the board. Therefore, future studies can investigate the impact of 
the top management team’s functional experience and position tenure on corporate financial 
and social performance.      
6.6.4.7 Powerful management players’ reputation and performance 
As discussed in the literature review chapter of this thesis, prior studies provide mixed 
findings on the effects of directors’ reputation on financial performance. Prior studies have 
explained the impact of directors’ cross-directorships on financial performance by following 
the busyness argument (Fich & Shivdasani 2006), reputational impact argument (Jiraporn et 
al. 2008; Gilson 1990; Kaplan & Reishus, 1990) and resource dependency argument (Pfeffer 
1972; Mizruchi & Stearns 1994; Booth & Deli 1995). Unlike these prior studies this study 
finds a non-significant relationship between key executives’ cross directorships and financial 
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performance. Therefore, this study concludes that the CEOs’ and Chairpersons’ cross- 
directorships do not tend to affect financial performance of family controlled listed Indian 
companies. 
In relation to the impacts of cross-directorships on social performance, this study provides 
strong evidence of a positive relationship between CEOs’ and Chairpersons’ cross- 
directorships and social performance. The independent samples t-test, correlation analysis and 
regression analysis all strongly find that the CEOs’ and Chairpersons’ extent of cross-
directorships is positively related to social performance. These findings support the 
reputational and resource dependency arguments as described by previous researchers. 
Moreover, these results also support the findings of Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) who report a 
positive relationship between number of cross-directorships held by directors and 
environmental performance.  
6.6.4.8 Overall findings 
In summary, the above discussion reveals that the Chairperson’s characteristics have more 
impact on financial and social performance of listed family controlled firms in India 
compared to the CEO characteristics. Furthermore, it also reveals that the Chairperson’s 
characteristics have more influence on social performance compared to financial performance. 
Additional analysis reveals that younger CEOs are associated with firm growth and the 
Chairpersons having a bachelor degree in science and engineering are more innovative as 
compared to other executives. The table 6.26 shows overall impact of Chairpersons’ 
demographic characteristics on financial and social performance of listed family controlled 
firms in India. 
6.7 Integrated and decoupled performance 
As discussed in the Chapter 3, this thesis also expands on available literature that investigates 
factors affecting the achievement of not only decoupled financial and social corporate 
performance, but also integrated financial and social performance. Findings in this study 
indicate that the group of family controlled firms having a large number of board committees 
have better financial and social performance compared to other family firms. Findings also 
suggest that family controlled firms led by the Chairperson having foreign qualification have 
better integrated performance (i.e. a combination of high financial and higher social 
performances) compared to other family controlled firms. Moreover, results also suggest that 
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the group of family controlled firms without a founder on the board have better integrated 
performance compared to the group of firm with a founder on the board. 
Table 6.26: The overall impact of Chairpersons’ characteristics on firm performance 
 
Normative influences on key executives 
Financial Performance,      
R2= 0.692 
Social Performance,         
R2=0.284 
Chairman Reputation Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
Chairman Amount of Education Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Chairman MBA Qualification Negative, Significant Non-significant 
Chairman Foreign Qualification Positive, Significant Positive, Significant 
Chairman Age Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Chairman Total Experience Non- Significant  Non-Significant 
Chairman Tenure Non-Significant Non-Significant 
Chairman Humanities Qualification Non- Significant Non-Significant 
Chairman Science and Engineering 
Qualification 
Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
Chairman Business Qualification Non-Significant Positive, Significant 
 
Fig. 6.11 exhibits a profile for integrated and decoupled performance of listed Indian family 
controlled firms. This Figure shows that the extent of family shareholding positively 
influences financial performance but on the other hand it has a negative impact on social 
performance. On the other hand, board governance factors such as large board size and board 
independence only influence social performance.   
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the impacts of family controlling status, family-impacted board 
governance and powerful actors’ demographic characteristics on financial and social 
performance of listed Indian family controlled firms. Moreover, this chapter has also outlined 
the impacts of these characteristics on integrated and decoupled performance of listed family 
controlled firms in India. 
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Figure 6.11: A profile for integrated corporate performance by listed Indian family 
controlled firms 
 
 
In relation to the impacts of family related control on financial and social performance, this 
thesis reports a curvilinear relationship between family shareholding and financial 
performance and suggests that financial performance of a family firm initially increases with 
family shareholding percentage up to 80%, but beyond that financial performance decreases 
with the increase in family shareholdings. Therefore, consistent with past literature this thesis 
provides evidence of existence of alignment and entrenchment effects in the context of family 
controlled firms in India. This thesis also reports an inverse relationship between family 
shareholdings and corporate social performance. Moreover, findings suggest that the group of 
family controlled firms managed by successors has better social performance compared to 
firms managed by founders.  
In relation to board governance, findings suggest that board governance has a greater effect on 
social performance compared to financial performance of listed family controlled companies. 
Results further suggest that board governance variables in general have a mostly positive 
influence on social performance. However family-related governance variables have a 
negative impact on social performance. Finally, findings suggest that family governance 
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variables in general do not have an influence on financial performance, apart from insiders’ 
reputation which has a positive impact on financial performance. 
Turning to the impact of powerful actors’ demographics on financial and social performance, 
findings suggest that the Chairperson’s demographic characteristics have relatively more 
effect on performance than the characteristics of the CEO. Results further suggest that the 
Chairperson’s demographic characteristics have a stronger impact on the social performance 
compared to the financial performance of listed family controlled firms in India. 
Finally, findings suggest that high family reputation, higher number of board committees, 
founder’s absence on the board and the Chairperson’s foreign qualifications help family 
controlled firms to achieve integrated financial and social performance.  
Future implications of these findings with limitations of this research will be discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the key findings, and consider the contribution of 
this thesis to the literature, implications for governance practices and policies, and future 
research directions. This chapter also recognises limitations of the findings. There are four 
sections in this chapter. The first section summarises of findings of this thesis. It discusses 
findings in relation to individual research questions as described in the objective in the 
Chapter 1. The second section covers significant contributions made by this thesis to the 
available literature in the area of family business, governance and sustainability. The third 
section recognises limitations of this study. Fourth section discusses implications of the 
findings for governance practices in listed family firms. 
7.2 Study’s overview and summary of findings 
This thesis adds to the body of literature on family ownership status, family-impacted board 
governance, powerful management players’ normative influences and their effects on the 
performance of the firm in both its financial and social dimensions. It particularly extends this 
literature into the economically important and culturally unique context of family companies 
listed in India. Moreover, it makes a first-time contribution to the evidence in the corporate 
governance literature in respect of particular factors affecting corporate social performance. 
From a sample of 300 listed family-controlled firms drawn from the top 500 companies listed 
on the Bombay Stock Exchange, the findings of a positive relationship between family 
shareholding and financial performance, and a negative relationship between family 
shareholding and corporate social performance is consistent with prior findings in other 
contexts. Consistent with the institutional theory perspective invoked by McGuire et al. 
(2012), this thesis finds that large listed companies having high family shareholdings will 
display more commitment to financial performance and possibly allow the firm to engage in 
poorer social performance. Another finding is that a founder’s presence on board has an 
adverse influence on both financial and social performance, while other family members’ 
presence on board has no impact on financial and social performance. A further 
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characteristics of board governance found to partially impact on financial and social 
performance is the presence of independent directors on the board.  It is found, in support of 
Dutta’s (1997) argument of the existence of dummy boards in Indian family businesses that 
the proportion of independent directors has no impact on financial performance; however, it 
has a significant positive impact on social performance. The inference is that family directors 
in India are focused on the achievement of financial performance. They tend to control the 
firm’s financial decisions themselves and give freedom to the independent directors on the 
board to take decisions related to social performance.  
In terms of board committees, this thesis finds a significant positive relationship with both 
financial and social performance. Descriptive analysis identifies the existence of more than 40 
types of board committees across the sample. Several of these committees have a role relating 
to risk management, loans, investments, banking and finance. The finding suggests that 
families prefer assigning responsibilities to board committees and establishing these 
committees according to business needs that arise. This thesis reports that most of the board 
committees are related to financial matters; therefore, findings reveal a positive relationship 
between number of committees and financial performance. This indicates that controlling 
families appoint board committees to gain expert advice predominantly on financial matters. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that there is a negative impact of number of board 
committees on social performance of listed family controlled firms in India. 
In relation to the impact that normative pressures of powerful management players of family 
businesses have on financial and social performance, this thesis reveals that a family 
chairperson’s demographic characteristics have a more significant impact on financial and 
social performance as compared to the demographic characteristics of a family CEO. In most 
of the companies in the sample, family chairpersons are family patriarchs who play a 
dominant role in strategic decision making and provide mentorship for the next family 
generation joining as a CEO.  These findings are consistent with prior literature suggesting 
dominant role of family patriarchs in the Indian family tradition. 
7.2 Contribution to the literature 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature on family business, corporate governance and 
sustainability in several ways. First, it contributes new evidence about factors in large family 
firms’ that affect the financial and social performance in the context of a large emerging 
economy. In relation to financial performance, this study provides support for the body of 
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evidence in other contexts that there is a positive relationship between family shareholding 
and financial performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Barontini & Caprio 2005; Andres 2008). 
More importantly, in the context of emerging economies like India, this thesis provides first-
time evidence that the relationship between family shareholdings and financial performance is 
curvilinear. This result indicates the existence of an alignment effect for family shareholdings 
below 80%, and an entrenchment effect for family shareholdings above 80%. 
Second, this thesis measures and models new variables about the governance and 
management characteristics of Indian family businesses. Prior studies conducted on Indian 
family businesses have replicated studies conducted primarily in the US and European 
settings. They have not considered variables uniquely applicable in India, such as the fact that 
62% of family-controlled firms in India belong to an ethnic group known as trading 
communities. A variable is constructed in this thesis to recognize this fact. Third, a substantial 
contribution is made in this thesis to the embryo literature on the effects of governance 
characteristics on corporate social performance of family-controlled firms. This relatively 
recent area of literature largely lacks empirical analysis. This thesis provides new evidence of 
an inverse relationship between family shareholdings and corporate social performance of 
listed family controlled firms.     
Fourth, this thesis extends the body of literature on board governance and financial 
performance by adding board governance factors specific to the family business context. The 
aspects of board governance widely considered by prior researchers are board size, number of 
board meetings, board independence, and board busyness. This thesis not only provides 
evidence of the impacts of board governance on financial performance in the Indian context 
but also makes a contribution by investigating the impacts of insiders’ and outsiders’, board 
meeting attendance and cross directorships on both financial and social performance. Fifth, 
management researchers have proposed a possible connection between demographic 
characteristics of powerful management players and organisational outcomes primarily related 
to innovation and strategic decision making. Subsequently, studies using Hambrick’s upper 
echelons theory have  extended the available interdisciplinary literature (mainly coming from 
psychology) to establish a possible linkage between top managements’ demographic 
characteristics and its normative influence, through learnt cognitions, on a firm’s financial and 
social performance. There is limited research using this theory. This thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by providing findings on the effects of the chairpersons’ and CEOs’ 
demographic characteristics on corporate financial and social performance.  
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Finally, this thesis contributes a schema for positioning the governance factors found to 
significantly impact on financial and social performance. This schema can be used in future 
studies to empirically locate the impacts of  family control, board governance and upper 
management echelons factors on integrated and decoupled financial and social performance. 
This thesis also introduces a three layer conceptual model to investigate effects of controlling 
family status, family-impacted governance and top management characteristics on financial 
and social performance of family controlled firms.  With this, the thesis makes a significant 
research contribution in the area of family business and corporate governance research 
especially in the context of literature addressing impacts of family related control, governance 
and chairpersons’ and CEOs’ characteristics on social performance.  
 
7.3 Limitations 
Limitations of the findings in this thesis need to be recognized. Like other studies conducted 
in the area of family business and corporate governance, this thesis also has several 
limitations. 
First, this is a quantitative study that relies on the analysis of secondary data collected from a 
number of sources. Therefore, this thesis acknowledges the shortcomings of a sole reliance on 
quantitative methods and secondary data. Second, there are also limitations in the surrogate 
measures of concepts. This thesis has used surrogate measures to quantify attributes of family 
control, family related governance and normative influences of powerful managers. Although 
adoption of these measures is founded with prior studies in the area of family business and 
corporate governance, it remains that these surrogate measures cannot capture all dimensions 
of the concept embodied in their latent variable. For example, the combined use of Board size 
and frequency of meetings to represent the concept of board operating mode are unable to 
identify the actual operating processes of Boards, including the communication processes at 
board meetings. Third, the identification of a family-controlled company for purposes of 
sample selection could have been based on any of several definitions described in Chapter 2. 
Handler (1989) has also recognised problems related to the unavailability of a universally 
accepted definition of a family firm. He identified this issue as one of the five methodological 
issues critical to the development of family business research. Although this thesis follows a 
broader definition of a family firm, such a definition remains arguable because it would not 
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apply equally well across different countries. Clearly, there can be limitations in generalising 
these findings to other family firms. 
Fourth, this thesis recognises its limitation in relation to the measurement of corporate social 
performance. Corporate social responsibility index used to measure corporate social and 
environmental performance in this thesis is only one indicator of social performance. 
McGuire et al. (2012) argue that family firms may be particularly concerned with a particular 
stakeholder group or may focus their social activities on philanthropy. For example, Birla 
group of industries in India are involved more in religious charity. This aspect of social 
activity is not taken into consideration by corporate social responsibility rating used by this 
thesis. McGuire et al. (2012) argue that the social performance measures (e.g. KLD and other 
sustainability ratings) might not fully capture all dimensions of social and environmental 
performance. Similarly, corporate social responsibility ratings used by this thesis may be 
insufficient in capturing all dimensions of social and environmental performance.  
Fifth, limitations are recognises in relation to the use of Tobin’s Q as a measure of financial 
performance in this study. Although Tobin’s Q has been widely used as a proxy for a firm’s 
financial performance in corporate governance research (Gompers et al. 2003; Yermack 1996; 
Anderson & Reeb 2003), other studies have also identified problems related to the use of 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for financial performance (Bertrand et al. 2002; Dybwig & Warachka 
2010). The computation of Tobin’s Q fails to include a replacement cost of intellectual capital 
that is not recorded in book value of assets. 
Finally, the sample in this thesis comes from the top 500 largest listed firms in India. 
Therefore similar to McGuire et al. (2012) and Dyer and Whetten (2006) most of these 
findings are applicable for large listed family firms. A significant portion of 5067 total 
companies listed at the BSE are small and mid-sized family firms. Therefore, findings in this 
thesis cannot be generalised to small and mid-sized family firms. 
7.4 Implications of this study 
There can be several practical implications of this thesis. These implications can be drawn 
from figure 7.1 given below which indicates key family related ownership, governance and 
key managements’ characteristics for high and low performing listed Indian family firms in 
terms of their financial and social performances. 
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Figure 7.1: Performance Matrix 
  Financial Performance Social Performance 
High 
Performers 
High Family Reputation, High family 
shareholding, High reputation of inside 
directors, Large number of board 
committees, Employing  foreign 
qualified key executive 
Successor run businesses, Larger Board, 
Higher Board independence, 
Sustainability dominant board 
philosophy, Large number of board 
committees Key executives' outside 
connections, Foreign qualified 
Chairperson, Chairperson having 
bachelor's degree in science and 
business,  
Low 
Performers 
Founder on board, insiders excess 
involvement, presence of disclosure 
related to sustainability in corporate 
governance philosophy, MBA 
qualified key executives,  
High family shareholding, Founder on 
board, High frequency of board 
meetings, MBA qualified key 
executives,  
 
First, in relation to the implications for family firms, the performance matrix in Figure 7.1 
suggests that in order to achieve better financial performance the Indian family firms have to 
maintain a high family reputation and high family shareholding (up to 80% to avoid 
entrenchment effect). Figure 7.1 also suggests that large Indian family businesses should 
avoid excess family representation on the board, should appoint a high number of board 
committees and should employ chairpersons and CEOs having foreign qualification 
predominantly from the US and the UK. For better social performance, the matrix in Figure 
7.1 indicates that family businesses should have larger boards, should provide more freedom 
to the board and should appoint chairpersons and CEOs having strong outside connections. 
These findings can have implications for controlling shareholders to formulate internal 
policies for achieving better financial and social performance. Finally, these findings have 
implications for family controlling shareholders in setting criteria for the appointment of 
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powerful management players who have greater prospects of achieve better financial and 
social performance for the company. 
Second, findings of this study can have important implications for policy makers in designing 
policies related to the protection of minority shareholders in family-controlled firms where 
family has excess control. The results in this thesis infer that expropriation of minority 
shareholders’ funds takes place when controlling family shareholdings increase above 80%. 
The implication is that controlling families will not be acting in the best interest of minority 
shareholders when they have excessive control. Therefore, regulators need to consider of 
providing special protection to minority shareholders in highly family controlled listed firms 
in India.  
Third, findings of this thesis can have implications for corporate governance and 
sustainability regulators in designing and implementing policies to achieve a satisfactory 
balance of insiders’ and outsiders’ on boards of family-controlled firms in India. Similar to 
Jackling and Johl (2009) and Pandey et al. (2011), this thesis finds that independent directors 
on the board of family controlled firms in India do not add to the financial performance of the 
firm. The inference is that controlling families tend to appoint independent directors who are 
overly sympathetic to management but can still be classified as an independent under the 
regulation (Cohen et al. 2012). Therefore this thesis suggests that corporate governance 
regulators should think of implementing stricter requirements for the appointment of 
independent directors. Moreover, the findings also point to implications for sustainability 
regulators. Particular family and governance characteristics have been found to help a family-
controlled firm integrate sustainability practices into its corporate governance framework. 
Results have revealed that the size of family shareholding negatively impacts social 
performance. Therefore sustainability regulators should think of imposing stricter guidelines 
for these family-owned businesses. Recently, steps have begun with the government of India 
releasing voluntary guidelines on social, environmental and economic responsibilities of 
businesses in India.  
Fourth, findings of this study can have implications for management and shareholders. This 
thesis has investigated the relationships between Chairpersons ‘and CEOs’ demographic 
characteristics such as age, qualification, reputation and educational background, and 
financial and social performance. In addition, this thesis has also looked at the impact of age 
and educational background on the CEO and Chairperson’s innovation and risk taking 
capabilities. These findings can guide managers in developing attributes for achieving better 
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financial and social performance. Moreover, in relation to implications for shareholders, 
findings of this study can also be helpful the shareholders in understanding corporate 
governance mechanisms in the family firms. India, as an emerging economy is attracting a big 
flow of FDI from overseas investors, therefore findings of this study can give insights to 
global investors about the governance of family businesses. 
Finally, findings of this study could also be useful to the academics working in the area of 
family business and governance worldwide. Some of the variables used in this thesis have 
never been investigated before; therefore this thesis opens new opportunities for researchers 
to further explore these issues.  
7.5 Future research directions 
Descriptive statistics reveal that a majority of family-controlled listed firms in India are 
owned by Hindu owners belonging to trading communities. This thesis has not addressed 
some factors specially related to Hindu owners’ background, their values, culture, beliefs and 
codes of conduct, and how their attributes can affect the firm’s financial and social 
performance. Therefore, findings of this thesis suggest future research to explore the impacts 
of these Hindu trading communities’ background characteristics on financial and social 
performance. 
Findings of this thesis indicate that board composition has no significant impact on financial 
performance of listed family controlled firms in India. Qualitative research (especially 
interviews of outside directors) is needed to gain insights into the nature and extent of 
delegation of power to the outside directors by controlling family members. Such interviews 
could also help to understand the motivation of the board in achieving better corporate social 
performance.  
Additionally, the role of institutional and foreign investors has been excluded in conducting 
this research. Future researchers could study the impact of institutional and foreign investors 
on corporate financial and social performance. Finally to check the robustness of findings in 
this study, a similar study could be conducted on small and medium size family firms. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CLAUSE 49 OF LISTING AGREEMENT 
The company agrees to comply with the following provisions: 
I. Board of Directors 
(A) Composition of Board 
ii. The Board of directors of the company shall have an optimum combination of 
executive and non-executive directors with not less than fifty percent of the board 
of directors comprising of non-executive directors.  
iii. Where the Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director, at least one-third of 
the Board should comprise of independent directors and in case he is an executive 
director, at least half of the Board should comprise of independent directors.  
 Provided that where the non-executive Chairman is a promoter of the company or 
is related to any promoter or person occupying management positions at the Board 
level or at one level below the Board, at least one-half of the Board of the 
company shall consist of independent directors. 
 Explanation-For the purpose of the expression “related to any promoter” referred 
to in sub-clause (ii): 
a.  If the promoter is a listed entity, its directors other than the independent 
directors, its employees or its nominees shall be deemed to be related to it; 
b.  If the promoter is an unlisted entity, its directors, its employees or its 
nominees shall be deemed to be related to it.” 
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iv. For the purpose of the sub-clause (ii), the expression ‘independent director’ shall 
mean a non-executive director of the company who:  
a. apart from receiving director’s remuneration, does not have any material 
pecuniary relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters, its 
directors, its senior management or its holding company, its subsidiaries and 
associates which may affect independence of the director;  
b. is not related to promoters or persons occupying management positions at 
the board level or at one level below the board;  
c. has not been an executive of the company in the immediately preceding 
three financial years;  
d. is not a partner or an executive or was not partner or an executive during the 
preceding three years, of any of the following:  
i. the statutory audit firm or the internal audit firm that is associated with 
the company, and  
ii. the legal firm(s) and consulting firm(s) that have a material 
association with the company.  
e. is not a material supplier, service provider or customer or a lessor or lessee 
of the company, which may affect independence of the director;  
f. is not a substantial shareholder of the company i.e. owning two percent or 
more of the block of voting shares. 
g. is not less than 21 years of age 
Explanation  
For the purposes of the sub-clause (iii):  
a. Associate shall mean a company which is an “associate” as defined in 
Accounting Standard (AS) 23, “Accounting for Investments in Associates in 
Consolidated Financial Statements”, issued by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India.  
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b. “Senior management” shall mean personnel of the company who are 
members of its core management team excluding Board of Directors. 
Normally, this would comprise all members of management one level below 
the executive directors, including all functional heads. 
c. “Relative” shall mean “relative” as defined in section 2(41) and section 6 
read with Schedule IA of the Companies Act, 1956.  
d. Nominee directors appointed by an institution which has invested in or lent 
to the company shall be deemed to be independent directors. 
Explanation: 
“Institution’ for this purpose means a public financial institution as defined in Section 
4A of the Companies Act, 1956 or a “corresponding new bank” as defined in section 
2(d) of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 
or the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 
[both Acts].”  
(B) Non executive directors’ compensation and disclosures 
All fees/compensation, if any paid to non-executive directors, including independent 
directors, shall be fixed by the Board of Directors and shall require previous approval of 
shareholders in general meeting. The shareholders’ resolution shall specify the limits for the 
maximum number of stock options that can be granted to non-executive directors, including 
independent directors, in any financial year and in aggregate. 
Provided that the requirement of obtaining prior approval of shareholders in general meeting 
shall not apply to payment of sitting fees to non-executive directors, if made within the limits 
prescribed under the Companies Act, 1956 for payment of sitting fees without approval of the 
Central Government. 
(C) Other provisions as to Board and Committees 
i. The board shall meet at least four times a year, with a maximum time gap of four 
months between any two meetings. The minimum information to be made 
available to the board is given in Annexure– I A.  
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ii. A director shall not be a member in more than 10 committees or act as Chairman 
of more than five committees across all companies in which he is a director. 
Furthermore it should be a mandatory annual requirement for every director to 
inform the company about the committee positions he occupies in other 
companies and notify changes as and when they take place. 
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Explanation: 
1. For the purpose of considering the limit of the committees on which a 
director can serve, all public limited companies, whether listed or not, shall 
be included and all other companies including private limited companies, 
foreign companies and companies under Section 25 of the Companies Act 
shall be excluded.  
2. For the purpose of reckoning the limit under this sub-clause, 
Chairmanship/membership of the Audit Committee and the Shareholders’ 
Grievance Committee alone shall be considered. 
iii. The Board shall periodically review compliance reports of all laws applicable to 
the company, prepared by the company as well as steps taken by the company to 
rectify instances of non-compliances. 
iv. An  independent director who resigns or is removed from the Board of the 
Company shall be replaced by a new independent director within a period of not 
more than 180 days from the day of such resignation or removal, as the case may 
be: 
 Provided that where the company fulfils the requirement of independent directors 
in its Board even without filling the vacancy created by such resignation or 
removal, as the case may be, the requirement of replacement by a new 
independent director within the period of 180 days shall not apply 
(D) Code of Conduct 
i. The Board shall lay down a code of conduct for all Board members and senior 
management of the company. The code of conduct shall be posted on the website 
of the company.  
ii. All Board members and senior management personnel shall affirm compliance 
with the code on an annual basis. The Annual Report of the company shall contain 
a declaration to this effect signed by the CEO. 
 Explanation: For this purpose, the term “senior management” shall mean 
personnel of the company who are members of its core management team 
excluding Board of Directors. Normally, this would comprise all members of 
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management one level below the executive directors, including all functional 
heads. 
II. Audit Committee 
(A) Qualified and Independent Audit Committee 
A qualified and independent audit committee shall be set up, giving the terms of 
reference subject to the following: 
i. The audit committee shall have minimum three directors as members. Two-thirds 
of the members of audit committee shall be independent directors.  
ii. All members of audit committee shall be financially literate and at least one 
member shall have accounting or related financial management expertise. 
 Explanation 1: The term “financially literate” means the ability to read and 
understand basic financial statements i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account, 
and statement of cash flows.  
 Explanation 2: A member will be considered to have accounting or related 
financial management expertise if he or she possesses experience in finance or 
accounting, or requisite professional certification in accounting, or any other 
comparable experience or background which results in the individual’s financial 
sophistication, including being or having been a chief executive officer, chief 
financial officer or other senior officer with financial oversight responsibilities. 
iii. The Chairman of the Audit Committee shall be an independent director; 
iv. The Chairman of the Audit Committee shall be present at Annual General 
Meeting to answer shareholder queries; 
v. The audit committee may invite such of the executives, as it considers appropriate 
(and particularly the head of the finance function) to be present at the meetings of 
the committee, but on occasions it may also meet without the presence of any 
executives of the company. The finance director, head of internal audit and a 
representative of the statutory auditor may be present as invitees for the meetings 
of the audit committee; 
 256 
 
vi. The Company Secretary shall act as the secretary to the committee. 
(B) Meeting of Audit Committee 
The audit committee should meet at least four times in a year and not more than four months 
shall elapse between two meetings. The quorum shall be either two members or one third of 
the members of the audit committee whichever is greater, but there should be a minimum of 
two independent members present. 
(C) Powers of Audit Committee 
The audit committee shall have powers, which should include the following: 
1. To investigate any activity within its terms of reference. 
2. To seek information from any employee. 
3. To obtain outside legal or other professional advice. 
4. To secure attendance of outsiders with relevant expertise, if it considers necessary. 
(D) Role of Audit Committee 
The role of the audit committee shall include the following: 
1. Oversight of the company’s financial reporting process and the disclosure of its 
financial information to ensure that the financial statement is correct, sufficient 
and credible.  
2. Recommending to the Board, the appointment, re-appointment and, if required, 
the replacement or removal of the statutory auditor and the fixation of audit fees.  
3. Approval of payment to statutory auditors for any other services rendered by the 
statutory auditors.  
4. Reviewing, with the management, the annual financial statements before 
submission to the board for approval, with particular reference to:  
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a. Matters required to be included in the Director’s Responsibility Statement to 
be included in the Board’s report in terms of clause (2AA) of section 217 of 
the Companies Act, 1956  
b. Changes, if any, in accounting policies and practices and reasons for the 
same  
c. Major accounting entries involving estimates based on the exercise of 
judgment by management  
d. Significant adjustments made in the financial statements arising out of audit 
findings  
e. Compliance with listing and other legal requirements relating to financial 
statements  
f. Disclosure of any related party transactions  
g. Qualifications in the draft audit report.  
5. Reviewing, with the management, the quarterly financial statements before 
submission to the board for approval  
 5A. Reviewing, with the management, the statement of uses / application of funds 
raised through an issue (public issue, rights issue, preferential issue, etc.), the 
statement of funds utilized for purposes other than those stated in the offer 
document/prospectus/notice and the report submitted by the monitoring agency 
monitoring the utilisation of proceeds of a public or rights issue, and making 
appropriate recommendations to the Board to take up steps in this matter. 
6. Reviewing, with the management, performance of statutory and internal auditors, 
adequacy of the internal control systems.  
7. Reviewing the adequacy of internal audit function, if any, including the structure 
of the internal audit department, staffing and seniority of the official heading the 
department, reporting structure coverage and frequency of internal audit.  
8. Discussion with internal auditors any significant findings and follow up there on. 
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9. Reviewing the findings of any internal investigations by the internal auditors into 
matters where there is suspected fraud or irregularity or a failure of internal 
control systems of a material nature and reporting the matter to the board. 
10. Discussion with statutory auditors before the audit commences, about the nature 
and scope of audit as well as post-audit discussion to ascertain any area of 
concern.  
11. To look into the reasons for substantial defaults in the payment to the depositors, 
debenture holders, shareholders (in case of non payment of declared dividends) 
and creditors.  
12. To review the functioning of the Whistle Blower mechanism, in case the same is 
existing.  
13. Carrying out any other function as is mentioned in the terms of reference of the 
Audit Committee. 
 Explanation (i): The term "related party transactions" shall have the same meaning 
as contained in the Accounting Standard 18, Related Party Transactions, issued by 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. 
 Explanation (ii): If the company has set up an audit committee pursuant to 
provision of the Companies Act, the said audit committee shall have such 
additional functions / features as is contained in this clause. 
(E) Review of information by Audit Committee 
The Audit Committee shall mandatorily review the following information: 
1. Management discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of 
operations;  
2. Statement of significant related party transactions (as defined by the audit 
committee), submitted by management;  
3. Management letters / letters of internal control weaknesses issued by the statutory 
auditors; 
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4. Internal audit reports relating to internal control weaknesses; and  
5. The appointment, removal and terms of remuneration of the Chief internal auditor 
shall be subject to review by the Audit Committee 
III. Subsidiary Companies 
i. At least one independent director on the Board of Directors of the holding company shall be 
a director on the Board of Directors of a material non listed Indian subsidiary company.  
ii. The Audit Committee of the listed holding company shall also review the financial 
statements, in particular, the investments made by the unlisted subsidiary company.  
iii. The minutes of the Board meetings of the unlisted subsidiary company shall be placed at the 
Board meeting of the listed holding company. The management should periodically bring to 
the attention of the Board of Directors of the listed holding company, a statement of all 
significant transactions and arrangements entered into by the unlisted subsidiary company. 
Explanation 1: The term “material non-listed Indian subsidiary” shall mean an unlisted 
subsidiary, incorporated in India, whose turnover or net worth (i.e. paid up capital and free 
reserves) exceeds 20% of the consolidated turnover or net worth respectively, of the listed 
holding company and its subsidiaries in the immediately preceding accounting year. 
Explanation 2: The term “significant transaction or arrangement” shall mean any individual 
transaction or arrangement that exceeds or is likely to exceed 10% of the total revenues or 
total expenses or total assets or total liabilities, as the case may be, of the material unlisted 
subsidiary for the immediately preceding accounting year. 
Explanation 3: Where a listed holding company has a listed subsidiary which is itself a 
holding company, the above provisions shall apply to the listed subsidiary insofar as its 
subsidiaries are concerned. 
IV. Disclosures 
(A) Basis of related party transactions 
i. A statement in summary form of transactions with related parties in the ordinary 
course of business shall be placed periodically before the audit committee.  
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ii. Details of material individual transactions with related parties which are not in the 
normal course of business shall be placed before the audit committee.  
iii. Details of material individual transactions with related parties or others, which are 
not on an arm’s length basis should be placed before the audit committee, together 
with Management’s justification for the same.. 
 (B) Disclosure of Accounting Treatment 
Where in the preparation of financial statements, a treatment different from that 
prescribed in an Accounting Standard has been followed, the fact shall be disclosed in 
the financial statements, together with the management’s explanation as to why it 
believes such alternative treatment is more representative of the true and fair view of the 
underlying business transaction in the Corporate Governance Report. 
(C) Board Disclosures – Risk management 
The company shall lay down procedures to inform Board members about the risk 
assessment and minimization procedures. These procedures shall be periodically 
reviewed to ensure that executive management controls risk through means of a 
properly defined framework. 
(D) Proceeds from public issues, rights issues, preferential issues etc. 
When money is raised through an issue (public issues, rights issues, preferential issues 
etc.), it shall disclose to the Audit Committee, the uses / applications of funds by major 
category (capital expenditure, sales and marketing, working capital, etc), on a quarterly 
basis as a part of their quarterly declaration of financial results. Further, on an annual 
basis, the company shall prepare a statement of funds utilized for purposes other than 
those stated in the offer document/prospectus/notice and place it before the audit 
committee. Such disclosure shall be made only till such time that the full money raised 
through the issue has been fully spent. This statement shall be certified by the statutory 
auditors of the company. Furthermore, where the company has appointed a monitoring 
agency to monitor the utilisation of proceeds of a public or rights issue, it shall place 
before the Audit Committee the monitoring report of such agency, upon receipt, without 
any delay. The audit committee shall make appropriate recommendations to the Board 
to take up steps in this matter. 
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(E) Remuneration of Directors 
i. All pecuniary relationship or transactions of the non-executive directors vis-à-vis 
the company shall be disclosed in the Annual Report.  
ii. Further the following disclosures on the remuneration of directors shall be made 
in the section on the corporate governance of the Annual Report:  
a. All elements of remuneration package of individual directors summarized 
under major groups, such as salary, benefits, bonuses, stock options, pension 
etc.  
b. Details of fixed component and performance linked incentives, along with 
the performance criteria.  
c. Service contracts, notice period, severance fees.  
d. Stock option details, if any – and whether issued at a discount as well as the 
period over which accrued and over which exercisable.  
iii. The company shall publish its criteria of making payments to non-executive 
directors in its annual report. Alternatively, this may be put up on the company’s 
website and reference drawn thereto in the annual report.  
iv. The company shall disclose the number of shares and convertible instruments held 
by non-executive directors in the annual report.  
v. Non-executive directors shall be required to disclose their shareholding (both own 
or held by / for other persons on a beneficial basis) in the listed company in which 
they are proposed to be appointed as directors, prior to their appointment. These 
details should be disclosed in the notice to the general meeting called for 
appointment of such director 
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(F) Management 
i. As part of the directors’ report or as an addition thereto, a Management 
Discussion and Analysis report should form part of the Annual Report to the 
shareholders. This Management Discussion & Analysis should include discussion 
on the following matters within the limits set by the company’s competitive 
position: 
1. Industry structure and developments. 
2. Opportunities and Threats. 
3. Segment–wise or product-wise performance. 
4. Outlook 
5. Risks and concerns. 
6. Internal control systems and their adequacy. 
7. Discussion on financial performance with respect to operational 
performance. 
8. Material developments in Human Resources / Industrial Relations front, 
including number of people employed.  
ii. Senior management shall make disclosures to the board relating to all material 
financial and commercial transactions, where they have personal interest, that may 
have a potential conflict with the interest of the company at large (for e.g. dealing 
in company shares, commercial dealings with bodies, which have shareholding of 
management and their relatives etc.) 
 Explanation: For this purpose, the term "senior management" shall mean 
personnel of the company who are members of its. core management team 
excluding the Board of Directors). This would also include all members of 
management one level below the executive directors including all functional 
heads. 
  
 263 
 
(G) Shareholders 
i. In case of the appointment of a new director or re-appointment of a director the 
shareholders must be provided with the following information: 
a. A brief resume of the director; 
b. Nature of his expertise in specific functional areas; 
c. Names of companies in which the person also holds the directorship and the 
membership of Committees of the Board; and 
d. Shareholding of non-executive directors as stated in Clause 49 (IV) (E) (v) 
above  
i.  Disclosure of relationships between directors inter-se shall be made in 
the Annual    Report, notice of appointment of a director, prospectus 
and letter of offer for issuances and any related filings made to the 
stock exchanges where the company is listed. 
ii. Quarterly results and presentations made by the company to analysts 
shall be put on company’s web-site, or shall be sent in such a form so 
as to enable the stock exchange on which the company is listed to put 
it on its own web-site.  
iii. A board committee under the chairmanship of a non-executive 
director shall be formed to specifically look into the redressal of 
shareholder and investors complaints like transfer of shares, non-
receipt of balance sheet, non-receipt of declared dividends etc. This 
Committee shall be designated as ‘Shareholders/Investors Grievance 
Committee’. 
iv. To expedite the process of share transfers, the Board of the company 
shall delegate the power of share transfer to an officer or a committee 
or to the registrar and share transfer agents. The delegated authority 
shall attend to share transfer formalities at least once in a fortnight. 
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V. CEO/CFO certification 
The CEO, i.e. the Managing Director or Manager appointed in terms of the Companies Act, 
1956 and the CFO i.e. the whole-time Finance Director or any other person heading the 
finance function discharging that function shall certify to the Board that:  
a. They have reviewed financial statements and the cash flow statement for the  year 
and that to the best of their knowledge and belief : 
i. these statements do not contain any materially untrue statement or omit any 
material fact or contain statements that might be misleading; 
ii. these statements together present a true and fair view of the company’s 
affairs and are in compliance with existing accounting standards, applicable 
laws and regulations.  
b. There are, to the best of their knowledge and belief, no transactions entered into 
by the company during the year which are fraudulent, illegal or violative of the 
company’s code of conduct.  
c. They accept responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls for 
financial reporting and that they have evaluated the effectiveness of internal 
control systems of the company pertaining to financial reporting and they have 
disclosed to the auditors and the Audit Committee, deficiencies in the design or 
operation of such internal controls, if any, of which they are aware and the steps 
they have taken or propose to take to rectify these deficiencies. 
d. They have indicated to the auditors and the Audit committee  
i. significant changes in internal control over financial reporting during the 
year; 
ii. significant changes in accounting policies during the year and that the same 
have been disclosed in the notes to the financial statements; and  
iii. instances of significant fraud of which they have become aware and the 
involvement therein, if any, of the management or an employee having a 
significant role in the company’s internal control system over financial 
reporting. 
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VI. Report on Corporate Governance 
i. There shall be a separate section on Corporate Governance in the Annual Reports 
of company, with a detailed compliance report on Corporate Governance. Non-
compliance of any mandatory requirement of this clause with reasons thereof and 
the extent to which the non-mandatory requirements have been adopted should be 
specifically highlighted. The suggested list of items to be included in this report is 
given in Annexure- I C and list of non-mandatory requirements is given in 
Annexure – I D.  
ii. The companies shall submit a quarterly compliance report to the stock exchanges 
within 15 days from the close of quarter as per the format given in Annexure I B. 
The report shall be signed either by the Compliance Officer or the Chief 
Executive Officer of the company 
VII. Compliance 
1. The company shall obtain a certificate from either the auditors or practicing 
company secretaries regarding compliance of conditions of corporate governance 
as stipulated in this clause and annex the certificate with the directors’ report, 
which is sent annually to all the shareholders of the company. The same certificate 
shall also be sent to the Stock Exchanges along with the annual report filed by the 
company.  
2. The non-mandatory requirements given in Annexure – I D may be implemented 
as per the discretion of the company. However, the disclosures of the compliance 
with mandatory requirements and adoption (and compliance) / non-adoption of 
the non-mandatory requirements shall be made in the section on corporate 
governance of the Annual Report.  
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Annexure I A 
Information to be placed before Board of Directors 
1. Annual operating plans and budgets and any updates.  
2. Capital budgets and any updates.  
3. Quarterly results for the company and its operating divisions or business segments.  
4. Minutes of meetings of audit committee and other committees of the board.  
5. The information on recruitment and remuneration of senior officers just below the board 
level, including appointment or removal of Chief Financial Officer and the Company 
Secretary.  
6. Show cause, demand, prosecution notices and penalty notices which are materially 
important  
7. Fatal or serious accidents, dangerous occurrences, any material effluent or pollution 
problems.  
8. Any material default in financial obligations to and by the company, or substantial 
nonpayment for goods sold by the company.  
9. Any issue, which involves possible public or product liability claims of substantial nature, 
including any judgement or order which, may have passed strictures on the conduct of the 
company or taken an adverse view regarding another enterprise that can have negative 
implications on the company.  
10. Details of any joint venture or collaboration agreement.  
11. Transactions that involve substantial payment towards goodwill, brand equity, or 
intellectual property.  
12. Significant labour problems and their proposed solutions. Any significant development in 
Human Resources/ Industrial Relations front like signing of wage agreement, 
implementation of Voluntary Retirement Scheme etc.  
13. Sale of material nature, of investments, subsidiaries, assets, which is not in normal course 
of business.  
14. Quarterly details of foreign exchange exposures and the steps taken by management to 
limit the risks of adverse exchange rate movement, if material.  
15. Non-compliance of any regulatory, statutory or listing requirements and shareholders 
service such as non-payment of dividend, delay in share transfer etc.  
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Annexure I B 
 
Format of Quarterly Compliance Report on Corporate Governance 
 
 
Name of the Company: 
 
Quarter ending on: 
 
Particulars 
Clause of 
Listing 
agreement 
Compliance 
Status 
Yes/No 
Remarks 
I. Board of Directors 491   
(A) Composition of Board 49 (IA)   
(B) Non-executive  Directors’  compensation  
& disclosures 
49 (IB)   
(C) Other provisions as to Board and 
Committees 
49 (IC)   
(D) Code of Conduct 49 (ID)   
II. Audit Committee 49 (II)   
(A) Qualified & Independent Audit Committee 49 (IIA)   
(B) Meeting of Audit Committee 49 (IIB)   
(C) Powers of Audit Committee 49 (IIC)   
(D) Role of Audit Committee 49 II(D)   
(E) Review of Information by Audit 
Committee 
49 (IIE)   
III. Subsidiary Companies 49 (III)   
IV. Disclosures 49 (IV)   
(A) Basis of related party transactions 49 (IV A)   
(B) Disclosure of Accounting Treatment 49 (IV B)   
(C) Board Disclosures 49 (IV C)   
(D) Proceeds from public issues, rights issues, 
preferential issues etc. 
49 (IV D)   
(E) Remuneration of Directors 49 (IV E)   
(F) Management 49 (IV F)   
(G) Shareholders 49 (IV G)   
V. CEO/CFO Certification 49 (V)   
VI. Report on Corporate Governance 49 (VI)   
VII. Compliance 49 (VII)   
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Note: 
1. The details under each head shall be provided to incorporate all the information required 
as per the provisions of the Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement.  
2. In the column No.3, compliance or non-compliance may be indicated by Yes/No/N.A.. 
For example, if the Board has been composed in accordance with the Clause 49 I of the 
Listing Agreement, "Yes" may be indicated. Similarly, in case the company has no related 
party transactions, the words “N.A.” may be indicated against 49 (IV A)  
3. In the remarks column, reasons for non-compliance may be indicated, for example, in case 
of requirement related to circulation of information to the shareholders, which would be 
done only in the AGM/EGM, it might be indicated in the "Remarks" column as – “will be 
complied with at the AGM”. Similarly, in respect of matters which can be complied with 
only where the situation arises, for example, "Report on Corporate Governance" is to be a 
part of Annual Report only, the words "will be complied in the next Annual Report" may 
be indicated. 
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Annexure I C 
Suggested List of Items to Be Included In the Report on Corporate Governance in the 
Annual Report of Companies 
 
1. A brief statement on company’s philosophy on code of governance.  
 
2. Board of Directors:  
a. Composition and category of directors, for example, promoter, executive, 
nonexecutive, independent non-executive, nominee director, which institution 
represented as lender or as equity investor.  
b. Attendance of each director at the Board meetings and the last AGM.  
c. Number of other Boards or Board Committees in which he/she is a member or 
Chairperson. 
d. Number of Board meetings held, dates on which held. 
 
3. Audit Committee:  
i. Brief description of terms of reference  
ii. Composition, name of members and Chairperson  
iii. Meetings and attendance during the year  
 
4. Remuneration Committee:  
i. Brief description of terms of reference  
ii. Composition, name of members and Chairperson  
iii. Attendance during the year  
iv. Remuneration policy  
v. Details of remuneration to all the directors, as per format in main report.  
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5. Shareholders Committee:  
i. Name of non-executive director heading the committee  
ii. Name and designation of compliance officer  
iii. Number of shareholders’ complaints received so far  
iv. Number not solved to the satisfaction of shareholders  
v. Number of pending complaints  
 
6. General Body meetings:  
i. Location and time, where last three AGMs held.  
ii. Whether any special resolutions passed in the previous 3 AGMs  
iii. Whether any special resolution passed last year through postal ballot –  details of 
voting pattern  
iv.  Person who conducted the postal ballot exercise  
v. Whether any special resolution is proposed to be conducted through postal ballot  
vi. Procedure for postal ballot  
 
7. Disclosures:  
i. Disclosures on materially significant related party transactions that may have 
potential conflict with the interests of company at large.  
ii. Details of non-compliance by the company, penalties, strictures imposed on the 
company by Stock Exchange or SEBI or any statutory authority, on any matter 
related to capital markets, during the last three years.  
iii. Whistle Blower policy and affirmation that no personnel has been denied access 
to the audit committee.  
iv. Details of compliance with mandatory requirements and adoption of the 
nonmandatory requirements of this clause  
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8. Means of communication.  
i. Quarterly results  
ii. Newspapers wherein results normally published  
iii. Any website, where displayed  
iv. Whether it also displays official news releases; and  
v. The presentations made to institutional investors or to the analysts.  
 
9. General Shareholder information:  
i. AGM : Date, time and venue  
ii. Financial year  
iii. Date of Book closure  
iv. Dividend Payment Date  
v. Listing on Stock Exchanges  
vi. Stock Code  
vii. Market Price Data : High., Low during each month in last financial year  
viii. Performance in comparison to broad-based indices such as BSE Sensex, CRISIL 
index etc.  
ix. Registrar and Transfer Agents  
x. Share Transfer System  
xi. Distribution of shareholding  
xii. Dematerialization of shares and liquidity  
xiii. Outstanding GDRs/ADRs/Warrants or any Convertible instruments,  conversion 
date and likely impact on equity  
xiv. Plant Locations  
xv. Address for correspondence 
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Annexure I D 
Non-Mandatory Requirements 
1. The Board 
The Board - A non-executive Chairman may be entitled to maintain a Chairman's 
office at the company's expense and also allowed reimbursement of expenses 
incurred in performance of his duties. Independent Directors may have a tenure 
not exceeding, in the aggregate, a period of nine years, on the Board of a 
company. The company may ensure that the person who is being appointed as an 
independent director has the requisite qualifications and experience which would 
be of use to the company and which, in the opinion of the company, would enable 
him to contribute effectively to the company in his capacity as an independent 
director." 
2. Remuneration Committee 
i. The board may set up a remuneration committee to determine on their 
behalf and on behalf of the shareholders with agreed terms of reference, the 
company’s policy on specific remuneration packages for executive directors 
including pension rights and any compensation payment.  
ii. To avoid conflicts of interest, the remuneration committee, which would 
determine the remuneration packages of the executive directors may 
comprise of at least three directors, all of whom should be non-executive 
directors, the Chairman of committee being an independent director.  
iii. All the members of the remuneration committee could be present at the 
meeting.  
iv. The Chairman of the remuneration committee could be present at the 
Annual General Meeting, to answer the shareholder queries. However, it 
would be up to the Chairman to decide who should answer the queries. 
3.    Shareholder Rights 
A half-yearly declaration of financial performance including summary of the 
significant events in last six-months, may be sent to each household of 
shareholders.  
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4.  Audit qualifications 
Company may move towards a regime of unqualified financial statements. 
5.    Training of Board Members 
A company may train its Board members in the business model of the company as 
well as the risk profile of the business parameters of the company, their 
responsibilities as directors, and the best ways to discharge them. 
6.    Mechanism for evaluating non-executive Board Members 
The performance evaluation of non-executive directors could be done by a peer 
group comprising the entire Board of Directors, excluding the director being 
evaluated; and Peer Group evaluation could be the mechanism to determine 
whether to extend / continue the terms of appointment of non-executive directors. 
7.    Whistle Blower Policy 
The company may establish a mechanism for employees to report to the 
management concerns about unethical behaviour, actual or suspected fraud or 
violation of the company’s code of conduct or ethics policy. This mechanism 
could also provide for adequate safeguards against victimization of employees 
who avail of the mechanism and also provide for direct access to the Chairman of 
the Audit committee in exceptional cases. Once established, the existence of the 
mechanism may be appropriately communicated within the organization. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
A Report on the Karmayog Corporate Social Responsibility of the 1000 Largest Indian 
Companies, March 2009 
In a democracy like India's, sustainable solutions to society's problems can only be found 
though the collaboration and involvement of all stakeholders. Karmayog, established in 2004, 
is a unique organization that connects citizens, civil society groups, corporates, 
academicians, media and government through online and offline methods. Visit us on 
www.karmayog.org 
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Karmayog Corporate Social Responsibility Ratings 
of the 1000 largest Indian companies - 2008 
www.karmayog.org/csr2008 
 
Why a Rating on Corporate Social Responsibility? 
 
The problems and issues that confront society today are too large and complex to be solved by 
government and NGOs alone. Sustainable solutions to society’s problems can only be found 
through the collaboration and involvement of all who are part of it.  
Companies have tremendous strengths; they have extremely capable people, technology, 
access to money, the ability of geographical reach, etc. Many companies worldwide and now 
even in India are more powerful than governments and even countries, and thus corporates are 
important stakeholders in society. 
The Karmayog Corporate Social Responsibility Study and Ratings of Indian Companies was 
undertaken to explore and understand the role that corporates are playing and can play in 
finding meaningful solutions to the problems facing India today.  
CSR Ratings are important to various stakeholders for different reasons:- government bodies 
can use CSR Ratings to develop industry-wise CSR guidelines, industry associations can use 
them to set benchmarks of CSR for companies to follow, NGOs get to know about the CSR 
undertaken by companies, thus enabling partnerships with them, and companies themselves 
learn about and from the CSR initiatives of other companies.  
Usually corporates are invited to enter or nominate themselves for CSR awards, and hence 
only the good companies are highlighted, whereas a rating enables a comparative study across 
all companies. Karmayog undertook a CSR study and rating to understand the CSR activities 
of all companies on an equal level, thus showing up companies doing no CSR, as well as 
showcasing companies doing good work.  
The Karmayog CSR Ratings also help to identify areas where corporates, government and 
civil society organizations can work together. 
This is the second CSR study and ratings undertaken by Karmayog, the first of which was 
done in 2007.  
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Bar chart showing the results of the 
Karmayog CSR Ratings of the 1000 largest Indian companies, 2008 
 
Rating Criteria  
 
A) Minimum Necessary Criteria  
 
Necessary parameters that make a company eligible for a particular rating level: 
 
Necessary Criteria Explanation Rating 
Level 
If undertaking any CSR Activity Where any kind of social, developmental or 
community work is done 
Level 1 
If CSR is linked to reducing the 
negative impacts of company’s own 
products or processes 
CSR activities that aim to improve 
processes and products of the company.  
Level 2 
If CSR initiatives are for the local 
community 
CSR activities that are focused on those 
who are affected directly by the company 
Level 3 
If CSR is embedded in the business 
operations 
CSR activities form a part of the daily 
business activities of the company. 
Level 4 
If innovative ideas and practices are 
developed for CSR 
CSR activities enable sustainable and 
replicable solutions to problems faced by 
society.  
Level 5 
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B) Sufficient Criteria for Minimum Rating 
 
If the company is doing this, they automatically get this rating at least. 
 
Sufficient Criteria What this means Rating 
Level 
Company fulfilling the basic needs 
of society 
e.g. manufacture of food  
The products and services of the company 
are useful and benefits society 
Level 1 
Unique CSR activity which would 
not otherwise happen 
e.g. Developing a mapping and 
tracking software for adoption in 
India 
The CSR activity being undertaken by the 
company is not being done by government, 
NGOs, etc.  
Level 1 
Company reducing negative impact 
of others 
e.g. A company that makes water 
purification & waste recycling 
systems  
The company’s products or services provide 
solutions to mitigate harm caused by actions 
of companies, their products, etc.  
Level 1 
Company adopting the GRI 
Framework for CSR reporting 
The company is committed to measuring 
and reporting its CSR initiatives as per a 
voluntary globally accepted framework.   
Level 2 
Company’s annual expenditure on 
CSR = 0.2% of sales 
 
The company is committed to a minimum 
expenditure on CSR annually, and thus 
considers CSR as an integral part of its 
business 
Level 3 
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C) Negative Criteria that usually determine the maximum possible Rating 
 
Companies in this category will not normally get a higher rating than the one shown 
 
Negative Criteria Reason Rating 
Level 
Companies that make liquor, 
tobacco, genetically modified crops 
 
These products are not needed by society, 
and cause harm to people and the 
environment. The CSR to do is to stop 
making these products. 
Level 0 
Companies that violate 
laws/rules/regulations 
CSR is not limited just to how a company 
spends its money, but also to how it makes 
that money in the first place 
Level 1 
Companies engaged in high impact 
processes 
 
Processes that severely damage the 
environment require extraordinary efforts 
by the company to reduce and repair the 
damage, and require greater contributions 
to benefit society 
Level 1 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
TESTS FOR CHECKING RELIABILITY OF KARMAYOGA RATINGS 
1-  Correlation between Asian Sustainability Ratings and Karmayog 
Ratings 
  KARMA ASR 
KARMA Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 17  
ASR Pearson Correlation .684** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002  
N 17 17 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
2-  Correlation between SPESG and Karmayog Ratings 
  SPESG KARMA 
SPESG Pearson Correlation 1 .614 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .079 
N 9 9 
KARMA Pearson Correlation .614 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .079  
N 9 9 
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3-  Correlation between  Karmayoga Ratings and Donations provided by 
the companies for charity 
  KARMA DONATION 
KARMA Pearson Correlation 1  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 300  
DONATION Pearson Correlation .182** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002  
N 299 299 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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